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Abstract 
The central concern of this study is to identify the role of power and politics in 
systems implementation. The current literature on systems implementation is 
typically divided into two areas, process modelling and factor based studies. Process 
modelling classifies the implementation into a linear process, whereas factor based 
studies have argued that in order to “successfully” implement a system, particular 
critical factors are required. This literature misses the complexities involved in 
systems implementation through the human factors and political nature of systems 
implementation and is simplistic in its nature and essentially de-contextualises the 
implementation process.  
 
Literature has investigated some aspects of human factors in systems 
implementation. However, it is believed that these studies have taken a simplistic 
view of power and politics. It is argued in this thesis that human factors in systems 
implementation are constantly changing and essentially operating in a dynamic 
relationship affecting the implementation process. The concept of power relations, as 
proposed by Foucault (1976, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1982), have been utilised in order to 
identify the dynamic nature of power and politics. Foucault (1978) argued that power 
is a dynamic set of relationships constantly changing from one point in time to the 
next. It is this recognition that is lacking from information systems. Furthermore, 
these power relations are created through the use of discourse. Discourse represents 
meaning and social relationships, forming both subjectivity and power relations. 
Discourses are also the practices of talk, text and argument that continuously form 
that which actors speak.  
 
A post-structuralist view of power as both an obvious and hidden concept has 
provided the researcher a lens through which the selection and implementation of an 
enterprise-wide learning management system can be observed. The framework aimed 
to identify the obvious process of system selection implementation, and then 
deconstruct that process to expose the hegemonic nature of policy, the reproduction 
of organisational culture, the emancipation within discourse, and the nature of 
resistance and power relations. A critical case study of the selection and 
implementation of an enterprise-wide learning management system at the University 
of Australia was presented providing an in-depth investigation of the implementation 
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of an enterprise-wide learning management system, spanning five years. This critical 
case study was analysed using social dramas to distinguish between the front stage 
issues of power and the hidden discourses underpinning the front stage dramas. The 
enterprise-wide learning management system implemented in the University of 
Australia in 2003 is a system which enables academic staff to manage learners, the 
students, by keeping track of their progress and performance across all types of 
training activities. 
 
Through telling the story of the selection and implementation of an enterprise-wide 
learning management system at the University of Australia discourses emerged. The 
key findings from this study have indicated that the system selection and 
implementation works at two levels. The low level is the selection and 
implementation process, which operates for the period of the project. The high level 
is the arena of power and politics, which runs simultaneously to the selection and 
implementation process. Challenges for power are acted out in the front stage, or 
public forums between various actors. The social dramas, as they have been 
described here, are superfluous to the discourse underpinning the front stage. It is the 
discourse that remains the same throughout the system selection and implementation 
process, but it is through various social dramas that reflect those discourses. 
Furthermore, the enactment of policy legitimises power and establishes the 
discourse, limiting resistance. Additionally, this research has identified the role of the 
“State” and its influence at the organisational level, which had been previously 
suggested in education literature (Ball, 1990). 
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Chapter One – Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis is a study of the selection and implementation of an enterprise-wide 
learning management system at the University of Australia1. The enterprise-wide 
learning management system, implemented in the University of Australia in 2003, is 
a system which enables academic staff to manage learners, the students, by keeping 
track of their progress and performance across all types of training activities. The 
learning management system allows staff to create learning resources, deliver 
content, monitor student participation and assess student performance. The focus of 
the study is on the social issues involved in systems selection and implementation, 
rather than on the system implementation process itself. The technical aspect of 
systems selection and implementation refers to the tools, methodologies, procedures 
and techniques utilised to implement a system, whereas the social aspect of systems 
selection and implementation refers to the human factors involved, such as the 
political environment. Describing the social factors involved in systems selection and 
implementation will help provide richness to an understanding of what contributes to 
either a successful or flawed implementation process. 
 
1.2 Systems Selection and Implementation 
The failure of an information system in an organisation can have a crippling effect on 
the organisation itself, the members of that organisation and the reputation of that 
organisation. In other words, if a system is not successfully implemented, the 
company could lose potential profit. For example, RMIT, a University in Victoria, 
Australia, mismanaged the implementation of the Academic Management System, 
resulting in students not being able to arrange enrolments, invoices, subject changes 
and timetables (Royall, 2002). Subsequently, the system was abandoned and 
members of the senior management and project team were fired. 
 
Stories of failed systems occur regularly in the media, which damage the credibility 
of organisations and turn potential customers away. The costs of systems failure 
vary. Typically they include firstly, economic costs, such as investments in 
                                                 
1 Full details of this case study can be found in Chapter 4.2 
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equipment and labour. Secondly, there are costs of missed opportunities, where a 
system fails to deliver on benefits promised. Finally, there are costs incurred in terms 
of client service or risks to the community (Sauer, 1993). In the case of the failed 
implementation at RMIT, the users of the system, students were unhappy with the 
system and called for the resignation of the Chancellor of the University, followed by 
the Vice-Chancellor (Royall, 2002). People become wary of information systems. 
This is partly attributable to the media as they would have us believe that information 
systems are constantly failing.  
 
There are many other stories of failed systems implementation that have also had 
significant consequences. Neumann (1993, p. 146) highlights fourteen different cases 
of failed systems implementation. Examples include: 
· A new child support checking system in Virginia, USA, which experienced 
massive delays, confusion, lost checks, delayed payments, and improper 
seizure of tax refunds. Operations costs were expected to be triple the original 
estimates; 
· The Bank of America spent US$23 million on an initial 5-year development 
of MasterNet, a new computerized trust accounting and reporting system. 
After abandoning the old system, they spent US$60 million more trying to 
make the new system work, and finally gave up. Departed customer accounts 
may have exceeded billions of dollars;  
· Oklahoma hired a major accounting firm in 1983 to design a US$.5 million 
system to handle its workers' compensation claims. Two years and more than 
$2M later, the system still didn't work. It was finally finished in 1987 for 
nearly US$4 million; & 
· The software for the modernisation of a satellite tracking control facility in 
the United States was about seven years behind schedule, about US$300 
million over budget, and provided less capability than required. 
 
It is therefore important to implement successfully a system and ensure that it is 
running well and that the users, both customers and employees alike, are sufficiently 
satisfied with the system to want to continue using it. However, this raises crucial 
issues for organisations implementing systems. How can successful system 
implementation be guaranteed? Is it by having good project management, getting the 
system implemented on time and on budget? Or is it by the technical team 
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developing the system in a way that attracts users which is bug free? Or is it through 
the involvement of end users and customers, identifying what they want and catering 
to their needs? Or is it the top management, those funding the project, believing that 
improved efficiency and effective can be delivered with such a system? Each aspect 
is in itself important, but ultimately, can such a guarantee of successful system 
implementation be offered? This leads to perhaps the most significant question in 
systems implementation: can successful systems implementation be guaranteed at 
all? 
 
1.3 Problem domain 
These questions lead the researcher to the problem domain. The information systems 
community need a deeper understanding of what is involved in systems 
implementation, and more specifically, what enables successful implementation and 
what contributes to unsuccessful systems implementation. The focus of this study is 
on the social aspects of system selection and implementation as opposed to the 
technical or actual system implementation process. The researcher is interested in 
how the social component of system selection and implementation affects the overall 
process. The technical component of system selection and implementation has 
already received significant discussion and has led to two approaches to systems 
implementation, namely process models and factor-base studies. These traditional 
approaches to systems implementation are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2.2. 
 
Proponents of the first approach, process models, argue that systems implementation 
should follow a particular procedure, typically a five or seven-step process known as 
the system development lifecycle (SDLC) (Davis, 1974; Hoffer, et al., 1998; Avison 
and Fitzgerald, 2003). If a project manager or system implementation team follows 
the linear step-by-step process, then they will have a system implemented 
successfully. This approach has created multiple methodologies, or stock or package 
of methods, such as the Structured Analysis, Design and Implementation of 
Information Systems (STRADIS) (Gane and Sarson, 1979); the Structured Systems 
Analysis and Design Methodology (SSADM) (Downs et al., 1988; Weaver, 1993); 
and Object-oriented analysis (Booch, 1991; Coad and Yourdon, 1991; Martin and 
Odell, 1992). These methodologies can then be employed in the implementation 
process, allowing the implementation team to get various perspectives from the 
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stakeholders of what they require, and how they can use that information to 
implement a system. 
 
Advocates of the second approach, factor-based studies, argue that in order to 
successfully implement a system, certain critical factors are required to be in place 
(Rockart, 1979; Ginzberg, 1981; DeLone and McLean, 1992, 2003). Typically, 
research has indicated that the absence of top management support (Ginzberg, 1981; 
Kydd, 1989; Corbitt 2000), poor attitudes towards information systems (Corbitt, 
1997) and absence of education and training (Cragg and King, 1983) lead to failure 
of the information system implementation. Instead, the support of management 
(Somers and Nelson, 2001; Poon and Wagner, 2001; Hartman and Ashrafi, 2002), 
clear goals and objectives of the proposed system (Averweg and Erwin, 1999; Teo 
and Ang, 1999; Somers and Nelson, 2001), project management (Somers and 
Nelson, 2001; Akkermans and van Helden, 2002; Havelka and Lee, 2002) and the 
available information technologies (Khandelwal and Ferguson, 1999; Somers and 
Nelson, 2001; Croteau and Li, 2003)  all contribute to a successful system. However, 
it is argued that factor-based studies provide somewhat obvious findings that perhaps 
do not reflect the complexity involved in systems implementation. 
 
However, it is argued here that both of these approaches are structuralist, and 
essentially over simplistic in nature. These approaches do not provide adequate detail 
about the complexity of the process, nor do they tell us anything specific about the 
factors or steps involved with systems implementation. Such factor studies are rarely 
reflective of the processes which occur in systems implementation. Rather, the 
traditional approaches tend to provide structure to enable understanding of a complex 
process. They reduce the complex to an easier, simpler structure.  Implementation is 
neither driven entirely by factors of success or failure (Corbitt, 1997). Rather, the 
implementation process in information systems is more reflective of the stakeho lder 
relationship interactions and the impact of the context, either business, 
organisational, social or cultural, in which the implementation occurs. However, the 
traditional approaches ignore or underplay the political aspects involved in 
stakeholder relationships, as well as elements of power in systems implementation. 
As a result, some authors have taken a more socio-technical approach to information 
systems implementation (Mitev, 2001; Orlikowski, 1992). In order to do this, we as 
researchers, must “move beyond commonsense explanations of failure and success 
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and find more complex and richer ways of understanding the use of IS in 
organisations through the inclusion of broader social, economic, political, cultural 
and historical factors” (Mitev, 2001, p. 84). By taking this approach, we can enable a 
better understanding of the power and politics involved in systems implementation, 
by focusing on social issues in the implementation process (Chapter 2.5).  
 
Rather than take the social aspect of systems implementation at face value, we need 
to understand and perform research that recognises the complexity and historical 
construction of the members of the implementation team and process (Mitev, 2001). 
We currently cannot describe or explain the political environment in systems 
implementation because politics in implementation endures influence, pressure, 
dogma, expediency, conflict compromise, intransigence, resistance, error, opposition 
and pragmatism (Ball, 1990). That is, the implementation process is complex, messy, 
inconsistent, ambiguous and contains dilemmas.  
 
1.4 Research Question 
The approaches adopted in previous studies have over-simplified a complex process 
influenced by social factors, rather than exploring the inherent political issues 
involved with systems selection and implementation. This makes the systems 
implementation process messy, inconsistent and imbued with ambiguity, rather than 
structured or manifestly associated with factors creating success. The motivation 
behind this research is that previous studies of systems implementation and social 
factors have been structuralist and simplistic (Mitev, 2001). Previous studies reduce a 
complex process into various steps with particular factors involved in order to 
implement a system. It is argued that the systems selection and implementation 
process does not follow the linear system development lifecycle, nor do the critical 
success factors truly represent what is occurring in the systems implementation 
process. The researcher wishes to explore and report on what occurs during the 
selection and implementation of a new system in an organisation, paying particular 
attention to the role of power and politics in the systems selection and 
implementation process. This motivation has led to the development of the following 
question: 
 
How is power and politics an integral part of the systems selection and 
implementation process? 
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This also raises the following sub-questions: 
 
What are the positive and negative aspects of power and politics in the systems 
selection and implementation process?  
 
How can this understanding of power and politics be incorporated in the systems 
selection and implementation process in order to help researchers and practitioners? 
 
By undertaking this research, we can identify outcomes of the selection and 
implementation of an enterprise-wide system by providing a better understanding to 
the human factors involved, and specifically the power and politics in systems 
selection and implementation. It should be noted, however, that the outcomes of this 
study do not aim to provide a solution to the power and politics involved in systems 
selection and implementation, but to fully recognise that there are political factors 
involved in implementing a system.  
 
Nevertheless, there is also potential to gain insight into the lessons learnt from that 
particular implementation about what can contribute to a better implementation 
process – specifically, that the literature on implementation methodologies and tools 
is not a true representation of the systems selection and implementation process. For 
if power and politics in systems selection and implementation is central to the 
systems selection and implementation process, then the research on critical success 
factors and process models do not fully represent the social aspect and complexities 
involved in the selection and implementation process.  
 
The objective of this study is not to re-write or change the stages involved in the 
systems selection and implementation process. There are common steps or stages in 
that implementation process. The objective of this research is not to define what the 
steps are, or what is involved in them. Instead, the objective of this research is to 
review the role, influence and importance of power and politics in the systems 
selection and implementation process. This cannot be done within the current 
common and structuralist approach. Rather than concentrate on the technical aspect 
of systems selection and implementation, researchers should undertake research 
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based on the supposition that managerial assumptions are socially constructed 
(Chapter 2.5) (Mitev, 2001). 
 
1.5 Research Approach 
The nature of this research suggests that a post-structuralist analysis of power and 
politics in systems selection and implementation is required in order to provide a 
richer understanding of the phenomena under investigation. A critical theory 
approach has been adopted in this study as the researcher is then able to critically 
assess the social reality being studied, and therefore create awareness and 
understanding of the various forms of social domination.  
 
Ngwenyama and Lee (1997, p. 153) have argued that the critical approach is 
different to the positivist, in that the critical approach, as adopted in the Information 
Systems discipline, observes people “not as passive receptacles of whatever data or 
information that is transported to them, but as intelligent actors who assess the 
truthfulness, completeness, sincerity, and contextuality of the messages they 
receive.” The critical approach also differs from the interpretive approach, as the 
critical approach “requires the researcher to attend to not only the matter of mutual 
understanding, but also the matter of the emancipation of organisational actors from 
false or unwarranted beliefs, assumptions and constraints” (Ngwenyama and Lee, 
1997, p. 153-154). Details about the methodology used are presented in Chapter 
Three. 
 
To facilitate clarity and to provide some boundaries for the study, a case study 
methodology has been adopted, as it allows the researcher to identify what it is the 
subjects are doing, in their own words. Benbasat et al. (1987, p. 370) note that a case 
study allows for the exploration of “a phenomenon in its natural setting, employing 
multiple methods of data collection to gather information from one or a few entities.” 
Benbasat et al. (1987) argue that case study research is well-suited to the information 
systems discipline not only because “the researcher can study information systems in 
a natural setting, learn about the state of art, and generate theories from practice” 
(Benbasat et al., p.81), but also “to understand the nature and complexity of the 
processes taking place” (Benbasat et al., p.81). The benefit of using a case study in 
developing a deeper understanding is that its method usually focuses on one or a few 
cases to be investigated to represent other typical cases. A case study also covers a 
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small scope of a case and investigates the case in detail (Borg and Gall, 1989; 
Denscombe, 1998). By being immersed in the organisational activities, the researcher 
is able to gain richer information as to how power relations are created and how they 
may transform over time for the systems implementation group.  
 
Data was collected from interviews and existing organisational documents. Staff 
involved in implementation of a learning management system in the University of 
Australia were interviewed and their data supplemented by and cross referenced with 
university policy documents, minutes of meetings and other publications. The 
enterprise-wide learning management system was selected and implemented to 
enable academic staff to manage teaching and learning by keeping track of student 
progress and performance across all types of learning activities. They used a range of 
tools to create learning resources, deliver content, monitor student participation and 
assess student performance. The systems selection and implementation process 
studied in this thesis has been on-going since 2000. The systems selection and 
implementation process of the enterprise-wide learning management system has been 
written in narrative form, telling the story of the selection and implementation 
process at the University of Australia. This approach has been adopted as the 
narrative form “supports a unity of form among the original interview situation, the 
analysis, and the final report” (Kvale, 1996, p. 184).  
 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis  
Chapter Two provides a review of the literature on systems implementation, 
specifically the two approaches to systems implementation, process models and 
factor-based studies, before proceeding onto a discussion of the weaknesses within 
the literature in regards to a post-structuralist view of systems implementation. A 
review of power-related information systems studies will then be discussed, again 
highlighting the weaknesses of the current literature in regards to the structuralist 
approach being taken. A framework will then be suggested that takes a post-
structuralist view of power and politics in the realm of systems selection and 
implementation, including issues of resistance and control. 
 
Chapter Three will discuss in greater detail the approach taken in this research. A 
post-structuralist, critical view of power and politics in systems selection and 
implementation is required, in order to provide a richer understanding of the 
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phenomena under investigation. A critical theory approach was adopted for this 
study as critical theory creates awareness and understanding of the various forms of 
social domination. By using critical theory, the researcher is able to critically assess 
the social reality being studied. 
 
Chapters Four, Five and Six present the research in context – in other words, the 
narrative, or story, of the selection and implementation process of an enterprise-wide 
learning management system at the University of Australia. Each chapter deals with 
a specific phase of the implementation process. Chapter Four discusses the historical 
context of the organisation, and the decision to implement a learning management 
system. By providing this detail, the reader is able to ascertain the strategic direction 
of the university as well as being able to identify any issues that arose in this 
historical phase of the University, which may impact the current selection and 
implementation process. 
 
Chapter Five discusses the selection process involved with identifying and 
recommending an enterprise-wide learning management system to the senior 
members of the university. This phase of the selection and implementation process 
saw the establishment of two working groups, which were given the task from the 
Deputy Vice-Chancellor to recommend an enterprise-wide learning management 
system. Requirements were gathered for the new system, which involved the wider 
university community, as well as the two working groups. A list of 64 potential 
learning management systems were identified, which was then reduced down to a 
working subset of five systems, before being further condensed to a list of three 
potential systems. Debate and discussion were held over the three potential systems 
and one system was identified, by the majority of the working groups, to meet the 
requirements established earlier, which was then recommended to the senior 
members of the university. 
 
Chapter Six discusses the implementation of the enterprise-wide learning 
management system at the University of Australia. This phase of the selection and 
implementation process saw a number of changes occurring at the senior level of the 
university, with the old Vice-Chancellor retiring and a new Vice-Chancellor being 
appointed. Further changes occurred as the Deputy Vice-Chancellor resigned within 
the first six months of the appointment of the new Vice-Chancellor, and a new senior 
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position, the Pro Vice-Chancellor (Distance Education) was established. Policy was 
enacted that required units to promote distance education. Units were migrated 
across to the new enterprise-wide learning management system through a phased- in, 
parallel approach, overcoming technical issues with the new software and hardware. 
A brief discussion on the current status of the system is provided. Furthermore, at the 
conclusion of each chapter, an analysis of the emerging themes relating to that 
specific phase of the implementation process will be provided. 
 
Chapter Seven considers the framework developed in Chapter Two to provide further 
analysis and discussion of the role of power and politics in systems selection and 
implementation, in regard to the implementation of the enterprise-wide learning 
management system at the University of Australia. This chapter will relate the 
findings of Chapters Four, Five and Six to the proposed framework, highlighting 
aspects of resistance and control in the implementation process. Implications for 
systems selection and implementation, practice, theory and future research as well as 
limitations of the study are then considered. A brief summary of the thesis is then 
provided, concluding this thesis. 
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Chapter Two – Developing a Conceptual Framework 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores existing research and theory to provide an interpretative lens to 
answer the research question “how is power and politics an integral part of the 
systems selection and implementation?” This exploration starts with an analysis of 
existing research on systems implementation. The objective of this research is not to 
examine systems implementation structures, but to provide a critique of that 
literature and identify gaps in the light of other theoretical traditions. The technical 
aspect of system implementation, the tools, methodologies, procedures and 
techniques utilised to implement a system, has received extensive attention in the 
literature. However, the researcher is interested in the social issues involved in 
system selection and implementation and is therefore focusing on those aspects, as 
opposed to the systems implementation structures. By identifying gaps in the 
literature, the researcher is able to develop a conceptual lens to detect issues of power 
and politics in the system selection and implementation process. 
 
Through the study of the literature, the researcher will argue that power and politics 
are an integral part of the system selection and implementation process. This 
viewpoint has not been well discussed or examined in the literature. However, 
power, properly conceived as a fluid and non-static technique or action that 
individuals can engage in and which is exercised rather than possessed, can be seen 
as integral to the outcomes and processes of system selection and implementation. As 
will be discussed throughout this chapter, there is no exercise of power without 
resistance. It is the political nature of power, resistance and discourse that forms the 
basis of an argument which suggests that power impacts substantially on system 
selection and implementation as it affects the role of organisational reproduction and 
control through the obvious creation of policy and the hidden impact of discourse. 
 
This chapter will describe systems implementation and the two research areas of 
systems implementation, process models and factor based studies. Weaknesses in 
terms of the attention paid to social issues in systems implementation will be 
discussed, which will then lead to a discussion on the importance of power and 
politics. The traditional view of power and its use in Information Systems research 
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will be discussed, and an attempt will be made in this chapter to demonstrate that the 
traditional views of power are inadequate for the understanding of power and its 
influences on system selection and implementation. A post-structuralist view of 
power will be introduced and issues such as resistance and discourse will be 
discussed in light of the adopted post-structuralist view of power, before providing 
the conceptual lens to be used in this study. 
 
2.2 Systems Implementation 
Systems implementation has received considerable attention in the literature from 
authors such as Davis (1974), Lucas (1981), Maddison, et al. (1983), Avison and 
Fitzgerald (1995; 2003), Hoffer, et al. (1998), Lauden and Lauden (1998), 
Hawryszkiewycz (2001), and Nickerson (2001). Although no specific definition is 
provided, the general description of systems implementation is the process of 
identifying the need for an information system of some kind, and the process(es) 
involved in getting that system installed into an organisation. Lucas (1981, p. 14) 
characterises information systems implementation as “an on-going process which 
includes the entire development of the system from original suggestion through the 
feasibility study, systems analysis and design, programming, training, conversion, 
and installation of the system.” Research into the area of systems implementation has 
provided the majority of early studies in the discipline of information systems and 
typically falls into two categories: process models such as the systems development 
lifecycle (SDLC); and factor studies (Newman and Robey, 1992). Both forms of 
research will be discussed here. 
 
2.3 Process Models 
Avison and Fitzgerald (2003, p. 528), utilise the definition offered by Maddison, et al 
(1983, p. 4), that an information system methodology is “a recommended collection 
of philosophies, phases, procedures, rules, techniques, tools, documentation, 
management, and training for developers of information systems,” to suggest that an 
information systems methodology contains a variety of components. These 
components include: 
· How a project is to be broken down into stages; 
· What tasks are to be carried out at each stage; 
· What outputs are to be produced; 
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· When, and under what circumstances, they are to be carried out; 
· What constraints are to be applied; 
· Which people should be involved; 
· How the project should be managed and controlled; and 
· What support tools may be utilised. 
 
Early studies of systems implementation have described stages in systems 
development and implementation (Davis, 1974). Davis (1974) argues that this 
process consists of three major stages and eight sub-stages. The activities taking 
place in each stage varies from stage to stage, and one needs to complete one stage 
before proceeding onto the next stage. Davis’ (1974) model outlines the stages and 
sub-stages as follows: 
 
Main Stage Sub-Stage 
Definition stage Feasibility assessment 
 Information analysis 
Physical Design Stage System design 
 Program development 
 Procedure development 
Implementation Stage Conversion 
 Operation and management 
 Post audit 
 
For Davis (1974), the definition stage focuses on what the new system will do and 
how it will look to the user. This stage involves initial conceptualisation of the 
system and requirements gathering of what users believe they see as necessary in the 
new system. An assessment is also performed on the technical and financial 
feasibility of the project. The physical design stage takes the business specification 
developed during the definition stage, and a design of the computer-based system to 
meet the specifications developed earlier in the process. During the implementation 
stage, the physical system is installed, operated and monitored. Each component of 
the system design and implementation process consists of various steps, making this 
process linear and essentially simplistic, providing structure for system implementers 
to follow. The implementation team cannot proceed onto the next step until the 
current step is complete.  
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The work by Davis (1974) was a pre-cursor to the more traditional Systems 
Development Life Cycle (SDLC), which, similarly to Davis’ (1974) approach, is a 
set of steps or stages that start with a set of user requirements and produce a system 
that meets these requirements (Hawryszkiewycz, 2001; Avison and Fitzgerald, 2003; 
Nickerson, 2001; Hoffer, et al., 1998; Lauden and Lauden, 1998). The SDLC is also 
known as a linear or waterfall model, whereby those adhering to the SDLC have to 
go through a rigorous step-by-step process of implementing a system. Depending on 
the author, there can be a number of different steps involved to get the system 
implemented.  
 
For example, Hoffer, et al. (1998) condense the systems development life cycle into 
seven steps: project identification and selection; project initiation and planning; 
analysis; logical design; physical design; implementation and maintenance. 
Similarly, Nickerson (2001) simplifies the system development lifecycle to five 
steps: systems planning; systems analysis; systems design; systems implementation; 
and systems maintenance. Each phase inside each step is also simplified compared to 
Hoffer et al. (1998). Lauden and Lauden (1998) differentiate themselves by 
describing the development and implementation process as five steps, but differently 
to Nickerson (2001): define and analyse problem; investigate and understand 
problem; select best option; design solution; and implement solution.  
 
It is interesting to note that many of these potential systems design and 
implementation processes are similar, albeit it monotonous and consistently 
simplistic, reducing a complex process into a set of structuralist steps and phases. 
However, there is still a lack of agreement in regard to the number of stages 
involved, what those stages are and what is required in those stages. This highlights a 
problem inside the systems design and implementation literature itself. That is, with 
the systems implementation literature being in existence for over 30 years, there is 
still little or no common understanding of how many steps or stages should be 
included in the systems implementation process. Ideas have not progressed in the last 
30 years besides being pedantic about the number of steps. A total 
reconceptualisation is required in order to develop a richer understanding of systems 
implementation and what goes in the implementation process, rather than identifying 
a new process model, describing it and testing it. 
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Furthermore, there are weaknesses associated with process models used in systems 
implementation. The main weakness is that this approach is structuralist. Those that 
adhere to process models believe that structure underpins particular events, viewing 
systems implementation as highly ordered and rational. The process model approach 
is not necessarily a toolbox that is used by system implementers to implement a 
system. Rather, as presented, process models enable the system implementers to 
utilise particular methodologies to implement a system. It is these methodologies that 
are linear and structured. By adhering to the process modelling approach, we can 
implement a system by following certain steps, but they have to be completed in a 
linear manner. In other words, we cannot proceed to the next step until the current 
step has been completed and the appropriate outputs have been produced. In practice, 
the implementation process does not follow this linear method. We cannot break a 
project down into various stages, because of the nature of systems implementation 
and one of the most important elements of systems implementation, the people 
(Nguyen, 2000). People do not work in this linear method. Invariably, the systems 
implementation is chaotic and complex.  
 
Avison and Fitzgerald (2003, p. 34) further highlight weaknesses involved with the 
Systems Development Life Cycle. These weaknesses include: 
· Failure to meet the needs of management; 
· Instability; 
· Inflexibility; 
· User dissatisfaction; 
· Lack of control; and 
· Incomplete systems. 
This raises the question of “why?” Why do organisations, developers and researchers 
still promote and follow the SDLC when it has proven weaknesses, which ultimately 
affect the overall implementation of the system. Besides the technical shortcomings 
of the SDLC, there are also theoretical shortcomings of the process models approach. 
These weaknesses include the typical positivist approach adopted for such studies 
and the creation of a structured view of the world in which research must be 
undertaken to find or create order out of a messy and complex environment. 
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As a result of this shortcoming with the SDLC, at least ten potential methodologies 
utilised for the systems implementation process have been developed (Avison and 
Fitzgerald, 1995). Later research (Avison and Fitzgerald, 2003) categorised the 
above methodologies into various groups, which are shown in Table 2.1. As can be 
seen in Table 2.1, the majority of the methodologies and categories are normative 
and structuralist in nature. They all have multiple phases and tasks required to 
complete each phase before moving onto a new phase in the methodology. 
 
Table 2.1 Categorised Systems Implementation Methodologies 
Process Based Methodologies 
 Structured Analysis, Design and Implementation of Information Systems 
(STRADIS) (Gane and Sarson, 1979) 
 Yourdon Systems Method (YSM) (Yourdon, 1993) 
 Jackson Systems Development (JSD) (Jackson, 1975; 1983) 
Blended Methodologies 
Structured Systems Analysis and Design Method (SSADM) (Downs et al., 
1988; Weaver, 1993; Eva, 1994) 
 Merise (Quang and Chartier-Kastler, 1991) 
 Information Engineering (IE) (Martin and Finkelstein, 1981; Martin, 1989) 
 Welti ERP Development (Welti, 1999)  
Object Oriented Methodologies 
 Object-Oriented Analysis (OOA) (Booch, 1991; Coad and Yourdon, 1991; 
Martin and Odell, 1992; Rumbaugh et al., 1991) 
 Rational Unified Process (RUP) (Jacobson, 2000) 
Rapid Development Methodologies 
 James Martin’s RAD (JMRAD) (Martin, 1991) 
 Dynamic Systems Development Method (DSDM) (Stapleton, 1997) 
 Extreme Programming (XP) (Jeffries, 2001) 
 Web IS Development Methodology (WISDM) (Vigden, et al., 2002) 
People Oriented Methodologies 
 Effective Technical and Human Interaction of Computer-Based Systems 
(ETHICS) (Mumford, 1983; 1986; 1995) 
 KADS and CommonKADS (Wielinga, et al., 1993; De Greef and Breuker, 
1992) 
Multiview (Wood-Harper et al., 1985; Wood-Harper and Avison, 2003) 
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Organisational Oriented Methodologies 
 Soft Systems Methodologies (SSM) (Checkland, 1981) 
 Information Systems Work and Analysis of Changes (ISAC) (Lundeberg, et 
al., 1982) 
 Process Innovation (PI) (Davenport and Short, 1990; Davenport, 1993) 
 
The people-oriented and organisational-oriented methodologies start adopting a 
social perspective on systems implementation, recognising that there are social and 
organisation factors involved with systems implementation (Mumford, 1983, 1995). 
The use of the ETHICS methodology is an attempt to establish “a value position in 
which the future users of computer systems at all organisational levels play a major 
part in the design of these systems” (Mumford, 1983). The ETHICS method requires 
the system implementation team to select people who are representative of their units 
or constituents, whilst at the same time overcome the key difficulty of identifying 
and addressing the needs of an enormous range of stakeholders in a complex 
organisation. As a result, ETHICS focuses on quality of job life for users of the 
software and hence the ETHICS method is primarily designed for workplace 
systems, adopting an iterative process that begins with early interaction with the 
users. An updated version of ETHICS, QUICKethics (Quality Information from 
Considered Knowledge) has been developed by Mumford (1995, p. 79) and is 
described as the “front end of ETHICS”. QUICKethics is designed specifically for 
requirements analysis and consists of four acts: Self-reflection; Self- identification; 
Group discussion; and Group decision (Avison and Fitzgerald, 1995). Each manager 
“describes his or her work role and relationships with information needs, along with 
information needs ranked as ‘essential’, ‘desirable’, and useful on an individual 
basis” (Avison and Fitzgerald, 1995, p. 364). 
 
However, the people-oriented and organisational-oriented methodologies still take a 
structured view of systems implementation. ETHICS consists of fifteen steps 
(Mumford, 1986), KADS and CommonKADS develops five and three different 
models respectively, with the aim to develop a computational model of desired 
behaviour (Wielinga, et al., 1993; De Greef and Breuker, 1992; Avison and 
Fitzgerald, 2003). There are seven stages required to use the soft systems 
methodology (Checkland, 1981; Checkland and Scholes, 1990), and ISAC consists 
of five major phases (Lundeberg, et al., 1982). Process innovation (Davenport and 
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Short, 1990; Davenport, 1993) follows five stages and the Multiview methodology 
sees information systems development as a hybrid process that involves the 
specialists that build and design the system, and the users that will be using the 
system (Wood-Harper et al., 1985; Wood-Harper and Avison, 2003). Although this 
approach is flexible in terms of the techniques used, there is a five stage waterfall 
process where each stage depends on the previous stage for progress to be achieved 
(Avison and Fitzgerald, 2003). This is not to say that we must reject all engineering 
principles and abolish steps and guidelines, and follow an ad hoc approach. Instead, 
the current weakness of these structured approaches is their simplistic view on the 
complexity and dynamics of the social world within which the system is being 
implemented and used. 
 
There are, then, a plethora of methods to implement an information system. 
However, it can be argued that the weakness of the methodologies described above is 
that they are essentially structuralist and linear, and reduce the complexities of the 
process to phases or stages in order to simplify understanding. The outcome at each 
stage is a social product: a product of an application of engineering principles but 
also a product of social interactions between stakeholders and subjective socially 
meaningful interpretation of the developers about the organisations, businesses, 
people and their needs. There is however, a methodology that recognises the systems 
implementation process as complex and non- linear, requiring a social interaction of 
various stakeholders. This methodology is Peter Checkland’s (1981) Soft Systems 
Methodology (SSM).   
 
Checkland (1981) provides extensive discussion about intersubjectivity in soft 
systems methodology. For Checkland (1981) a system can be characterised as one 
which is comprised of many interacting parts such that a change affecting any one 
part has a propagating effect influencing all other parts in an unpredictable manner. 
Through processes of modelling, iteration, reflection and negotiation it draws 
together different perceptions, assumptions and points of view of different people 
who are involved in a problem situation in a cycle of learning (Barry and Fourie, 
2001). The soft systems methodology expresses the situation in which a perceived 
problem exists in terms of structure and processes and the relation between the two, 
rather than as a clearly defined problem. Checkland’s (1981) soft systems 
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methodology views unstructured problems as conditions to be alleviated, rather than 
problems to be solved. 
 
However, in the researcher’s opinion, the soft system methodology does not 
acknowledge the dynamics and complexity of social relations in the implementation 
process. The rich picture and associated documents, such as the conceptual model, 
reflect a rather static picture of the organisation. The dynamics and complexities 
would then be lost when the developers move from the real world to the conceptual 
world. Furthermore, can we really implement a system if we start at stage one, 
complete that stage, produce the required outputs, move onto stage two and repeat 
until the system is implemented? Do organisations and developers follow these 
structured methodologies? 
 
Research has already shown that the linear methodologies described above are not 
followed. Although these methodologies are “well used, respected, [and] typify the 
approaches utilised in [Information Systems development]” (Avison and Fitzgerald, 
1995, p. 261), it is interesting to note that in a survey of UK organisations 
implementing a system, while the organisations surveyed were using some kind of 
methodology mentioned above, the majority of organisations were developing or 
adapting the methodology to fit the needs of the developer and the organisation 
(Fitzgerald, et al., 1999). The majority of organisations did not use the formal 
methodologies, but rather opted for ad hoc approaches, contingency approaches, 
component development or outsourcing the development and implementation 
process. Why, then, is research still being undertaken identifying the technical issues 
in systems implementation if these methodologies are not being strictly followed? 
Rather, research needs to be undertaken to explore the social issues inside systems 
implementation, focusing on how people influence the implementation process and 
why such methodologies are not adhered to. 
 
The other apparent and recognised shortcoming of the existing systems 
implementation process models is that they support a continual linear or sequential 
process, that one stage should be completed before going onto the next stage. As 
Ginzberg (1981, p. 47) stated, by using this systems implementation process 
approach “it is difficult to say whether ‘good’ performance at a particular stage 
requires good resolution of all issues or only of some issues, and if the latter is the 
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case, which issues are most important?” This systems implementation approach then 
is essentially reductionist, perhaps simplistic. It is certainly structuralist. There is a 
constant search for categorisation, stages and sub-stages. To counter this apparent 
reliance on structure, some researchers have sought to understand those factors 
considered critical to the success of systems implementation. Ginzberg (1981) 
claimed that management information systems implementation research looks 
primarily at the measurement of success and failure (Rockart, 1979). Research has 
also focused on critical success factors and systems implementation (DeLone and 
McLean, 1992; 2003; Somers and Nelson, 2001; Wilkin and Castleman, 2002; 
Shanks et al., 2003; Seddon, 1997). 
 
2.4 Critical Success Factors 
Considerable research has examined the individual, organisational, and technological 
variables that affect implementation success (Lucas, Ginzberg, and Schultz, 1990; 
Sanders and Courtney, 1985; Rockart, 1979; Somers and Nelson, 2001; DeLone and 
McLean, 1992, 2003; Boon, et al., 2004). These include organisational commitment, 
the existence of an executive sponsor within the organisation (Raymond, 1985), the 
existence of an operating sponsor within the organisation to provide quick feedback 
across the organisation (Montazemi, 1988) and the existence of dedicated facilities 
within the organisation. In the small business context, Cragg and King (1983) 
suggested that the successful implementation of information systems occurs where 
there is demonstrated relative advantage in terms of time saved, benefits accrued or 
discomfort decreased, and where competitive pressure required the organisation to 
implement an information system in order to make the organisation flexible and 
profitable. A similar argument was offered by Allen and Kern (2002) in the higher 
education context. Finally, the central importance of the role of management is 
supported by Parr, et al. (1999), Duchessi, et al. (1989), Somers and Nelson (2001), 
Akkermans and van Helden (2002), Poon and Wagner (2001) Averweg and Erwin 
(1999), Hartman and Ashrafi (2002), and Teo and Ang (1999).  
 
In order for a system to be considered successfully implemented, certain objectives 
or factors need to be addressed (Rockart, 1979; Boynton and Zmud, 1984; Martin, 
1982; Zahedi, 1987; Soliman, et al., 2001). Previous work has addressed the most 
commonly cited critical success factors in systems implementation (Boon, et al., 
2004). The five most common factors in systems implementation are top 
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management support, clear goals and objectives, business process reengineering 
(BPR), project management, and information technology. It is interesting to note that 
three of the five common success factors involve human factors of some kind. Emery 
(1971) discussed the human factors in systems implementation, however, little has 
been added to the literature and body of knowledge in regards to human factors in 
systems implementation since then. 
 
Human factors make up some of the more significant critical success factors, such as 
having top management support, a project champion driving the project, as well as 
competent project teams (Havelka and Lee, 2002; Somers and Nelson, 2001; 
Boynton and Zmud, 1984; Akkermans and van Helden, 2002; Bergeron and Begin, 
1989; Hartman and Ashrafti, 2002; Croteau and Li, 2003). Human factors also 
include having the appropriate information systems staff, with skills for the project 
and an empathy for supporting users (Teo and Ang, 1999; Pollalis and Frieze, 1993; 
Khandelwal and Ferguson, 1999). 
 
Ginzberg (1981, p. 460) states that “while such research can provide insight into the 
nature of the implementation problem, it lacks the power of an alternative approach, 
one that focuses on the management of the implementation process” (original authors 
emphasis). It is through studies of the management aspect of the implementation 
process that we can really understand what contributes to implementation success or 
failure. The management aspect also provides the richness that other measurements 
of systems implementation cannot, due to the simplistic, reductionist nature of 
measuring successful implementation. 
 
The failure of information systems implementation has been linked to the absence of 
an information systems champion or change agent, lack of management support 
(Ginzberg, 1981; Kydd, 1989; Corbitt 2000), strain on already restricted managerial 
time (Cragg and King, 1983), poor attitudes towards information systems (Corbitt, 
1997), absence of education and training (Cragg and King, 1983), organisational 
problems (Markus, 1983), technical problems (Cragg and King, 1983), and perceived 
gaps between expectations of information systems supporters and those expected to 
use the system (Kydd, 1989).  
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Current research in the systems implementation process has generally taken a 
positivist approach. Essentially, positivists undertaking research in the critical 
success factors involved in systems implementation believe that human factors can 
be isolated from the environment, adopting a simplistic view of the world. According 
to Mitev (2001), this approach is typically taken by managers and technologists and 
is unrealistic as it views technology as unproblematic and neutral. Following the 
positivist approach, managers typically believe that technology has little or no impact 
on the systems implementation success or failure. This positivist approach also 
misses the social aspect of systems implementation; it fails to recognise that there is 
a political aspect involved in systems implementation. In other words, this viewpoint 
ignores or reduces the “understanding of organisations characterised by a belief in 
rational management; a denial of the existence of power relations and conflicts; a 
tendency to see organisations as individual closed entities; and limited focus on the 
business environment” (Mitev, 2001, p. 85). Implementation however, is neither 
driven entirely by factors of success or failure (Corbitt, 1997). Rather, the 
implementation process in information systems is reflective of the stakeholder 
relationship interactions and the impact of the context, either business, 
organisational, social or cultural, in which the implementation occurs.  
 
2.5 The Importance of Power and Politics 
The systems implementation models and methodologies outlined above ignore the 
political aspect and therefore the element of power in systems implementation. As a 
result, some authors have taken a more social- technical approach to information 
systems implementation (Mitev, 2001; Orlikowski, 1992). In order to do this, we as 
researchers, must “move beyond commonsense explanations of failure and success 
and find more complex and richer ways of understanding the use of IS in 
organisations through the inclusion of broader social, economic, political, cultural 
and historical factors” (Mitev, 2001, p. 84). By taking this approach, we can enable a 
better understanding of the power and politics involved in systems implementation 
by focusing on social issues in the implementation process.  
 
There is more to the implementation process than what the existing literature 
suggests. Systems implementation processes, it can be argued, operate at a more 
discursive level where operational practice and policy impacts on the decisions made 
along the systems implementation process, as opposed to the more technical aspect 
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of implementation utilising process models and critical success factors. There is 
more to the implementation process than what the existing literature suggests. There 
is an inherent political issue. In other words, there are forms of influence or self-
serving tactics of influence in the system selection and implementation process. 
Furthermore, as Bacharach and Lawler (1998, p. 69) state, politics refers to “the 
efforts of individuals or groups in organisations to mobilise support for or opposition 
to organisational strategies, policies, or practices in which they have a stake or 
interest.” This makes the systems implementation process messy, inconsistent and 
imbued with ambiguity, rather than structured or manifestly associated with factors 
creating success. Systems implementation takes place in the fluid setting of changing 
business. Implementation involves more than just a multi-staged context 
(McLaughlin, 1987), it is also an iterative process (Corbitt, 1997). By exploring the 
implementation of policy, McLaughlin (1987) claimed that implementation is 
affected by social issues such as local capacity and will. However, there are other 
factors that play an important role in system selection and implementation. Belief 
may also be nurtured from action. Even motivation or will is influenced by factors 
beyond the reach of technical implementation (Corbitt, 1997). Environmental 
stability, competing centres of authority, contending priorities or pressures and other 
aspects of the social-political milieu can influence implementation intensely (Yin, 
1981). Implementation generally requires a combination and balance of pressure and 
support (McLaughlin, 1987). Pressure by itself may be insufficient when objectives 
contain their own implementation directions (Corbitt 1997). Pressure per se cannot 
affect those changes in attitudes, beliefs and routine practices typically assumed by 
reform policies. Communication can be deliberately distorted by misinformation to 
influence process and gain advantage (Forester, 1989). The implementation of any 
new system also involves a change in the way business is performed.  
 
Systems implementation, it can be argued, is essentially political and non-rational 
(Self, 1981; Mitev, 2001). Mitev (2001, p. 90) argues that “politics is an inescapable 
feature of local organisational life…some human perspectives win over others in the 
construction of technologies and truth, some human actors go along with the will of 
other actors, and some humans resist being enrolled, in an unpredictable manner.” 
One cannot plan or premeditate the political nature of organisations or the system 
selection and implementation process. Rather, the system selection and 
implementation process is differentiated by the various stakeholders involved in the 
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implementation process. In this process the constructions of power and influence 
interact to impact on the path that systems implementation follows. This 
implementation process is influenced by, and influences, human behaviour.  
 
As outlined in Chapter 1.4, rather than take the social aspect of systems 
implementation at face value, we need to understand and perform research that 
recognises the complexity and historical construction of the members of the 
implementation team and the process itself. By researching the complex human 
issues in systems implementation, particularly the power and politics involved, we 
are able to identify what influences the implementation process. We can essentially 
identify the driving forces of systems implementation. Currently we cannot describe 
or explain the political environment in systems implementation because politics in 
implementation endures influence, pressure, dogma, expediency, conflict 
compromise, intransigence, resistance, error, opposition and pragmatism (Ball, 
1990).  
 
Contrary to the process model and critical success factor approaches outlined above, 
the systems implementation process does not necessarily follow a structure. Like all 
social processes, it is inevitably chaotic, messy and encumbered with values, 
ideology and other social practices. In information systems this has been the focus of 
work by Ngwenyama and Lee (1997), Romm and Pliskin (1999), Trauth and 
O’Connor (1991), and Daft and Lengel (1986). When implementing a system, 
developers do not necessarily follow the SDLC step-by-step. The implementation 
process is differentiated and not as simplistic as the systems implementation 
literature claims. The implementation process cannot realistically be structured or 
categorised into various steps. Systems implementation, it can then be argued, is 
inherently a political and complex process. Few researchers have studied the power 
and politics involved in systems implementation. However, in a series of papers, 
Markus (1981, 1983, 1984; 1994; Markus and Pfeffer, 1983; Markus and Bjørn-
Anderson, 1987) examined the role of power, politics and systems implementation. 
The seminal research by Markus was undertaken in 1983, over twenty years ago, and 
argues that the power of human and technological resistance impacted on systems 
adoption. However, the implications of this study have rarely, if at all, been taken 
further, or applied to the systems implementation process. To deal with this aspect 
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more fully, there is a need to re-examine the nature of power and discuss the 
apparent influence of power on systems implementation.  
 
2.6 The Social Impact of Power 
As Parsons (1963, p. 232) stated, there is a “notable lack of agreement both about its 
specific definition, and about many features of the conceptual context in which it 
should be placed.” It is not only Parsons (1963) that reflects on the lack of agreement 
on the definition of power, as authors such as Pfeffer (1981) and Galbraith (1984) 
have also highlighted this issue. What further complicates this issue is, as Galbraith 
(1984) states, “the reader or listener is assumed to know what it [the term ‘power’] 
means” (p. 1). This section provides a brief summary of the work on power by 
initially discussing the classical view of power as proposed by Dahl (1957) and his 
method of analysing power (Dahl, 1968). An analysis of Dahl’s work in the 
management discipline will be provided and critiqued via Lukes (1974), which then 
leads into a discussion of power-based studies in the Information Systems discipline. 
 
Dahl (1957, p. 202) provides a classic view of power suggesting that “A  has power 
over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise 
do.” Dahl (1957) referred to power as the controlling of someone else’s behaviour 
and/or actions. This view is shared by Russell (1975, p. 25), who argued that “power 
over human beings may be classified by the manner of influencing individuals.” 
However, Russell (1975) described how individuals may influence or be influenced 
by the use of power, for example by:  
· direct physical power over an opponent’s body – which refers to physical 
damage via the use of a weapon to get their way; 
· rewards and punishments as inducements – the use of incentives, such as 
monetary reward or punishment by removing privileges; and 
· influence on opinion – the use of propaganda to modify an opponent’s 
mindset. 
 
Through later work, Dahl (1968) suggested four key characteristics to analyse power: 
magnitude; distribution; scope; and domain. Magnitude equates to the amount of 
power someone is presumed to possess. Dahl claims that this is a difficult 
characteristic to identify. The example provided by Dahl (1968) related to the 
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magnitude of the power A has with respect to B (in the sense that A has power over 
B). This power is thought to be able to be measured via an interval scale.  
 
Distribution relates to the classification and description of the most common 
allocations and patterns of power relations. Dahl (1968) suggested some of the 
typical questions raised in terms of distribution: 
· What are the characteristics of A (where A is the powerful figure in the 
relationship), and what are the characteristics of B (where B is less powerful 
compared to A); and  
· Do they come from different classes, strata, regions or other groups, such as 
culture?  
 
Dahl’s (1968) view of scope contests the view that individuals or groups may be 
powerful with respect to one kind of activity, but weak with respect to others. In 
other words, power need not be generalised, instead power may be specialised (Dahl, 
1968). Is power generalised over many scopes or is it specialised? This is the typical 
question raised in regards to scope for Dahl (1968), There is a need to specify the 
power of A with respect to some class of B’s activities, the scope. 
 
In domain, the fourth characteristic, power is limited to certain individuals (Dahl, 
1968). Domain links back to scope in that individuals may have power in regards to 
specialised areas, or domains. Who appears to have more power in the relationship 
and what are their characteristics? These are some of the questions Dahl (1968) has 
raised. The characteristics considered include class, strata, region and culture of 
individuals. 
 
Four underlying explanations were used to explain why magnitude, distribution, 
scope and domain are important for analysing power: resources; skill; motivation; 
and costs. Resources relates to the differences attributed to the distribution of 
resources. If you increase resources, you increase power. Resources for Lasswell and 
Kaplan (1963, p. 87) included “power (which can serve as a base for more power), 
respect, moral standing, affection, well-being, wealth, skill and enlightenment.”  
 
Skill refers to the different skills an individual may possess (Dahl, 1968), and leads 
to the fact that power is not generalised, it is specialised, relating to the domain of the 
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individual. Two individuals may have the same resources (and skills), but may differ 
in terms of motivation (Dahl, 1968). For example, A may have the motivation to 
choose resources to increase his or her power as opposed to B who may be motivated 
to use his or her resources differently.  
 
The final explanation relates to costs (Dahl, 1968). The supply of resources may have 
a bearing on how willing A will be in order to control B, in other words, the 
opportunity costs involved. Will A invest a lot of his or her resources if the return 
does not exceed the costs involved? As this is unlikely, there is a trade-off in regards 
to the costs involved of investing the resources and how much of a gain they will 
make. 
 
This is a structuralist approach to analysing power, reducing power to the ability to 
allocate or give power to a particular individual or group. As structuralist as this 
work is, this classic view of power is influential in business. For example, research 
by French and Raven (1958) claims that power can take on multiple forms in 
organisational behaviour: 
· Coercive Power – a person reacts to this power out of fear of the negative 
ramifications that might result if they fail to comply. 
· Reward Power – compliance achieved based on the ability to distribute 
rewards that others view as valuable. 
· Legitimate Power – the power a person receives as a result of their position in 
the formal hierarchy of an organisation. 
· Expert Power – influence based on special skills or knowledge. 
· Referent Power – influence based on possession by an individual of desirable 
resources or personal traits. 
 
Rather than treating power as a property of the individual, as Dahl (1957; 1968) 
does, French and Raven (1958) believe that power is a property of the relationship 
between an individual and others (Buchanan and Badham, 1999). This approach 
enables a researcher to categorise the type of power and role someone may have in 
the organisation. The research by French and Raven (1958) has influenced the work 
of Benfari et al. (1986), who identified eight bases of power. These include the five 
from French and Raven (1958), plus information, affiliation and group power. 
Furthermore, Benfari et al. (1986) continues the classical, structuralist and 
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categorical view of power by providing both a positive and a negative exercise of 
power depending on the circumstances. This treatment of power has been criticised 
by Buchanan and Badham (1999). This method of treating power as a property of a 
relationship do not distinguish power-related behaviour from other forms of 
organisational behaviour, therefore creating a generic concept of power, which has 
limited analytical appeal (Buchanan and Badham, 1999). More importantly, this 
treatment of power presents a surface view of power (Buchanan and Badham, 1999), 
enabling the analyst to categorise power into five or eight bases of power. In other 
words, this treatment of power is essentially structuralist in nature and misses the 
messiness and complexities involved with power. 
 
In the management literature, Pfeffer (1981) examined organisational behaviour and 
outlined one method to help assess power in organisations. According to Pfeffer 
(1981), there is a need to identify political actors in the organisation, we need to 
identify the relevant units for analysis. Pfeffer (1981, p. 36) stated that “in most cases 
it [identifying political actors] will require judgement to assess whether or not the 
appropriate units of analysis have been identified.” A direct, or binary approach 
(straight yes or no answer) is ineffective in this type of scenario. For example, the 
typical question asked is “is this actor political in the environment or group they 
belong to and work in?” A binary approach would answer “yes” or “no”. Such an 
approach cannot be adopted for a study of power. Pfeffer (1981, p. 37) further adds 
that “it is important to recognise that the identification of meaningful political units 
will change over time and be dependent on the particular set of issues at hand.” In 
conjunction with the transforming issues Pfeffer (1981) referred to, actors may also 
have multiple memberships, relationships and interests that are crosscut in a variety 
of different ways.  
 
One way of analys ing and measuring power is by its visible symbols. For Pfeffer 
(1981), such symbols include titles, special parking places and office size. However, 
one can only read so much into these symbols, and thinking that one can derive a 
precise measure of power, based on certain symbols is naïve and simplistic. There is 
no proof that specific, visible symbols, provide a perfect correlation to the amount of 
power an actor possesses.  
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Another way of finding out who possesses power is to ask people within the 
decision-making group. This is known as reputational indicators of power (Pfeffer, 
1981), which requires members of an organisation to rate and rank departments and 
subunits to assess the relative power each unit possesses. However, informants may 
be unwilling to tell you what they know about the power distribution within the unit, 
or simply that they do not have the knowledge about power within the unit. Pfeffer 
(1981, p. 45) added that identifying the powerful “requires observation of the various 
social actors prior to the decision-making event, as well as a knowledge of their 
preferences before the political activity began. If one knows the initial preferences, 
the attempts at influence undertaken, and then the final decision, power can be more 
reliably diagnosed.” One cannot simply administer a questionnaire or survey to 
identify the power actors possess within the unit, nor can one use specific symbols or 
interviews to assess the power within the unit.  
 
Pfeffer (1981) further suggested that power can be analysed by recognising specific 
symbols (such as title and office size) and by asking individuals to rate or rank other 
individuals and units in regards to perceived power. However, both of these methods 
have serious flaws, such as being overly simplistic and containing bias, as 
individuals would rank according to their preference and not to what the appropriate 
ranks are. Pfeffer (1981, p. 45) noted this and suggested that analysing power 
“requires observation of the various social actors prior to the decision-making 
event.” 
 
The implication of this approach is that power can be measured, a positivist and 
structuralist approach. It is believed that this approach to power misses the intricacy 
of what power is and how it operates in the organisation and system selection and 
implementation process. In other words, power has typically been represented as 
something that can be measured. Under the classical view of power, there is a 
structuralist understanding that power can be reduced to categories (French and 
Raven, 1958), and characteristics (Dahl, 1968). Power, by the definition employed in 
this study, is not a concrete term or concept. The definition of power is abstract in the 
sense that power is a social human behaviour and cannot be measured using a 
psychological scale. Power does not reside in, or is not an attribute of, people.  
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It is through this work that Lukes (1974) developed a seminal contribution to studies 
of power. Lukes (1974) developed a valuable link between what he sees as the 
behaviourist orientation of many organisational theorists and the views of other 
social theorists. His work provides an influential summary of earlier writings on 
power. Having studied and critiqued two previous conceptions of power by Dahl 
(1957) and Bachrach and Baratz (1962), which he distinguishes as the one-
dimensional view of the American pluralists and the two dimensional view of 
Bachrach and Baratz, Lukes (1974) then develops his own dimension - the third 
dimension of power.  
 
The first dimension as discussed by Lukes (1974) implies an intentional agency 
theory. This is the same view as Dahl (1957, p. 202), whereby “A has power over B 
to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.” Dahl 
referred to power as the controlling of someone else’s behaviour and/or actions, 
called ‘episodic power’. The focus in the first dimension is on the observable 
activities of members, “seeking proof of power in processes” (Thompson and 
McHugh, 2002, p. 123). Fundamentally the exercise of power entails conflict. More 
specifically, the process of power works through the realm of decision-making, with 
the winner prevailing through the possession of superior resources, acumen, or both 
(Lukes 1974). In other words, power can be easily identified and measured.  
 
Lukes (1974) also discusses a ‘second-dimension’ to power, proposed by Bachrach 
and Baratz (1962). The second dimension includes the notion of mobilizing bias and 
non-decision making. Essentially, the use of power can be seen not only in the overt 
attempts to influence decision-making, but also in the more subtle ways that issues 
put forward for decision making are selected and presented, in such a way as to head 
off the mere possibility of conflict. An example includes the professor who attends a 
meeting and  decides not to make a proposal (Introna, 1997). However, this still 
concentrates on the observable nature of power. As Lukes (1974, p. 20) states, “the 
two-dimensional view of power involves a qualified critique of the behavioural focus 
of the first view…and it allows for consideration of the ways in which decisions are 
prevented from being taken on potential issues over which there is an observable 
conflict of…interests, seen as embodied in express policy preferences and sub-
political grievances” (original authors emphasis). Lukes (1974) acknowledges that 
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there are hidden agendas of power and that ownership of resources sets the grounds 
upon which these agendas are set.  
 
Where Lukes (1974) differentiates himself from other researchers on power, is his 
third dimension, people’s interests. Lukes (1974, p. 27) defined power as: “A  
exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interests.” 
Furthermore, Lukes (1984) believed and acknowledged that processes cannot be 
measured, but the outcomes, in terms of the structuralist inequalities between groups 
can. Lukes (1974, p. 284) acknowledges that this is a hidden conflict, “which 
consists of a contradiction between the interests of those exercising power and the 
real interests of those they exc lude” (original authors emphasis). Power, for Lukes 
(1974), is vested in the ability to define reality for others, so that they internalise the 
existing order as ‘divinely ordained and beneficial’, or at least acquiesce in it because 
they can ‘imagine no alternative’ to it. Lukes (1974) proposes that power elites 
manage not only the first two dimensions of power but also this third, more subtle, 
dimension.  
 
Giddens (1979, 1984), Clegg (1989), Hardy (1996) and Thompson and McHugh 
(2002) are amongst Lukes’ critics. Hardy (1996) argues that Lukes’ (1974) third 
dimension of power sees power solely as being exercised in a ‘top-down’ manner, 
that the possibility of the less powerful being capable of influence is explicitly 
denied. Consequently Hardy refined Lukes’ model to include a ‘bottom-up’ aspect to 
each of the three dimensions. Further criticism of Lukes’ work is that there is an 
inadequate resolution of the dilemma between defining what power is and where it is 
located (Thompson and McHugh, 2002; Giddens, 1979, 1984). The difficulty lies in 
identifying whether it is culture, social groups, gender or race that determines power; 
or whether power depends on our will and responsibility.  
 
2.7 Power in Information Systems Research 
Lynne Markus was the first person to introduce power-based research into the 
Information Systems discipline via an arguably positivist (Lee, 1989) and 
interpretive perspective (Walsham, 1993; Lee, et al., 2000). The web version of the 
Social Science Citation Index shows that “over 200 other published studies have 
cited Markus’ classic paper since 1993 (the earliest year covered by the web version 
of SSCI)” (Lee, et al., 2000, p. 724). Markus (1983) based her work on Kling (1980), 
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who examined the role of politics and power in systems deve lopment through the 
social aspect of resistance to the diffusion of information technologies. Kling 
suggested that resistance can be viewed in a number of ways, from the rational to the 
structuralist, from human relations to an interactionist perspective, and from both an 
organisational and class political perspective. According to Romm and Plisken 
(1998, p. 83) these perspectives differed on a variety of dimensions, including “their 
view of technology, the social setting into which it is introduced, and the 
implications for the dynamics of the diffusion process.” By adopting these 
dimensions, Kling (1980) introduced a structuralist view of politics into the diffusion 
of information technology literature. Kling (1980) believed that the complex issues 
could be simplified and reduced into various categories, measurable by correlations 
between variables. Social activities and concepts however, are naturally messy and 
complex (Ball, 1990; Corbitt, 1995) and thus it is difficult to categorise their impact.  
 
By extending the work of Kling, Markus (1983) discussed the social aspects involved 
in Management Information Systems (MIS) implementation. Markus (1983) defined 
three major categories of resistance to diffusion: people-determined, system-
determined and interactionalist. However, Markus’ paper deals only with the obvious 
– an interpretative or positivist view about the role of influence, politics and agendas 
within organisations dealing with information systems. In her work, Markus focused 
her argument on a variant of interaction theory. Furthermore, Markus (1983, p. 431) 
argued that “here, resistance is explained as a product of the interaction of system 
design features with the intraorganisational distribution of power, defined either 
objectively, in terms of horizontal or vertical power dimensions, or subjectively, in 
terms of symbolism.”  
 
Information Systems research in the 1980’s and early 1990’s adopted the work of 
Kling (1980) and Markus (1983) as studies that were then completed investigating 
the strategies and tactics used by stakeholders to influence the information systems 
development process to their favour (Franz and Robey, 1984; Lyytinen and 
Hirschheim, 1987; Markus and Robey, 1983; Robey, 1984; Robey and Markus, 
1984; Robey, et al., 1993; Newman and Robey, 1992). However, the majority of 
these authors adopted the work of the structuralist, Dahl (1957), moving away from a 
post-structuralist view of power and politics in systems implementation, and towards 
a categorical and measurable positivist-based understanding of power. Romm and 
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Pliskin (1998; 1999) recognised the positivist view of power in Information Systems 
and suggested that there is more complexity involved behind the “seemingly simple 
definitions” (Romm and Pliskin, 1998, p. 82). As a result, Romm and Pliskin (1998, 
p. 82) discussed two different approaches to power utilised in information systems 
research: “the Marxist, or critical voice, and the functionalist, or managerialist 
voice.” Power-based research in the Information Systems discipline either follows 
the critical voice or the managerialist voice.  
 
Examples of research adopting a managerialist voice includes work by Robey 
(1984), who utilised the “zero-sum” game, where one party “wins” and the “losses” 
are suffered by other parties in conflict. This utilisation adopts a binary view of 
power, similar to Dahl (1957), where A has power over B. Later research by  Robey 
(1984; Robey and Farrow, 1982; Robey, et al., 1989) developed a model to 
investigate conflict involved in information systems development. This model 
consists of four variables: participation; influence; conflict; and conflict resolution 
(Robey, Smith and Vijayasarathy, 1993). In simplifying the conflict and conflict 
resolution process, Robey (1984) noted that “participation is treated as a determinant 
of influence, and influence is treated as a determinant of both conflict and conflict 
resolution” (Robey, et al., 1993, p. 125). This model has also been tested empirically 
(Robey and Farrow, 1982; Robey, et al., 1989).  
 
Research by Robey and Markus (1984) acknowledged that information systems 
implementation imposes both a technical and social change in an organisation. 
However, Robey and Markus (1984, p. 5) treated the political aspect of information 
systems implementation as ritual, or “symbolic behaviours that reinforce the 
prevailing belief system in an organisation.” There was no attempt to understand the 
inherent complexity of the political process in systems implementation. 
 
In an attempt to move away from the managerialist view, Markus and Bjørn-
Anderson (1987) extended previous work of power in Information Systems focusing 
on power relations. However, this is only in regards to “the professional/user power 
relation: the power of IS professionals over systems users” (Markus and Bjørn-
Anderson, 1987, p. 298). In essence, they investigated only one aspect of power 
relations. They categorised the exercise of power, taking into account the context and 
target of the power exercised. They categorised the exercise of power as: 
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· technical, where information systems professionals exercise power over users 
when system design features are selected and users will initially explicitly 
object;  
· structural, where the exercise of power is done by the “creation of 
organisational structures and routine operating procedures that give them 
formal authority over users or foster user dependence on them for important 
resources (Markus and Bjørn-Anderson, 1987, p. 500);  
· conceptual, by selecting objectives the information system will serve; and  
· symbolic, where users’ desires and values are shaped outside the context of 
the individual development effort. 
 
The focus of these power relationships is the interaction between the system designer 
and system user. In essence, this does not deal with the problem of power relations 
within the organisational context of systems implementation. Although Markus and 
Bjørn-Anderson (1987) attempted to move away from the managerialist approach to 
power, they adopted a categorical approach of the exercise of power in their study, 
arguing that power could be structured and placed into various categories, depending 
on how that power is exercised.  
 
In a further attempt at deepening the understanding of the role of power in systems 
development, and ultimately moving away from the managerialist approach to 
power, Hirschheim and Klein (1994) reviewed Mumford’s (1983) information 
systems development methodology – ETHICS – and proposed a different 
methodological approach to the more common structuralist method. In this different  
approach, Hirschheim and Klein (1994) discuss the concept of ‘neohumanism’, 
which according to Hirschheim and Klein (1994, p. 84), “insists that [user 
participation in the analysis, design, and implementation of an information system] is 
even more important for social sense-making to create ethical imperatives of work 
arrangements, in a democratic society.” Neohumanism utilises the structuralist 
approach and extends it to include emancipatory ideals and principles. By modifying 
Mumford’s (1983) ETHICS methodology to incorporate the neohumanism ideals, 
Hirschheim and Klein (1994) suggested how emancipation can be achieved through 
systems development.  
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Essentially, emancipation is concerned with remedies to overcome the 
communicative distortions, such as weaknesses of human personality including 
wilful unresponsiveness by an individual or information inequalities resulting from 
legitimate division of labour (Hirschheim and Klein, 1994) present in a given 
situation in systems implementation. In order to do this:  
· all members of the organisation must have an equal opportunity to raise 
issues by asking questions, making speeches, or giving rebuttals to questions 
and speeches of others;  
· members must be in an equal position to give and refuse orders, diffusing the  
distorting effects of power amongst members of the organisation;  
· members must be in an equal position to call into question the truth, 
correctness, appropriateness, or sincerity of what is said, helping to maximise 
the chances that the best available evidence is used to test factual truth; and 
· members must be in an equal position to express their attitudes, feelings, 
concerns and doubts, maximising the chances that illusions and deceptions 
are uncovered.  
This approach recognises the rich perspectives within systems implementation that 
are created by and create the systems implementation process, and recognise the 
importance of power and power relations in that process.  
 
Moving further away from the managerialist perspective, Myers and Young (1997) 
investigated the role of hidden agendas and power in managerial assumptions in 
information systems development. Myers and Young (1997) identified the need for 
research on social issues such as power and politics in systems implementation, by 
adapting Broadbent, et al.’s (1991) adaptation of Habermas’ (1984) model of societal 
development. Myers and Young (1997) examined how hidden agendas and power 
can be deeply embedded within information systems development projects. An 
ethnographic study explored an information system for mental health services in an 
organisation in New Zealand. The implementation of the system contained hidden 
agendas of management and more broadly of the New Zealand Government. 
Furthermore, the study by Myers and Young (1997) discussed the extent to which 
hidden agendas, power centres and managerial assumptions inhibit, repress and 
constrain user participation. 
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Building on research by Drory and Romm (1990), Romm and Pliskin (1998, 1999) 
adopted the framework of organisational politics combining three aspects: influence 
attempts; conflict; and informal means, and incorporate conflict into the “mainstream 
literature on organisation politics” (Romm and Pliskin, 1998, p. 83). They concluded 
that the use of email and its features, such as speed, multiple addressability, 
recordability, processing and routing, facilitate its use for political purposes. As has 
been argued previously, this view of power misses the complexities involved with 
power and politics, preferring an easy to measure and observe approach. 
 
In a more recent paper, Dhillon (2004) attempted to investigate power and 
information systems implementation utilising post-structuralist work by authors such 
as Lukes (1974) and Foucault (1976; 1977; 1978; 1980; 1982). However, in an 
attempt to interpret power, Dhillon (2004) reverts to the managerialist, structuralist 
view of power, adopting Hardy’s (1996) four dimensions of power, resource, 
process, meaning, and system-based power. Specifically, Dhillon (2004, p. 637) 
argued that successful implementation of an information system will occur when 
power residing in the resources, processes, and meaning can be effectively leveraged. 
By exploring the implementation of an information system at the Nevada Department 
of Motor Vehicles (DMV) and Public Safety, Dhillon (2004, p. 643) concluded that 
it is “important to understand the human behavioural aspects of analysis, design and 
management of systems. In particular, an understanding of power in the resources, 
processes, and meanings needed to align changes in the structure, systems, people, 
and culture.” Furthermore, three lessons were discussed from the implementation of 
the information system: 
· an understanding of resources, processes, and the meaning of power is a 
precursor to successful information systems  implementation; 
· in addition to understanding the dimensions of power, there is a need to 
address various alignment questions pertaining to the changes in structure, 
systems, people, and the culture; and  
· an adequate consideration and understanding of power vested in the system is 
essential for any successful information systems implementation. 
 
Power, by the definition employed in the Information Systems discipline, is a 
managerialist and structuralist concept, seeking a category to group the exercise of 
power in systems selection and implementation. However, as Dhillon (2004) 
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foreshadowed, there is an alternative perspective to power. It is abstract in the sense 
that it is a social human behaviour and cannot be simply measured using Likert 
scales. On the other hand Foucault (1980, p. 98) suggested that power must be 
analysed as  
something which circulates, or rather as something which only functions 
in the form of a chain. It is never localised here or there, never in 
anybody’s hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. 
Power is employed and exercised through a net- like organisation. And not 
only do individuals circulate between its threads, they are always in the 
position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising this 
power…individuals are the vehicles of power, not its points of application. 
In other words, power, for Foucault, is non-static, fluid and exercised, rather than 
something that can be possessed by managers and those seeking power. It is to this 
approach that we now turn.  
 
2.8 The post-structuralist view of power 
According to Buchanan and Badham (1999) no contemporary treatment of power is 
complete without reference to the French philosopher Michel Foucault. Foucault 
(1976; 1977; 1978; 1980; 1982) was concerned with the development of the human 
sciences, specifically the evolution of forms of discipline and control. Foucault’s 
work is argued to be both post-structuralist and post modern, despite him not 
accepting this label. Foucault does not hold that any essential or “real” structure 
underpins particular “events” (McHoul and Grace, 1993). This viewpoint opposes 
that of the classical, positivist view adopted in studies of power in the Information 
Systems literature. Rather than view power as episodic and structuralist, as the 
traditional view of power is, Foucault theorised a post-structuralist view of power. 
 
For Foucault (1976; 1977; 1978; 1980; 1982), power relations consist of two 
dimensions, bio-power and disciplinary power. Bio-power operates through 
establishing and defining what is normal or abnormal, and consequently what is 
socially deviant or acceptable in thought and behaviour (Buchanan and Badham, 
1999). This is achieved through the use of discourse. As a result, organisational 
culture, or culture of the systems implementation team, plays a significant role in 
sustaining and altering what we conceive as socially normal or deviant. Through this, 
we can challenge the power and discourse by questioning what is normal, rather than 
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accept the status quo, or the current and taken for granted definitions and 
representations.  
 
The other form of power that Foucault (1976; 1977; 1978; 1980; 1982) identified 
was that of disciplinary power. Disciplinary power operates through the construction 
of social and organisational routine, targeting individuals and groups (Foucault, 
1977). Power is therefore established through a set of techniques whose effects are 
achieved via disciplinary practices, the tools of surveillance and assessment to 
control and regiment individuals (Buchanan and Badham, 1999). This was based on 
Jeremy Bentham’s concept of the panopticon, a devise that was developed to 
constantly keep an eye on prisoners. A watchtower is established in the middle of a 
collection of cells. Each cell is observed from the central watchtower, but no cell can 
see into another cell. Prisoners could also not escape from being seen and no prisoner 
could tell if they were being watched or not. As a result, this affects their behaviour 
with the knowledge that they may be being watched. The prisoner would act under 
the assumption that they are indeed being watched. Similarly to bio-power, the 
structure of the panopticon encourages self-discipline (Buchanan and Badham, 
1999). Foucault (1977) concluded that the panopticon serves as a metaphor, claiming 
that disciplinary and bio-power, tacitly influence and constantly control our 
behaviour through our own self-monitoring. 
 
Foucault (1978, p. 94) claimed that “power comes from below; that is, there is no 
binary and all-encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at the root of power 
relations, and serving as a general matrix.” Rather than power being an absolute 
term, whereby someone has power all of the time, Foucault's notion of power is in 
the form of power relations. As Foucault (1978, p. 92) stated  
Power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force 
relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which 
constitute their own organisation; as the process which, through ceaseless 
struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them, as 
the support which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a 
chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions 
which isolate them from one another; and lastly, as the strategies in which 
they take effect, whose general design or institutional crystallisation is 
embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the 
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various social hegemonies…one needs to be nominalistic, no doubt: 
power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain 
strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a 
complex strategical situation in a particular society.  
 
In one of his later works, Foucault (1982, p. 220) noted that “what defines a 
relationship of power is that it is a mode of action, or mode of conduct, which does 
not act immediately and directly on others. Instead it acts upon their actions: an 
action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present  
or future.” In other words, power is not something that is possessed by individuals, 
but power is exercised upon the actions of others, thus breaking away from the 
classical and structuralist view of power as adopted by Dahl (1957).  
 
Deleuze (1988, p. 73) supported Foucault, claiming that power relations are 
Simultaneously local, unstable and diffuse, [power relations] do not 
emanate from a central point or unique locus of sovereignty, but at each 
moment move from one point to another, in a field of forces, making 
inflections, resistances, twists and turns, when one changes direction, or 
retraces one’s steps, this is why they are not ‘localized’ at any given 
moment. 
 
Power relations change from one moment to the next. They are never static, never 
standing still. It should be noted however, that people do not ‘have’ power implicitly; 
rather, power is a technique or action that individuals can engage in. Power should 
not be viewed as an entity, but rather a process. In other words, power is not 
possessed, it is exercised. A power relation only occurs where there is the potentiality 
for resistance, that is to say it may arise between two individuals each of whom has 
the potential to influence the actions of the other and to present resistance to this 
influence, the action upon an action as described above. Understanding power in this 
manner highlights the differences between the structuralist view of power and that of 
the post-structuralist, Foucault. For example, under the structuralist view, power is 
episodic, visible, observable in action, deployed intermittently, and is absent except 
when exercised, whereas through Foucault’s (1976; 1977; 1978; 1980; 1982) view, 
power is present in its absence, discreet, operating through taken-for-granted daily 
routines and modes of living. 
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We are not born with power, but we come into power. Foucault (1978, p. 94) argued 
that “power is not something that is acquired, seized or shared, something that one 
holds onto or allows to slip away.” These power relations are dynamic, transforming 
and constantly changing (McNay, 1994). Foucault claimed that power is 
transformable, that we may have power at one point in our life and then at another 
point in our life have no power. Foucault (1978, p. 93) stated that power “is produced 
from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one 
point to another. Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but 
because it comes from everywhere.” That is, power is instantiated in action.  
 
People look at what forces are at their disposal to get the obvious next step to be one 
that will serve the interests that they are concerned with in order to exercise power 
(Introna, 1997). However, people cannot predict what forces and power relations are 
in play since they are mobile and continually changing. Instead, people will draw 
upon those forces and power relations as they arise. Going further, every act, every 
communication by every person simultaneously reconfigures power; sometimes in a 
minute way and sometimes in a big way (Introna, 1997). In this sense then, power is 
imbued in the complexity of social agency. Its dynamic nature changes and alters the 
power relations that emerge. Inevitably this power is constructed by knowledge.  
 
In systems implementation, Dhillon (2004, p. 637) argued that “a properly planned 
implementation does result in shifting/modifying the power, however the success 
rates of such rationally planned approaches are rather dismal.” Additionally, there is 
a need in systems implementation to consider how the end-user resists the 
implementation of a system and how management imposes that system upon the end-
user. Work by Zuboff (1988) analysed the managerial techniques of control and 
surveillance, claiming that because of systems implementation and the power vested 
in these systems, the divide between the managers and employees increases, the 
former become increasingly isolated while the latter become suspicious. 
 
McNay (1994, p. 101) criticised Foucault because in Foucault’s writing, “power 
relations are only examined from the perspective of how they are installed in 
institutions and not considered from the point of view of those subject to power.” 
McNay claimed that Foucault is only discussing power from one point-of-view, the 
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institution. To provide a balanced discussion, McNay believed that Foucault needed 
to consider the power relation of those subject to overriding power, the less powerful, 
to see how they succumb and resist to the more powerful. In order to get a better 
understanding of the power relations operating in the system implementation process, 
the various actors need to be identified, from the managerial level to the end-user 
level in order to provide a more balanced discussion. 
 
Through the metaphor of the panopticon, Foucault (1977) argued that power is 
established and maintained not by overt legalistic control but, rather, by subtle forms 
of discipline. Disciplinary instruments of hierarchical observation, normalising and 
examinations are used. These serve to identify deviation from the norm or are overtly 
used for individuals “to become part of the ‘web of control’ of the state bureaucracy” 
(Kenway, 1990, p. 175). The influence of the larger social, political and economic 
contexts, and the history of the social drama acted out over time within specific 
arenas. Hatcher and Troyna (1994, p. 167) argued that “struggles over policy take 
place on a terrain already structured by power and above all by the power of the 
state,” or in this context an organisation and/or of ownership or governance 
structures.  
 
Hatcher and Troyna (1994) criticised Foucault, arguing that he underplays the 
coercive dimension of power of the state, and suggested that the state often uses 
force in implementation (cf McNay, 1994). It is an apparent simplification of what 
Foucault (1977) said to suggest that the organisation has no power. Rather, Foucault 
(1980) suggested that power is constituted by social relations and that when such a 
social relationship is created, the relationship can be challenged and/or modified. 
Social relationships he argued, not only exist as attraction but also generate 
resistance.  
 
The role of the organisation in systems implementation is accepted both as an 
influential parameter and as an influence affected by the recontextualisation of the 
situation of the information system in its organisational context (Corbitt 1997). 
Futhermore, in the realm of information systems implementation, it is argued that 
within an organisation actors are both empowered and disempowered and that it is by 
studying the immediate, the personal and the ordinary that the various levels of 
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resistance, empowerment and disempowerment can be recognised in the systems 
implementation process. 
 
By adopting Foucault’s (1976; 1977; 1978; 1980; 1982) notion of power relations, 
we are forced to pay attention to the myriad of mundane, transparent, taken-for-
granted, daily routines that continually shape our thinking and behaviour, and that of 
others (Buchanan and Badham, 1999). As Foucault (1976; 1977; 1978; 1980; 1982) 
argued - and it is believed that this is relevant in the realm of systems implementation 
- these power relations are constantly shifting, as they are open to challenge and 
dispute. It is through viewing systems selection and implementation from the 
perspective of various stakeholders, ranging from managers through to end-users 
over a period of time, that we are able to appreciate the dynamic nature of power 
relations. Furthermore, it is through knowledge that we are able to recognise the 
opportunities to find these areas of dispute or appropriate points of resistance and 
proactively challenge and achieve power.  
 
Foucault’s (1976; 1977; 1978; 1980; 1982) perspective of power relations served to 
remove the obscurity of the political role in controlling and regimenting individuals, 
opening up the practices of challenge and resistance (Buchanan and Badham, 1999). 
Essentially, as Foucault (1978, p. 95) suggested, “where there is power, there is 
resistance.” According to Ashforth and Mael (1998), resistance implies opposition 
against something, typically power and the attempt to influence or control an 
organisational member. They contended that power and resistance are embedded in a 
dynamic relationship, that one force triggers the other and vice versa. 
 
This contrasts with the classical use of resistance in Information Systems research. 
For example, Markus (1983, p. 432) viewed resistance as “a product of the 
interaction of system design features with the intra-organisational distribution of 
power, defined either objective ly, in terms of horizontal or vertical power 
dimensions, or subjectively, in terms of symbolism.” That is, potential users would 
resist information systems if “they cause a re-distribution of power that either 
conflicts with the organisational structure (objective definition) or with the interests 
of individuals who are likely to lose power as a result of the implementation 
(subjective definition)” (Romm and Pliskin, 1999, p. 28). Markus (1983) claimed 
that resistance typically falls into these categories. Krovi (1993) reproduced the 
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structuralist construction of resistance in information systems implementation, 
analysing the causes of this resistance. Change, he argued, is closely related to 
resistance (McKenna, 1994; Krovi, 1993; Markus, 1983).  
 
According to Mitchell (2004), to overcome resistance, problematic people either 
need to be replaced or co-opted into the development process. Furthermore, people 
resist due to factors inbuilt into the system being implemented. Careful selection of, 
or attention to software quality, will reduce the levels of user resistance. Finally, 
resistance is a product of the interaction between personal characteristics and system 
characteristics. There is a greater focus on issues like organisational setting and the 
impact on distributions of power, or more specifically, the mismatch between 
existing patterns of behaviour and new patterns introduced by the system (Mitchell, 
2004). By employing greater user participation, we may be able to overcome the 
issues of resistance that Markus (1983) suggested and remove the structuralist 
imposition of that approach. Peszynski and Corbitt (2003) argue that power is more 
diffuse and non-systematic than Markus (1983) had argued. Peszynski and Corbitt 
(2003) argued that power within organisations in systems implementation results 
from and creates subjugation of one group to another, thus creating a power shift.  
 
Furthermore, the systems implementation process is people- influenced rather than 
people-determined. Determinism suggests that power exists as some quantifiable 
whole and is ingrained and objective. Power in reality is intersubjective. It is, and is 
becoming, rather than exists unmoved or unchanged. Power changes and is changed. 
It forms and reforms as the context in which it is created or displayed and is 
recontextualised by the actors operating within it. The sub group leaders in the 
organisation described gained their ability to resist from reputation gained and 
respect imbued in their legitimate power. Power is enacted by subterfuge, 
containment, disruption, challenge and radical action. Power is not static but 
dynamic and enforced through challenge rather than hierarchy or organisational 
structure, as argued in the more interpretive/positivist paper of Markus in 1983, it is 
through discourse in which power is exercised.  
 
Power by means of discourse gives rise to regimes of truth. Truth, being knowledge 
that is held to be true, is produced in discontinuous, unstable and mobile political 
discourses that function as the “general politics of truth.” Each institution or society 
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has its “regimes of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is, the types of discourse 
which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances that 
enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is 
sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; 
the states of those who are changed with saying what counts as true” (Foucault, 
1977, p. 131). Part of the post-structuralist emphasis on decentring the subject is via 
discourse (Thompson and McHugh, 2002).  
 
Discourses are “about what can be said, and thought, and also about who can speak, 
when, where and with what authority” (Ball, 1990, p. 17). Discourses represent 
meaning and social relationships; they form both subjectivity and power relations. 
Discourses are also the practices of talk, text and argument that continuously form 
that which actors speak. Foucault’s disciplinary practices produce knowledge that is 
inseparable from power (Thompson and McHugh, 2002). Foucault (1978, p. 101) 
claimed that “we must make allowance for the complex and unstable process 
whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a 
hindrance, a stumbling block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an 
opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also 
undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it.” 
There is a double side to discourse. On one side, discourse liberates and links 
knowledge to power, it creates power. However, on the other side, discourse exposes 
our lack of knowledge or weakness, therefore allowing other (more knowledgeable 
people) to gain the upper hand (and hence more power). For Foucault (1980, p. 119) 
power “traverses and produces things, it induces pleasures, forms knowledge, 
produces discourse.” Power structures discourse in a discontinuous and diffused 
manner.  
 
Haidar and Rodriguez (1995, p. 120) suggested that “discursive practices are 
understood as happenings which essentially fall into the production and reproduction 
of social, historical and cultural life manifesting not only linguistic mechanisms but 
also devices of a different order, such as those that reproduce ideology and contribute 
to maintaining existing power structures.” The link between how discourses are 
created and the power relations is supported by the ideologies of the group or 
individual members. Foucault (1980, p. 102) argued that: 
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The major mechanisms of power have been accompanied by ideological 
productions…basically I believe that what has taken place can be said 
to be ideological. It is both much more and much less than ideology. It 
is the production of effective instruments for the formation and 
accumulation of knowledge – methods of observation, techniques of 
registration, procedures for investigation and research, apparatuses of 
control. All this means that power, when it is exercised through these 
subtle mechanisms, cannot but evolve, organise and put into circulation 
a knowledge, or rather apparatuses of knowledge, which are not 
ideological constructs. 
 
By utilising discourse, members are able to challenge the existing power relations 
and in effect, establish a new power relation. Members of the implementation team 
rely on their ideologies to create their discourse, and as a result, define the power 
relations inside the systems implementation team. Ideologies are the “basic 
frameworks for organizing the social cognitions shared by members of social groups, 
organisations or institutions…ideologies are both cognitive and social. They 
essentially function as the ‘interface’ between the cognitive representations and 
processes underlying discourse and action, on the one hand, and the societal position 
and interests of social groups, on the other hand” (Van Dijk, 1995, p. 18).  
 
Westwood and Clegg (2003) claimed that all discourses are in a constant state of 
change, as the interactional and textual work that sustains them ebbs and flows. 
Discourses broaden, develop, and strengthen, but they also wither, decay and die and 
are reconstituted as they synthesize, bifurcate, coalesce, and fragment. Westwood 
and Clegg (2003, p. 1) stated “discourses vary in terms of their longevity, coherence 
and power effects.”  
 
Discourses inside systems implementation constantly change as they are challenged, 
re-created, challenged again and so forth. The discourses surrounding the power 
relations reflect the dynamic nature of the power relations. The discourse is 
established in the exercise of power of individuals or groups. It is through resistance 
that these power relations are challenged. As the power relation is challenged, so to 
is the discourse. A new discourse is established as an outcome and this discourse 
continues until the next cha llenge. As I have previously argued, systems 
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implementation is a complex process due to the human factors involved, specifically 
the power and the politics. Discourses allow us to interpret or observe these changing 
power relations. However, as has been noted, discourse is the hidden dimension of 
power and politics systems implementation. This hidden dimension co-exists and is 
both derived from and determines a more obvious position, that of policy. 
In order to legitimise power, it can be argued that policy is required. By 
implementing policy, those with power are able to further legitimise their position 
and effectively create disciplinary power, requiring the individual to comply with 
their policy. Hogwood and Gunn (1984, p. 13-18) confirm this by stating that policy 
is used “as an expression of general purpose or desired state of affairs; as decisions 
of governments; as formal authorisation.” Policy essentially gives the ability to 
appropriate legitimacy and therefore power. Silver (1990, p. 7) confirms this by 
suggesting that policy is about “relationships of communication, power, exploitation, 
consensus, co-operation, competition, and structures, which are formed by those 
relationships and which impact upon them.”  
 
There is currently no literature exploring the use of policy in system selection and 
implementation, which has highlighted a significant weakness and gap in the 
literature. However, research by Corbitt and Thanasankit (2002, p. 42), has 
investigated the role of policy in eCommerce development, highlighting the issue 
that concepts such as power, control and legitimacy “affect the perceptions and 
ideology underpinning the policy, and the perceptions of its meanings of those to 
whom the policy is directed.” As a result, policy development is essentially viewed 
as political and non-rational. That is, bureaucrats and elected officials play a central 
and complex role in the policy process and cannot be separated from politics 
(Portney, 1986; Nakamura and Smallwood, 1980). Rather, policy is “influenced by 
pluralistic inequality associated with sectional interests, power and factions” (Corbitt, 
2000, p. 311). Prunty (1984, p. 5), further stated that policy “serves to highlight the 
issues of power, control, legitimacy, privilege, equity, justice, and above all, values 
so embedded in the concept of policy.”  
 
Corbitt and Thanasankit (2002) claim that power is not limited to existence. It is also 
related to leadership and acceptance. Peszynski and Corbitt (2003) argue that power 
and hegemony change and are changed. They form and reform as the context in 
which it is created or displayed and is recontextualised by the actors operating within 
 
 
47 
it. Hegemony is existential, created by previous experiences, and influenced by 
current experiences. According to Gramsci (1971, cited in Strinati, 1995, p. 165), 
hegemony is a phenomenon whereby “dominant groups in society, including 
fundamentally, but not exclusively, the ruling class, maintain their dominance by 
securing the ‘spontaneous consent’ of subordinate groups, including the working 
class, through the negotiated construction of a political and ideological consensus 
which incorporates both dominant and dominated groups.” Essentially, hegemony 
manifests the role of a dominant government in policy, reflecting the relationship 
between the stakeholders and frames the way political influences affect policy 
development (Corbitt and Thanasankit, 2002; Corbitt, 2000). 
 
Power relations and hegemony, due to their existential nature are dynamic, 
transforming and constantly changing. We create our hegemony, discourses and 
power relations at the same time that we are created by them – similar to Giddens’ 
view of society under Structuration Theory (1979; 1984). This approach also extends 
Lukes’ (1974) third dimension of power, in which the agency and its effects remain 
hidden. However, Foucault’s disciplinary power entirely removes the controlling 
relationship between the subject and the object (Thompson and McHugh, 2002). By 
adopting the concept of the panopticon, disciplinary power encourages self-
discipline, where prisoners would change their actions in order to comply with the 
watchtower. Similarly, individuals would change their behaviour and actions in order 
to comply with the discourse and hegemony established, overcoming resistance and 
ultimately challenges to the power relations operating. 
 
2.9 Conceptual Lens  
As has been argued previously, systems implementation literature has typically been 
structuralist in nature. There is a view that if systems analysts ensure adherence to 
certain factors, then implementation of a system will be successful. However, the 
reality is more complex due to the power and politics that exist through the 
implementation process. In order to make sense of these complex issues, we need to 
adopt an argument that allows the researcher to observe and make sense of these 
issues. Foucault’s (1976; 1977; 1978; 1980; 1982) concept of power relations is 
appropriate because it has been acknowledged that power is non-static, that power 
relations constantly ebb and flow, and is exercised through discourse. In addition, 
processes like systems implementation are dynamic. At one phase of systems 
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implementation, certain individuals or groups may have power. In the next phase, 
that power may be challenged and new power relations established. As has been 
argued throughout this chapter, this understanding of power pushes our 
understanding beyond the positivist perspective adopted in such studies, categorising 
the various aspects of power. 
 
In this thesis, the non-structuralist view of power as both an obvious and hidden 
concept provides a lens through which the researcher can observe an implementation 
process. Rather than focusing on the obvious stages of systems implementation, 
which have been well documented, the paradigm used in this research enables the 
observation and extraction of rich data, which will expose the emancipatory levels of 
influence, such that the realms of power, specifically the concept of power relations, 
are exposed.  
 
This will enable a deeper understanding of the processes involved in systems 
implementation and enable the complexity in that process to be made explicit. Rather 
than viewing power as a possession and adopting a structuralist perspective, this 
study will observe the various stakeholders of the organisation over a period of time, 
promoting the post-structuralist view of power. In the case study that is the focus of 
this thesis, the meaning of the obvious process of systems implementation and the 
stages of that implementation are deconstructed to expose the hegemonic nature of 
policy, the reproduction of organisational culture, the emancipation within discourse, 
and the nature of resistance and power. What this will do is enable the researcher to 
unravel the complexity, expose intent and enrich our understanding of the systems 
implementation process. 
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Chapter Three – Research Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter outlines the methodological approach taken in this study. Previous 
studies in systems implementation have traditionally adopted a positivist approach. 
This approach has also extended into studies exploring power in systems 
implementation, which treats power as a possession and attempts to categorise power 
(Chapters 2.7). This research however, has adopted a post-structuralist view of 
power, whereby power is exercised and constantly transforming action upon action. 
As a post-structuralist view of power has been adopted, in conjunction with the 
concept of power relations theorised by the anti-positivist Foucault (Chapter 2.8), a 
post-positivist methodological approach is required. This approach enables the 
researcher to provide a rich understanding of systems implementation by exploring 
the hegemonic nature of policy, the reproduction of organisational culture, the 
emancipation within discourse, and the nature of resistance and power in systems 
implementation. This approach therefore allows the researcher to answer the question 
“how is power and politics an integral part of the systems selection and 
implementation process?”  
 
This chapter provides justification for the research approach used in this study. 
Adopting a post-positivist methodological approach precludes the quantitative 
research approach. Section 3.2 therefore discusses the adoption of the qualitative 
research approach, highlighting its use in studies where meaning of the phenomenon 
is created through members and their perception of the world. Section 3.3 discusses 
the adoption of the critical epistemology and how it is used to answer the research 
question.  
 
Sections 3.4 through 3.6 discuss and justify the data collection and data analysis 
methods. Data was collected via a case study with interviews of members of the 
selection and implementation team of an enterprise-wide learning management 
system at the University of Australia. Myers (1997), citing the work of others, claims 
that case study research can be positivist (Yin, 1994), interpretive (Walsham, 1993), 
or critical. As a result, data was analysed under the critical epistemology with a 
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combination of discourse analysis and social dramas, which identifies key events in 
the selection and implementation of the learning management system. 
 
Section 3.7 outlines issues of validity associated with the research. As this research 
adopts a critical epistemology and data was collected via interviews, issues of truth 
and knowledge of the data collected and of the analysis are raised. Such issues need 
to be overcome to ensure that any findings are valid and credible. Section 3.8 will 
provide a summary to this chapter.  
 
3.2 Research Approach 
The nature of the problem partially determines why a researcher should select a 
particular methodology (Creswell, 1994). For a quantitative study, other researchers 
have previously studied the problem and, as a result, a body of literature exists, the 
variables are already known and theories already exist. This differs for a qualitative 
study whereby the study is of an exploratory nature, the variables are unknown, the 
context is important and there is a lack of theory. Qualitative research also has 
different aims from quantitative research. It answers questions about what is 
happening in a particular situation. It gives an impression and feeling that can 
describe in detail what is happening in a community or in a conversation and 
includes the meaning of the message, feelings, and effects (Bouma and Ling, 2004).  
 
In qualitative research, what people say is captured and interpreted to understand the 
participants’ point-of-view of a particular event or phenomenon (Burns, 2000). The 
qualitative approach is appropriate when it is used to answer questions about the 
nature of a phenomenon with the purpose of describing and understanding the 
phenomenon from the member’s point of view (Leedy, 1997; Orlikowski and 
Baroudi, 1991). Ongoing interaction with participants and continuous reflection are 
needed to be able to collect more data to support the findings and give opportunity 
for the researcher to learn more from the subject or participants. Therefore, in 
qualitative research, the researcher is more interactive with the participants than in 
quantitative research (Bouma and Ling, 2004).  
 
A qualitative approach was adopted for this study as qualitative research includes the 
notion that the qualitative researcher is interested in meaning, how people make 
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sense of their lives, experiences, and their structures of the world. Creswell (1994) 
claimed that the qualitative researcher is the primary instrument for data collection 
and analysis. Data is collected and analysed through this human instrument, rather 
than through inventories, questionnaires or machines. Qualitative research is 
descriptive in that the researcher is interested in process, meaning and understanding 
gained through words or pictures (Leedy, 1997). Morse (1991, p. 120) highlights 
particular characteristics of qualitative research, claiming that such research is 
appropriate if “(a) the concept is “immature” due to a conspicuous lack of theory and 
previous research; (b) a notion that the available theory may be inaccurate, 
inappropriate, incorrect or biased; (c) a need exists to explore and describe the 
phenomenon and to develop theory; or (d) the nature of the phenomenon may not be 
suited to quantitative measure.”  
 
Although systems implementation has received significant attention, there has been 
little research adopting a post-structuralist view of power and politics in systems 
implementation. Earlier research in the systems implementation process does not tell 
us the “why,” or provide rich insights into the social phenomena of systems 
implementation. Instead, researchers have been exploring the steps involved with 
systems implementation and the critical success factors used to classify a system as 
being successfully implemented. This approach has been critiqued throughout 
Chapter Two as being positivist. A qualitative approach is therefore required for this 
research as it enables the researcher to understand the events involved in systems 
implementation, through the eyes of the members of the implementation team.  
 
3.3 Critical Perspective 
Just because a study is qualitative, it does not mean that an interpretive perspective is 
automatically adopted (Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991). Klein and Myers (1999) 
explicitly state that the word ‘qualitative’ is not a synonym for ‘interpretive’ and that 
the perspective of the researcher depends upon the underlying philosophical 
assumptions of the researcher. Chua (1986) described three categories in which a 
researcher’s perspective is based: positivist, interpretive and critical. Positivists 
generally assume that reality is objectively given and can be described by measurable 
properties, which are independent of the researcher and his or her instruments. 
Positivist studies generally attempt to test theory in an attempt to increase the 
predictive understanding of phenomena (Chua, 1986). Previous studies in both 
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systems implementation and power in an information systems context have adopted a 
positivist approach. The positivist approach lacks the depth and detail of what 
actually occurs in the system implementation process.   
 
Information Systems research can be classified as interpretive if it is assumed that 
our knowledge of reality is gained only through social constructions such as 
language, shared meanings, documents, and other artefacts. Interpretive research 
focuses on the complexity of human sense making as the situation emerges. It 
attempts to understand phenomena through the meanings that people assign to them 
(Walsham, 1995). As described in Chapter 2.7, the majority of early work exploring 
power in information systems has adopted a functionalist or managerialist view. The 
attempt to move towards an interpretive epistemology came in the late 1980’s with 
work by Markus and Bjørn-Anderson (1987) and Hirschheim and Klein (1994). The 
interpretive epistemology became more accessible in the late 1990’s with work by 
Myers and Young (1997) and Romm and Pliskin (1998, 1999).  
 
A third research perspective is the critical approach. Critical researchers assume that 
social reality is historically constituted and that it is produced and reproduced by 
people. Although people can consciously act to change their social and economic 
circumstances, critical researchers recognise that their ability to do so is constrained 
by various forms of social, cultural and political domination (Chua, 1986). Critical 
research focuses on the opposition, conflict and contradiction in contemporary 
society, seeking to eliminate the causes of these inconsistencies (Orlikowski and 
Baroudi, 1991).  
 
Unlike the positivist approach to Information Systems research, the critical approach 
observes people “not as passive receptacles of whatever data or information that is 
transported to them, but as intelligent actors who assess the truthfulness, 
completeness, sincerity, and contextuality of the messages they receive” 
(Ngwenyama and Lee, 1997, p. 153). The critical approach also differs from the 
interpretive approach as the critical approach “requires the researcher to attend to not 
only the matter of mutual understanding, but also the matter of the emancipation of 
organisational actors from false or unwarranted beliefs, assumptions and constraints” 
(Ngwenyama and Lee, 1997, p. 153-154).  
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According to Kinchelow and McLaren (2000, p. 281), critical researchers are 
concerned with “issues of power and justice and the ways that the economy, matters 
of race, class and gender, ideologies, discourses, education and other social 
institutions, and cultural dynamics interact to construct a social system.” The 
researcher is interested in analysing competing power interests between groups and 
individuals within society, identifying who gains and who loses in specific situations, 
which Kinchelow and McLaren (2000) claimed is a central focus of critical research. 
Furthermore, the critical researcher is “concerned with critiquing existing social 
systems and revealing any contradictions and conflicts that may adhere within their 
structures” (Bernstein 1978, p. 181). The researcher tried to create awareness and 
understanding of the various forms of social domination, ultimately, so that people 
can act to eliminate them. The critical epistemology is best suited for this research as, 
in tradition with the anti-positivist work of Foucault, a positivist or interpretive 
epistemology would lack the ability to focus on the oppositions, conflicts and 
contradictions in contemporary society, which the critical epistemology provides 
(Myers, 1997). 
 
Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991, p. 19) added that in critical research “social reality is 
understood to be produced and reproduced by humans, but also as possessing 
properties which tend to dominate human experience…the critical research 
philosophy emphasises the processual development of phenomena. Social relations 
are not posited as stable and orderly, but as constantly undergoing change.” This fits 
with the perspective of the current study and is post-positivist, thus sharing 
Foucault’s anti-positivist epistemology.   
 
A critical theory approach has been adopted for this study as it is believed that 
critical theory will create awareness and understanding, for the researcher, of the 
various forms of social domination. By using critical theory, the researcher is able to 
critically assess the social reality being studied – power and politics in systems 
implementation. The problem remains about how to analyse power and undertake 
this type of research. 
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3.4 Data Collection Method 
In qualitative research, there are different research methods available to collect and 
analyse information. The choice of research method informs the way in which the 
researcher collects data. Specific research methods also imply different skills, 
assumptions and research practices (Creswell, 1994). The objective of this research is 
to provide a rich understanding of the power and politics involved in systems 
implementation. As a qualitative approach has been adopted for this research, the 
researcher wishes to tell the story of the selection and implementation of an 
enterprise-wide learning management system at the University of Australia. The 
ability of telling this story can be either by being a participant and reporting the story 
as it unfolds, or as an observer, interviewing members of the selection and 
implementation team re-telling the story from the members’ perspective. Both 
approaches will be discussed. 
 
Creswell (1994, p. 11) stated that the ethnographic researcher “studies an intact 
cultural group in a natural setting during a prolonged period of time by collecting, 
primarily, observational data.” This is supported by Leedy (1997) who noted that the 
ethnographic method focuses itself on “discovering cultural patterns in human 
behaviour; describing the perspective of members of the culture; and studying the 
natural settings in which culture is manifested” (Gall et al., cited in Leedy, 1997, p. 
159). As the researcher was not a member of the organisation or the systems 
implementation team an ethnographic approach cannot be adopted for this study; as 
the researcher was unable to study the implementation process over a period of time.  
 
The alternate data collection method is the case study. According to Benbasat et al 
(1987, p. 370), a case study is an examination of “a phenomenon in its natural 
setting, employing multiple methods of data collection to gather information from 
one or a few entities.” Yin (1994) further added that the case study method is an 
appropriate strategy when the research tries to answer “how?” or “why?” questions, 
when the researcher has little control over the events being observed, and when the 
object is a contemporary phenomenon within some real life context.  
 
The work by Yin (1994) can be seen as positivist, which the researcher 
acknowledges. However, as Myers (1997) states, “case study research can be 
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positivist, interpretive, or critical, depending upon the underlying philosophical 
assumptions of the researcher” The work by Yin (1994) has been used under a 
positivist epistemology (Yin, 1994; Benbasat et al., 1987). Work by Walsham (1993) 
has highlighted an interpretive in-depth use of case study research.  The researcher 
wishes to further advance this in-depth use via the critical epistemology, as 
acknowledged by Myers (1997).  
 
Yin (1994, p. 13) claimed that the case study method is “an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real- life context, especially when 
the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.” In other 
words, the case study needs boundaries to limit the scope of the research, otherwise 
the case can go into other phenomena and can not create distinct identity in what the 
researcher is trying to find. The case study needs boundaries that are sufficiently 
clear and obvious to help the researcher to see what is included within the case and 
what is excluded from the case (Denscombe, 1998).  
 
Yin (1994, p. 13) further argued that case study inquiry “copes with the technically 
distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data 
points, and as one result relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to 
converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result benefit from the prior 
development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis.” 
Although this approach is positivist, through the nature of variables, the idea that 
multiple sources of data should be collected increases the validity and reliability of 
any particular study. There is a need to have multiple sources of data in this research 
in order to enhance and validate the re-telling of the selection and implementation of 
the enterprise-wide learning management system by the researcher (Section 3.7). 
However, the advantage of a case study is that there is no specific data collection and 
analysis method, rather a variety of collection and analysis methods that can be used 
in conjunction with one another to provide triangulation and rigour to the research. 
This makes the case study a comprehensive research strategy (Stake, 1994; Yin, 
1994). Data from different sources can also be cross examined to see the consistence 
of the findings to support the analysis (Denscombe, 1998). Data was collected via 
interviews with members of the implementation team and supporting documents 
(Section 3.5). 
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Lee (1989) stated that there is a strong case-study tradition in the academic field of 
information systems citing the work of Benbasat, et al. (1987), Fulk and Dutton 
(1984), Kling (1978), Kling and Iacono (1984), Kraemer, et al. (1987), Laudon 
(1974), Leonard-Barton (1987) and Markus (1983). Benbasat, et al. (1987) argued 
that case study research is well-suited to information systems research not only 
because “the researcher can study information systems in a natural setting, learn 
about the state of art, and generate theories from practice” (Benbasat, et al., p. 381), 
but also “to understand the nature and complexity of the processes taking place” 
(Benbasat, et al., p. 381). Although this work is dated, it does show the usefulness, 
significance and acceptance of the case study method for performing research in the 
information systems discipline. 
 
There are disadvantages of using case study as the research method (Denscombe, 
1998). As the case study method uses only a few examples to represent a wider range 
of examples that are being investigated, the credibility of generalisation made from 
the findings is easily criticised (Yin, 1994; Borg and Gall, 1989; Denscombe, 1998). 
However, Orlikowski and Baroudi (1989, pp. 13-14, cited in Walsham, 1993, p. 15) 
argued in favour for the use of case studies in post-positivist information systems 
research, claiming that “the argument of non-generalisability is often 
raised…[however] every particular social relation is the product of generative forces 
or mechanisms operating at a more global level, and hence the [post-positivist] 
analysis is an induction from the concrete situation to the social totality beyond the 
individual case.” The findings in a case study should not be limited to just the one 
case, instead being generalised to similar cases because there are the same 
“generative forces” influencing the social relationships. Drawing upon the argument 
of Stake (2000) and Lincoln and Guba (1985, p. 111), they believed that the term 
“generalisation” is extreme, claiming that “when a generalisation has been devised, 
no member of that class, kind, or order can escape its pervasive influence.” There is a 
notion in the Information Systems discipline that craves for a theory that attempts to 
explain large categories of phenomena, a grand theory. Rather than focusing on these 
grand theories, it is believed that theories should be developed that are based on 
either substantive theories or middle-range theories. Substantive theories are 
restricted to a particular setting such as group, time, population, or problem whereas 
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middle-range theories fall between minor working hypotheses of everyday life and 
the all- inclusive grand theories (Creswell, 1994; Merriam, 1988). Stake (2000, p. 
439) states that “generalisation should not be emphasised in all research.” 
 
It is difficult to define boundaries to limit the scope of the case (Denscombe, 1998). 
If the definitions of the boundaries are not clear enough, the case becomes easy to be 
influenced by other factors outside the scope.  On the other hand, if the boundaries 
are too inflexible, the case becomes impervious to reflect the nature of boundaries 
(Denscombe, 1998). Benbasat et al. (1987) stated that the boundaries in case study 
research are not clearly obvious, therefore it is easy for the case to be influenced by 
other factors outside the scope. Stake (2000) therefore advises the researcher to 
decide which factors should be included in the research and which factors should be 
ignored; otherwise, it is difficult to state what the case is. 
 
A conceptual lens has been provided in Chapter 2.9, which, in conjunction with the 
post-positivist and post-structuralist critical approach outlined above, highlights the 
need for a rich understanding of systems implementation, taking into consideration 
the hegemonic nature of policy, the reproduction of organisational culture, the 
emancipation within discourse, and the nature of resistance and power. The case 
study of University of Australia is an in-depth case study, investigating the 
implementation of an enterprise-wide learning management system, spanning five 
years (Chapter 4.2).  
 
3.5 Data collection procedures 
Case studies accept and encourage multiple methods of data collection procedures, in 
order to increase the rigour and credibility, offering triangulation amongst the 
collected data. Data was collected for this research with: 
· Interviews – “Open-response questions to obtain data of member meanings – 
how individuals conceive their world and how they explain or ‘make sense’ 
of the important events in their lives” (McMillan and Schumacher, 1993 cited 
in Leedy, 1997, p. 159). 
· Document Collection – The collection of documents including letters, 
personnel files, memos, annual reports and objects such as posters to 
supplement the other information collection methods. 
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· Twenty face-to-face, one-on-one, interviews were conducted with the 
members outlined in Table 3.1 below. This method was selected as, 
according to Daft and Lengel (1986, p. 560) it is the “richest medium because 
it provides immediate feedback so that interpretation can be checked. It also 
provides multiple cues via body language and tone of voice.”  
 
The information was collected via written notes made by the researcher, and, with 
the permission of each member, an audiotape-recorder was used in each interview. 
After each interview, a transcription of the interview was made. Notes were also 
made during the interview, including reflective notes and demographic information 
such as the time, date and location of the interview. These aided in providing an audit 
trail if such a study were to be replicated. 
 
As with most types of qualitative research, the style of interviewing changed with 
each interview. The researcher used what has been referred to as ‘reflection-on-
experience’ (Boud, 1993; Schön, 1987; Yoong, 1999), which involves “the trainee 
[interviewer] revisiting the experience [first and subsequent interviews]… The 
interviewer re-evaluates the experience, makes connections with prior experience, 
and plans the appropriate strategy to deal with similar events in the future [in this 
case, modifying the questions in order to achieve the appropriate answer to the 
research question, or further identify issues that arose in the first interview]” (Yoong, 
1999, p. 94).  
 
As a result the questionnaire was modified slightly for each interview. This method 
was used as it allowed the researcher to probe further on issues identified in 
interviews conducted with members of the systems implementation team. However, 
most interviews were in the form of, and used derivatives of, the following questions, 
“could you please tell me the story of the systems implementation?”, “what type of 
role did you play in the systems implementation?”, and “where there any obstacles in 
your way, in your position (project manager/project champion/end user) during the 
systems implementation process?” The questions changed to reflect the observations 
made of the systems implementation group. The final interview schedule is attached 
in Appendix A. Each interview lasted between sixty and ninety minutes.  
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Once the interview was conducted, a transcript of the interview was written and sent 
to the member interviewed in order for them to check the interview and provide 
changes if information was taken out of context (Section 3.7). Minor changes were 
made to some questions, particularly to obtain more information or focus on a 
particular event. Questions were also modified for each representative from different 
faculties or divisions. For example, there would be no point asking a representative 
from the Division of Teaching and Learning what specifically happened in the 
Faculty of Commerce and Administration. Therefore questions pertinent to the 
Division of Teaching and Learning were asked. 
 
The other source of data collection was in the form of documents, which included 
collecting publicly available information such as books reporting the history of the 
University of Australia, conference and journal papers relating to distance education 
and learning management systems at the University of Australia, action and project 
plans relating to the selection and implementation of the latter enterprise-wide 
learning management system, and available minutes of meetings from the meetings 
relating to the selection and implementation of the latter enterprise-wide learning 
management system. The time period these documents spanned ranged from a 
recollection of the previous 25 years of the University of Australia, published in 
2002, through to minutes of over 50 meetings held between 2002 and 2004. 
Although the minutes of meetings may be seen as sanitised, the contents of those 
meetings were used in order to support the chronological order of events of the 
selection and implementation process of the enterprise-wide learning management 
system in the University of Australia.  
 
The benefits of collecting documents as a method of data collection according to Yin 
(1994, p. 80) are that the information contained in documents are: 
· stable, and can be reviewed repeatedly;  
· unobtrusive, as they are not created by members of the organisation for the 
purpose of the research;  
· exact, as the information contains exact names, references and details of 
events;  
· broad in coverage, spanning a long period of time; and 
· able to corroborate and augment details given in interviews. 
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It was anticipated that this would help the researcher in obtaining information on 
how power relations are created or transformed during the periods or social dramas 
of the systems implementation group. Obtaining access to these documents helped 
the researcher to validate and verify what members of the selection and 
implementation have said. This in turn creates a richer picture of the systems 
implementation group and how they operated during the implementation process.  
 
In order to collect the data, the researcher has adopted the metaphor of the traveller, 
as discussed in Kvale (1996). The researcher can then report what has been described 
by the members and what has been supplemented by the documents collected. The 
researcher is then able to reconstruct a story of the implementation of the enterprise-
wide learning management system by the stories given by the members interviewed. 
Essentially, the researcher is providing their interpretation on the narratives provided 
by the members interviewed. This is similar to the ‘traveller metaphor’ as discussed 
by Kvlae (1996). This metaphor holds that “the interviewer is a traveller on a journey 
that leads to a tale to be told upon returning home. The interviewer-traveller wanders 
through the landscape and enters into conversations with the people 
encountered…what the travelling reporter hears and sees is described quantitatively 
and is reconstructed as stories to be told to the people of the interviewer’s own 
country” (Kvale, 1996, p. 4). Meanings of the narratives provided by the members 
may be differentiated, raising issues of validity and reliability, which are discussed in 
Section 3.7. It is acknowledged that if other researchers were replicating this study, 
different interpretations may be obtained.  
 
Sixteen members of the systems implementation team were involved in this research 
out of 23 potential members. The Deputy Vice-Chancellor delegated the selection of 
members of the Executive Group and Evaluation Group to the Head of the Division 
of Teaching and Learning. The Executive Group consisted of six members and 
oversaw the Evaluation Group, which consisted of 17 members. As the Head of the 
Division of Teaching and Learning, Helen2, recalled, “I put forward what the 
Executive Group and Evaluation Group should look like by writing to the Deans of 
each faculty asking for their nomination. However I would suggest X and Y, so I was 
going to end up with the people that I insisted on one way or another.” The 
                                                 
2 Pseudonyms have been provided for all people, places and other identifiable names in order to keep 
anonymity of members. 
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researcher selected the sixteen members based on a careful evaluation of the meeting 
minutes and asking other interviewed members to identify key members of the 
selection and implementation team.  
 
It was important to get a broad cross-section of each faculty and division affected by 
the implementation of the enterprise-wide learning management system. There was 
at least one member from each faculty (Commerce and Administration; Medical and 
Health Sciences; Creative Arts; Education; and Technology) involved in this study, 
members from the National Tertiary Education Union (NTEU), members of the 
Senior Executive of the university and representatives of the two major services 
divisions involved (the Division of Teaching and Learning and the Division of IT). 
By having such a broad cross-section, it increases the plausibility of the story, getting 
each view from each affected faculty or division. This also allows the researcher to 
verify the selection and implementation process from the points-of-view of various 
entities involved, thus increasing the reliability of the narrative as told by the 
researcher. All members interviewed are listed in Table 3.1 and represent a broad 
spectrum of the selection and implementation team. 
 
Table 3.1. Members of the University of Australia Enterprise-wide Learning 
Management System Selection and Implementation Team 
Name Position Area 
Prof. John Clement Pro-Vice Chancellor 
(Distance Education) 
Vice Chancellor and 
President 
Prof. Elizabeth Reeder Professor of Online 
Learning 
Vice Chancellor and 
President 
Dr. Samantha Davies Senior Lecturer Faculty of Technology 
Ms Helen Paige Head of Division Division of Teaching and 
Learning 
Mr Martin Nichols Project Manager Division of IT 
Mr Simon Price IT Manager Division of Teaching and 
Learning 
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Ms Rose O’Leary Desktop Publishing 
Manager 
Faculty of Commerce 
and Administration 
Mr Sebastian Abbott Head of Division Division of IT  
Dr. Peter Quirk Online Communication 
Manager 
Division of Teaching and 
Learning 
Ms Norma Little IT Manager Faculty of Commerce 
and Administration 
Mr Paul Foxcroft Lecturer Faculty of Commerce 
and Administration 
Mr Nick Jansen Library Website Designer Division of Teaching and 
Learning 
Ms Diane Johnston Head of Teaching and 
Learning Support 
Division of Teaching and 
Learning 
Ms Lara Lawson Online Learning Manager Faculty of Creative Arts 
Dr. Christopher Bing Online Teaching and 
Learning Manager 
Faculty of Education 
Dr. Sean Parkinson Online Learning Manager Faculty of Medical and 
Health Sciences 
 
This distribution of key informants was considered sufficient for triangulation in 
providing an accurate story of the implementation process, which will be discussed 
in greater detail in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Multiple members were interviewed from the 
Faculty of Commerce and Administration and the Division of Teaching and Learning 
as these were the major entities involved. The Division of Teaching and Learning 
was responsible for the teaching component of the University and therefore have 
vested interests in the selection and implementation of the enterprise-wide learning 
management system. The Faculty of Commerce and Administration, as described in 
Chapter 4.2 was involved with an early learning management system, EasyTeach, 
and had vested interests in the selection and implementation of a new learning 
management system. Both of these entities also had greater representatives on the 
Executive and Evaluation Groups compared with the other faculties and divisions. 
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3.6 Data Analysis 
As stated in Chapter 1.5, this study has utilised the narrative form of telling the story 
of the selection and implementation process of an enterprise-wide learning 
management system at the University of Australia. Citing the work of Polkinghorne 
(1988) and Mishler (1991), Kvale (1996, p. 2000) states that a narrative “contains a 
temporal sequence, a patterning of happenings. It has a social dimension, someone is 
telling something to someone. And it has a meaning, a plot giving the story a point 
and a unity…the narratives of a group contribute to constituting the group’s 
identity.” Furthermore, “the stories are reconstructed with regard to the main points 
the researcher wants to communicate…Narratives provide a powerful access to the 
temporal dimension of human existence” (Kvale, 1996, p. 274). 
 
This study also used a reiterative analytical technique of taking the literature review, 
the conceptual framework and the ideological preconceptions of the researcher and 
applying it to the data collected. Judgements were made on the data and referrals 
were made to the literature review to substantiate the author’s personal judgements. 
Such a technique is termed ‘hermeneutics’. Hermeneutics is primarily concerned 
with the meaning of text. According to Myers (1997) and Klein and Myers (1999), 
the basic question is: what is the meaning of text?  
 
Myers (1997), Klein and Myers (1999), drawing on the work of Gadamer (1976) 
claimed that the hermeneutic cycle helps us in the understanding of the text as a 
whole and the interpretation of its part, in which descriptions are guided by 
anticipated explanations. Text is interpreted based on iterations of the researchers 
own experience and existing literature and research. These interpretations are used to 
make judgements about text, creating further reiterations and interpretations of that 
text until conclusions or theorising suggests further reinterpretation. This cycle is 
shown below in Figure 3.1. The use of the hermeneutic cycle indicates the impact of 
the researcher on the analysis of the data. As discussed in Section 3.5, the story told 
in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 is the researcher’s narrative of the story told by the members 
interviewed. This influences how the story is told and acknowledges that other 
researchers may have different findings. However, the literature also influences the 
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researcher and the way they interpret and analyse the story, based on the existing 
literature.  
 
 
Figure 3.1: The Hermeneutic Circle (Thanasankit, 1999)  
 
Linked into the concept of the hermeneutic circle, discourse analysis was also 
employed to make sense of, and analyse the collected interviews and documents. 
According to Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000, p. 4), discourse analysis refers to “the 
practice of analysing empirical raw materials and information as discursive forms. 
This means that discourse analysts treat a wide range of linguistic and non- linguistic 
data – speeches, reports, manifestos, historical events, interviews, policies, ideas, 
even organisations and institutions – as ‘texts’ or ‘writings’.” In other words, 
discourse analysis puts words into work, giving them meaning, constructing 
perceptions and formulating understanding and ongoing courses of interaction 
(Gubrium and Holstein, 2000).  
 
According to Fairclough (2001, p. 25) discourse analysis “has a common concern 
with how language interconnects with other elements of social life, and especially a 
concern with how language figures in unequal relations of power, in processes of 
exploitation and domination of some people by others.” Discourse analysis allows 
the researcher to understand the language and authority of members involved with 
the study. By utilising discourse analysis as a method to analyse, it is noted that the 
researcher does not start discourse analysis from texts and interactions, but from 
social issues and problems, problems which face people in their social lives, issues, 
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according to Fairclough (2001), which are taken up within sociology, political 
science and/or cultural studies. To perform discourse analysis, “empirical data are 
viewed as sets of signifying practices that constitute a ‘discourse’ and its ‘reality’, 
thus providing the conditions which enable subjects to experience the world of 
objects, words and practices” (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 4). 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2.8, power is a fluid and non-static technique or action that 
individuals can engage in and is exercised rather than possessed, or, as Foucault 
(1978, p. 92) states, power “is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical 
situation in a particular society”. By understanding power from this perspective, 
power can be seen as integral to the outcomes and processes of system selection and 
implementation. Previous studies have adopted a positivist approach, where power is 
measured and analysed via a psychological measuring scale or other easily 
identifiable characteristic, which is structuralist and simplistic and does not provide 
rich detail of the power and politics in the system selection and implementation 
process. An interpretive understanding of power has also been utilised in information 
systems research, but again, this research fails to appreciate the complexities of 
power, adopting the definition by Dahl (1957, p. 202), where “A has power over B to 
the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do,” which 
again is simplistic and structuralist.  
 
Instead, power needs to be observed in the environment in which all actors operate. 
In other words, to view power and politics in systems implementation, the researcher 
needs to discuss the implementation process with key players, highlighting any 
political moves. One way of examining social relations and the role of power in a 
social context can be examined through social dramas, based on the conceptual 
approach used by Corbitt (1995; 1997). 
 
The concept of social dramas maintains that a social system and the inherent social 
relations of people or groups establishes and re-establishes a social equilibrium 
(Turner, 1957). However, balances are typically disrupted through political, cultural 
and social challenges. As a result, social disequilibrium or imbalance occurs. 
Readjustments need to happen in order to restore the balance. As Turner (1957) 
argued, when readjustments are made “profound modifications” may occur. In other 
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words, the new social equilibrium is rarely a replica of the old equilibrium. By 
viewing systems implementation as social drama, we are able to vividly observe how 
social movements operate in practice (Turner, 1980). According to Turner (1957, p. 
161), “the interests of certain persons or groups may have gained at the expense of 
others…certain relations between persons and groups may have increased in 
intensity, while others may have diminished.” We are essentially seeing challenging 
and political movements inside the social system. People, or groups object to one 
another, initiating a social drama. 
 
The concept of a social drama refers to a series of events in which there are shifts in 
power, views or opinions, and changes in social groups in which the social drama is 
operating (Turner, 1957, 1974, 1980, 1982; Corbitt, 1995, 1997). Social dramas 
occur within groups of persons who “share values and interests and who have a real 
or alleged common history” (Turner, 1980, p. 149). As an idea is contested it leads to 
a challenging of what currently exists. The actors act out social dramas by 
developing their interpretation of what has happened and what should happen. Social 
dramas occur in a context that is defined geographically by location (arenas) and by 
the underlying values, social constructs and meanings attached to statements and 
action by each of the actors involved. In the implementation of a system there 
appears to be a series of events, contestations, struggles, discourse setting, crises or 
‘social dramas,’ which the actors in the implementation process go through (Corbitt, 
1997). It is argued that implementation is rarely an ordered or sequential process. 
Actors within implementation contest and reconstruct the system to achieve their 
goals, to maintain their ideologies, to change programs, to change existing ideologies 
or to shift real power. 
 
A post-structuralist application of the concept of social dramas can provide a useful 
tool for the systems analyst to describe these events and crises that occur throughout 
the systems implementation process. Corbitt (1995) argued that the concept of social 
drama needs to be remoulded, removing the structuralist approach given by Turner 
(1957). Rather than identifying order and structure in the social drama, the researcher 
needs to provide a framework to identify patterns and the unstructured and unordered 
nature of human social relations (Corbitt, 1995). The researcher intends to use the 
concept of the social drama as a means of dealing with, and making sense of, the 
complexity involved with systems implementation. This will allow the systems 
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analyst to look at the process itself rather than just at the inputs and outputs, or the 
interactions and contestations of the process (Corbitt, et al., 2005). Similar to the 
traveller metaphor offered by Kvale (1996) for data collection, the use of social 
dramas is only an analogy used in this research to identify key events that occurred in 
the system selection and implementation process.  
 
In similar vein, the researcher wishes to draw upon the work of Turner (1979), who 
adopted the work by Goffman (1959; Goffman, et al., 1997) suggesting that actors in 
organisations act in a manner of calculated performance. Providing the analogy of a 
stage, actors prepare backstage (behind the scene or social setting) acting in an 
unconcealed way expressing reservations. Actors in this setting are often critical of 
others or of what they are to do. In a systems implementation context, the actors 
could be critical of those handing down, developing or implementing the changing 
policy or could be critical of the policy texts. Actors then move to the front stage 
(within the social setting), where they are more conforming. Those actors involved in 
implementing a system, when confronted with the authors of policy texts or those 
charged to ensure implementation can become less critical and ameliorative towards 
the policy. Life, Turner (1957) argued, is a series of dramas acted out in social 
settings. When conflict or crisis arises in the process, there are shifts in the policy, 
and a state of flux is created. Again, the researcher wishes to use the analogy of the 
frontstage and backstage of system selection and implementation in order to identify 
the obvious exercise of power and the hidden exercise of power, which, as discussed 
in Chapters 2.8 and 2.9, is developed through discourse.  
 
Turner (1974; 1982; 1985) accepted that a social drama is essentially a power play 
however his exploration of what power is limited. To strengthen the analytical value 
of social dramas, more refinement of the role of power is needed (Corbitt, 1995; 
1997). According to Forester (1989), drawing on the work of Foucault (1976; 1977; 
1978; 1980; 1982), claims that power may be exercised in a number of ways 
including decision-making, agenda setting, and in the shaping of felt needs. In the 
implementation process, power can be exercised through misinformation and 
resistance. The communication of information and arguments can be distorted in the 
implementation process by the use of ambiguity, deceit, insincerity, 
misinterpretation, confusion, unresponsiveness, withholding information, 
manipulation, lack of accountability, mystification and complexity, and 
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misrepresentation (Forester, 1989). Forester (1989, p. 45) ultimately saw power as 
political communication and concludes that: 
Power works through the management of competence, or obfuscation; or 
trust, or false assurance; of consent, or manipulated agreement; and of 
knowledge or misrepresentation. Each of the three modes of power works 
in this way, either to thwart articulate democratic participation and 
encourage positivity, or to encourage articulate political action and the 
rationalization of a democratic planning (policy) process. 
 
The social drama concept has been adopted in this study as it allows the researcher to 
create a framework to view the political nature of the systems implementation 
process. By ultimately breaking down the public episodes of tensional irruption into 
smaller periods, the researcher can examine the power relations and political nature 
of that period through the eyes of the members involved in the study. By employing 
the technique of social dramas, the researcher can also note the transforming power 
relations, according to Foucault (1976; 1977; 1978; 1980; 1982) from period to 
period. 
 
The role of the researcher in this study is to effectively collect information needed 
from the members to be studied. The researcher will analyse the interviews and 
secondary data (in the form of artefacts such as memos and meeting minutes) in an 
attempt to interpret the data into a meaningful result.  
 
3.7 Issues of Reliability and Validity  
Neuman (2000) raises an important consideration for any type of qualitative 
research, the need for high quality data. Qualitative data, by its nature is subjective, 
whereby members subjectively interpret their experiences within a social context. 
However, the researcher cannot remove subjective views to collect quality data, 
rather, the members descriptions are required to enable the researchers to immerse 
themselves in the study and obtain authentic experiences in the social world of 
members.  
 
Validity in all qualitative studies relates to the rigor of the description and the 
credibility of the explanation (Boje, 2000). There are two main types of validity in 
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case study research, internal validity and external validity. The former, internal 
validity, questions whether the findings or conclusions correctly map the experience. 
Does the research get at the substance of the story to be told? According to Trochim 
(2000), internal validity is only relevant in studies that try to establish a causal 
relationship. It is not relevant in most observational or descriptive studies, for 
instance, but for studies that assess the effects of social programs or interventions, 
internal validity is perhaps the primary consideration. The latter, external validity, 
questions the degree to which findings are credible and can be generalized to other 
settings similar to the one in which the study occurred.  
 
According to Lincoln and Guba (1985), Kvale (1996) and Neuman (2000), there are 
activities that can increase the validity of a study. One such activity is prolonged 
engagement, the investment of sufficient time to learn the ‘culture’, test for 
misinformation introduced by distortions, either by the researcher of the members 
and to build trust. The researchers attempt to familiarise themselves with the 
members of the implementation team, and speak in the terminology that members 
would be familiar with, such as discussing previous systems and particular acronyms. 
Interviews were also conducted at a time that was suitable for them, and in an 
environment that was familiar to the member being interviewed, typically their 
office. This made the member feel comfortable and encouraged them to discuss their 
role and the story of the selection and implementation of the enterprise-wide learning 
management system at Deakin University. 
 
The other activity performed to increase the validity of a study is through member 
checks (Neuman, 2000). This activity ensures that members are given the 
opportunity to provide the ability to dispute or add their own truth to the findings 
derived from the study by the researcher, and challenge what are perceived to be 
wrong interpretations. Two member checks were performed in this study. When 
members of the implementation team were approached, a consent form and plain 
language statement was given. This informed members of the objectives of the study 
and addressed any ethical issues. Members were also asked if the researcher could 
tape record the interviews, which would then be transcribed. The first member check 
involved the researcher sending each member a copy of the transcript of each 
interview as soon as it had been transcribed. This allowed members to change their 
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transcript if desired, including typographical errors and errors by the researcher 
misinterpreting the recording of the interview. The second member check was 
performed at the completion of the results chapter. This involved the researcher 
sending each member a copy of chapters 4, 5 and 6 allowing members the 
opportunity to provide more information, and specifically, their side of the story or 
truth to anything that they may have said that the researcher took in the wrong 
context, or provide further information that is relevant to the case study. Changes 
resulting from the member checks were minimal and typically involved the 
researcher fixing small typographical errors, however, some members wished to add 
further detail to their story, providing another perspective or truth on a particular 
phenomenon. These changes did not affect the analysis of the story. 
 
Issues of reliability refer to whether the findings by the researcher about the members 
and events are either internally or externally consistent (Neuman, 2000; Kvale, 
1996). Internal consistency questions if the data given is plausible, eliminates human 
deception and ensures that the story given fits into a coherent picture. By 
interviewing seventeen members of the selection and implementation team, the 
researcher believed that an accurate story was given by all members, as they all gave 
similar accounts of the selection and implementation process of the enterprise-wide 
learning management system. By the time the researcher interviewed the final 
member, the researcher was able to recount the story of the implementation process 
verbatim, due to the consistency provided by the members interviewed. 
 
External consistency refers to the ability to cross-check observations and stories 
given by members interviewed with other, divergent sources of data (Neuman, 2000; 
Kvale, 1996). The researcher used document collection as a method to supplement 
information given by members interviewed to verify what they had said against 
established and recognised documents. This increased the triangulation of the study, 
ensuring that the information given by members was accurate, minimising the 
misinformation, evasions, lies and fronts potentially given by members interviewed 
(Neuman, 2000; Kvale, 1996).  
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3.8 Summary  
This chapter has outlined the research methodology utilised in this study. A 
qualitative approach was adopted using critical social theory as the research 
epistemology. By taking such a perspective, the researcher acknowledges that the 
social history is created and represented by people, social actors in the systems 
implementation process.  
 
A case study methodology was employed, enabling the researcher to get inside the 
organisation and conduct multiple interviews and document collection in order to 
increase the rigour and credibility of the research. This approach also enabled the 
researcher to describe the organisation from the members point-of-view, reducing the 
distance between the researcher and the members of the study. By being immersed in 
the organisational activities, the researcher can gain richer information as to how 
power relations are created and how they may transform over time for the systems 
implementation group.  
 
Data was analysed using a combination of hermeneutics and discourse analysis. The 
researcher read the complete transcript of each interview and document before 
analysing the transcript for the creation and transformation of power relations within 
the systems implementation group. Data was initially coded into as many categories 
as possible focusing on the “events” as the appropriate unit of analysis (Marshall and 
Rossman, 1989; Creswell, 1994; Leedy, 1997). The researcher then analysed the 
collected data via a discourse analysis, in order to identify the hidden aspects of 
discourse and the power and politics involved in systems implementation.  
  
The next chapter will further establish the context of the research as well as tell the 
story of the systems implementation process. 
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Chapter Four – A Story of Systems Implementation – 
Part 1 – Precursor to the enterprise-wide learning 
management system 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The following chapters (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) tell a story of the implementation of an 
enterprise-wide learning management system (LMS) at the University of Australia. 
What follows in the three chapters is in the words of the implementation team, an 
“emotional,” “complex,” and “heart-breaking” story. The objective of this study is to 
explore the question, “how is power and politics an integral part of the systems 
selection and implementation process?” In order to do this, a post-structuralist view 
of power is adopted (Chapter 2.8 and 2.9). The observation and extraction of rich 
data will expose, as Foucault (1978) argues, the “complex strategical situations” that 
influence the system selection and implementation process, such that the realms of 
power, specifically the concept of power relations, are exposed. The meaning of the 
obvious process of systems implementation and the stages of the selection and 
implementation of the enterprise-wide LMS are deconstructed to expose the 
hegemonic nature of policy, the emancipation within discourse and the nature of 
resistance and power. This enables the researcher to attempt to unravel the 
complexity of system selection and implementation and enhance our understanding 
of the systems implementation process. 
 
To avoid overwhelming the reader, the story is presented in three chapters, each 
relating to a major step in the implementation process. This chapter describes the 
lead-up to the decision to have one LMS and focuses on a number of key events, or 
social dramas (Chapter 3.6). These social dramas provide the focus for the chapter 
and relate to important aspects of the University of Australia and the use of online 
technologies in teaching and learning. The use of social dramas in reporting the key 
events of the selection and implementation of an enterprise-wide learning 
management system is to allow the researcher to tell a transparent and unbiased 
narrative as opposed to the fine details of how and why the University of Australia 
was established. 
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Chapter 5 describes the initial conceptualisation of an enterprise LMS through to the 
decision. The third chapter, Chapter 6, describes the implementation of the new 
system. At the conclusion of each chapter, there is an analysis of the social dramas 
that occurred in that step of the implementation process based on the theoretical 
framework described in Chapter 2.9. Names of all people, places and other 
identifiable tags have been removed or modified in order to provide confidentiality 
and anonymity to the members interviewed and the organisation. 
 
As was outlined in Chapter 3.5, sixteen face-to-face, one-on-one interviews were 
held with the members of the implementation team for the LMS at the University of 
Australia. These members came from various faculties and divisions within the 
university. These interviews, together with existing documents from university 
committees will enable the telling of this story, validating incidents highlighted in the 
story. The story is supplemented by the official history of the University of Australia, 
The True History of the University of Australia3 (Stewart and Strider, 2002), and 
through a multitude of documents including minutes of meetings and university plans 
and reports. As discussed in Chapter 3.6, the story told here is the narrative of the 
researcher, based on the narratives given by members interviewed. Different 
interpretations and analysis may be obtained if this study were to be replicated by 
different researchers. The study of the decision made, accompanying documents and 
the rich data collected will enable the researcher to address the research question. 
 
4.2 Background to the Case Exemplar 
Like most Australian universities in the 1970’s, the University of Australia was 
created through the combination of multiple higher education institutions. The 
University of Australia was originally based in Rivendale4, a remote town based in 
the state of Hutt Peak. Many of the universities in the 1970’s attempted to identify 
and target a niche or growing market. The University of Australia targeted distance 
education as being a large component of the potential students that would only grow 
in the future, which followed the trend of other universities.  
 
                                                 
3 This is not the real title of the book or authors, which have been modified in order to preserve the 
anonymity of the institution, however, upon request to the authors, details can be disclosed. 
4 As stated in Chapter 3.5, pseudonyms have been provided for all people, places and other 
identifiable names in order to provide anonymity of members. 
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The University of Australia prided itself primarily on the large number of courses 
and programmes offered to students studying off-campus, although there was a 
minor on-campus presence in the original campus. The inspiration for the delivery of 
distance education came from the Open University in the United Kingdom, allowing 
students to study on-campus or off-campus as their circumstances permitted.  
 
In the late 1980’s, the Australian Federal Government introduced a series of 
initiatives in an attempt to rationalise the higher education system in Australia 
(Australia. Dept. of Employment Education and Training, and Dawkins, 1988). Due 
to the high number of universities and tertiary institutions in Australia and the high 
number of unmet demand for higher education, the Minister for Employment, 
Education and Training, John Dawkins, created a policy to create a unified national 
system of educational providers. This initiative was referred to as the Dawkins 
Reforms, which forced the University of Australia to merge with two other higher 
education institutions in Hutt Peak. The first institution to merge with the University 
of Australia was the rural-based Johnsonville University. Johnsonville University 
had a similar focus to the University of Australia, that of off-campus students. By 
being based in rural Hutt Peak, and having a low number of students, it was believed 
by the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Australia that merging with Johnsonville 
University could potentially increase its market sha re in an already competitive 
environment. 
 
The second merger under the Dawkins Reforms was with a city-based institute, the 
University of Erewhon. The focus of this university was much more on-campus as 
opposed to the off-campus focus of Johnsonville University and the University of 
Australia. The University of Erewhon had a high number of students compared with 
the merged University of Australia and therefore increased overall student numbers 
to over 15000 students, and increased presence by having three campuses across the 
state of Hutt Peak. The structure of the newly merged University of Australia can be 
seen in Figure 4.1.  
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Figure 4.1: The structure of the University of Australia after the mergers with the University 
of Erewhon and Johnsonville University. 
 
A Senior Executive committee sits at the top of the decision-making structure and 
consists of the Vice-Chancellor, the Deputy Vice-Chancellor who is responsible for 
academic aspects of the university, the Vice-President who is responsible for the 
administrative aspects of the university, and the Pro Vice-Chancellor, who is 
responsible for the research aspects of the university. Each senior member of the 
university is responsible for and oversees issues pertaining to their particular focus of 
the university. In other words, the Deputy Vice-Chancellor oversees academic issues 
in the faculties, the library, the Division of Communications and the Division of 
Course Development. The Vice-President is responsible for the Division of 
Administrative Services, the Division of Information Technology, the Division of 
Buildings and Ground Services, the Division of Financial and Business Services, the 
Division of Human Resource Services and Division of Campus and Student Services. 
 
One outcome of the mergers was the development of conflict between the campuses. 
When Johnsonville University and the University of Australia merged, there were no 
problems because both campuses had been involved with distance education and 
knew what was involved. However, once the University of Erewhon merger 
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occurred, there was resentment by the University of Australia and Johnsonville 
University, as the University of Erewhon was solely an on-campus provider and had 
more students than the other campuses. The University of Erewhon was a strong 
advocate of, and pushed for more on-campus classes as that had been their focus, as 
opposed to the off-campus based University of Australia and Johnsonville 
University, who were still focusing on and driving off-campus classes. In discussing 
the mergers, Paul, a Lecturer in the Faculty of Commerce and Administration based 
in Rivendale, believed that the merger between the University of Australian and 
Johnsonville University was beneficial to both institutions as “we were both distance 
education providers, so we had common goals and common views.”  
 
According to a number of members interviewed (Rose, Paul, Elisabeth, Peter), 
academics were divided into those who contributed to the promotion of distance 
education and those who continued focusing on the low number of on-campus 
students. Members of the university were divided into the two different teaching 
methods – those who believed that on-campus students were more important than the 
off-campus students, and vice versa – which mirrored the focus of the mergers, with 
those from the University of Erewhon promoting on-campus education and the other 
universities promoting distance education.  
 
Many members from the different campuses believe that there are still remnants of 
the strong campus identity, affecting the way that units are taught, either on-campus 
or off-campus (Rose, Paul, Peter, Elizabeth). From the interviews, it became 
apparent that members from the former University of Australia and former 
Johnsonville University believed that the University of Erewhon staff still did not 
take distance education as seriously as the other campuses, primarily on the basis that 
the University of Erewhon had the highest number of on-campus students and had no 
history of any distance education provision. 
 
The legacy left by the first Vice-Chancellor of focusing on distance education drove 
the strategic plan, with the university providing large numbers of courses and 
programmes via distance education. Academic staff, either those supporting distance 
education or not, had to develop units for off-campus students. Four of the five 
faculties were largely involved in distance education. The push for more distance 
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education in courses and programmes continued throughout the 1980’s, continuing 
the focus of distance education in the University of Australia. 
 
The delivery of distance education was primarily by print-based materials, which 
concerned the distance education supporters, as there were other Australian-based 
universities experimenting with ‘teletutorials’, the ability to conduct a tutorial with 
multiple students and an academic staff member via telephones. The University of 
Australia therefore borrowed the ideas of the Australian universities and the Open 
University of the United Kingdom, offering teletutorials in conjunction with print-
based and non-print-based methods such as audio and video-recordings. The 
University of Australia was now experimenting with other forms of providing 
distance education in order to supplement the commonly-used print-based materials. 
 
In summary, what occurred in the early years of the University of Australia was a  
focus on off-campus students. Under Government policy, the University of Australia 
was forced to merge with another off-campus focused university and a large on-
campus provider of tertiary education. This created tensions amongst staff members 
and divided members of the university into those that supported distance education 
and those that focused on the larger on-campus cohort. However, through 
cooperation with experimentation of technologies for distance education by the Open 
University of the United Kingdom and other Australian universities, the Vice 
Chancellor incorporated the use of technologies such as teletutorials and audio- and 
video-recordings into the strategic plan of the university to extend the educational 
value of the existing print-based materials. 
 
4.3 Early Learning Management Systems 
In the early 1990’s, members of the university experimenting with online 
technologies became concerned that the University of Australia was “being 
stereotyped as a predominately print-based operation” (Peter). Their belief was that 
despite the University of Australia having a large off-campus cohort, these students 
were primarily being served with print-based material, with few units having access 
to the teletutorials. Another supporter of online technologies, Rose, highlighted the 
issue off-campus students faced when only using print-based material to study. She 
said, “when you’re a distance education university, there is no attempt to improve the 
retention rate of remote students, who can be isolated in a big country and global 
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context. They [the off-campus students] experience a lack of social support and the 
provision of traditional student services is problematic.” The advocates of online 
learning argued that there was little communication with fellow classmates and with 
teaching staff, apart from using the telephone. They believed that the off-campus 
students felt isolated as they were essentially studying by themselves. Numbers 
reflected this sentiment as there was a tendency for off-campus students to withdraw 
from their studies.  
 
Paul, another supporter of online teaching, from the Faculty of Commerce and 
Administration, further added that “the major need was for collaborative learning, to 
be able to communicate, because that’s what the students don’t get in print. The 
distance education correspondent’s work alone, there’s no contact with anybody.” 
There was a perceived need by those experimenting with online teaching that the 
University of Australia needed to have a communication channel, where students 
(particularly, but not necessarily restricted to, off-campus students) could talk 
synchronously or asynchronously and have a sense of belonging to the University of 
Australia in a classroom environment, interacting with fellow class members and 
reducing the distance remote students often felt.  
 
The first online learning management system (LMS) originated as a local 
development inside the largest faculty in the university, the Faculty of Commerce 
and Administration. This system was known as the ETS (Electronic Tutorial System) 
and was a Unix-based, text-oriented system that provided dial- in network access to 
email, bulletin boards, the University of Aus tralia library catalogue, and to an online 
book ordering service. The ETS was an online text-based system housed on the 
University of Australia’s central computers and accessed via terminal emulation 
software. The ETS was developed in an attempt to bridge the gap between on-
campus and off-campus students, reducing the isolation that off-campus students felt.  
 
Over time, the ETS was refined and additional services were added, enabling tailored 
versions to be implemented to support other units, both undergraduate and 
postgraduate, across the university, such as Engineering, Education, Work Place 
Education, Psychology and Instructional Design. The ETS, according to the 
Professor of Online Learning, Elizabeth Reeder, was never a university-wide 
initiative and as a result never received recurrent funding. Instead, what sustained the 
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use of the ETS was the experimentation and enthusiasm of users of distance 
education technologies, primarily in the Faculty of Commerce and Administration 
and the Department of Teaching and Learning Development. By doing this 
supporters of online teaching were now able to promote their skill-set in helping the 
University of Australia enhance the current print-based method of teaching off-
campus students. 
 
Users, both students and academic staff, found the text-based interface difficult to 
use and often dropped out of tutorials due to the speed of modems. Paul revealed that 
the ETS “was pretty flaky in those days with modems…if it dropped out after you’re 
halfway through a big message, you lost the lot…it was frustrating.” Rose recalled 
that the system was “pretty primitive…it took pretty dedicated people using pretty 
slow modems to use it.” Although there was initiative to develop electronic systems 
within the university, the technologie s were antiquated, often causing more 
frustration for developers than bringing the off-campus and on-campus students 
together.  
 
In the mid-1990’s, online LMS technologies started to develop. Groups within the 
university using the ETS were becoming more interested in using the Internet and the 
World Wide Web as a potential method of teaching rather than just the Unix-based 
command system. One particular group leading the development of online 
technologies for teaching and learning was the Department of Teaching and Learning 
Development, a sub-unit within the Division of Course Development. The Head of 
the Department of Teaching and Learning Development reported to the Director of 
the Division of Course Development, who in turn reported to the Deputy Vice-
Chancellor, who oversaw the development of online technologies for teaching and 
learning.  
 
The Head of the Department of Teaching and Learning Development, Peter, claimed 
that their department was responsible for educational development of courses, 
professional development and training with the new technologies of the time, and 
research and evaluation on the impact of these technologies. It was through this 
development and the demonstrations to academic staff that members of the university 
“started to see the rise of the web and web-based applications being the future, not 
necessarily only stand-alone applications” (Peter). There was recognition that the 
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Internet could be a worthwhile tool to help reduce the negative effects of distance 
often experienced by off-campus students and the issues involved with ETS. Under 
the guidance of the Deputy Vice-Chancellor, the Department of Teaching and 
Learning Development, started to undertake a significant amount of web-based 
development.  
 
It was at this time that differences and tensions emerged between the Department of 
Teaching and Learning Development and the Division of IT. The Division of IT staff 
were developing a student record information system to be used in the university and 
were concerned about the technological aspects of that system. Decisions were made 
solely by the Division of IT, which affected other divisions and other systems that 
would be implemented in the future. According to Peter, the Division of IT 
“determined, amongst themselves, that databases were to be developed in Oracle.”  
 
The decision for databases to be developed in Oracle was made by the Division of IT 
and “related to an earlier decision [by the Division of IT] to support the Unix 
operating system, which included Sun Solaris and Oracle for database systems” 
(Martin). This decision was also influenced by the Vice-President, who controlled 
the administrative aspects of the University of Australia, and oversaw the Division of 
IT. The Vice-President believed that Australian universities were moving towards a 
centralised structure, and that the University of Australia should move in the same 
direction in an attempt to work more efficiently and effectively, and be more 
competitive compared the other Australian universities (Sebastian). Through making 
this decision, it was made clear by the Division of IT that Windows-based systems 
would not be supported. This impacted on any system using Microsoft Windows 
environments and systems using Microsoft infrastructure, such as the Microsoft 
email system, the Microsoft web server and the Microsoft database. The Unix/Oracle 
decision altered the teaching and learning aspect within the University of Australia as 
various schools had internally developed requirements to be able to teach via 
Microsoft technologies.  
 
This decision to move towards a centralised system was made purely on 
technological grounds by the Vice-President and the Head of the Division of IT. In 
providing reasoning for this technological focus, the Head of the Division of IT, 
Sebastion, saw that they had to “ensure that whatever product we acquired would 
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run on a technology that is in line with our key strategic direction. The functional 
requirements from a teaching and learning perspective is not my core competence 
and I am more than happy to leave it to staff with responsibilities in those areas. I’d 
rather be respected for what we are good in, don’t tell me how to run IT, and I won’t 
tell you how to run the teaching and learning.” The Division of IT claimed that they 
were only responsible for monitoring the technologies used in the University of 
Australia. This claim neglected the use of technology in teaching and learning. As a 
result, decisions about technology that affected the teaching and learning inside the 
university were made apparent ly with little or no consultation, leading to what some 
interviewees saw as potentially poor decisions that could seriously affect teaching 
and learning inside the University of Australia. 
 
Furthermore, the Head of the Division of IT noted that “the Division of IT’s role is 
purely about the IT infrastructure, that is, from the outside looking in. It’s the IT 
network infrastructure, the microwave, the optical fibre, right down to what students 
and staff receive on their desktop.” By policy, the Division of IT supports hardware 
or software. Through this policy, it was expected that, all divisions would be 
responsible for the data inside databases and other applications. Furthermore, as the 
Division of IT were concerned only with the technological infrastructure of the 
university, they had not considered, it seems, the implications for teaching and 
learning of the decision to use Oracle to develop systems (cf Winner, 1986; 1992). 
 
In talking with the Head of the Department of Teaching and Learning Development, 
Peter claimed that his department started developing applications via the Internet and 
the World Wide Web to help provide and support the distance education programs. 
In this development phase, it was claimed by Peter that there was little input from the 
Division of IT. As there was little communication between the two divisions, the 
Department of Teaching and Learning Development believed that they 
“pragmatically went with the full suite of Microsoft development tools as these tools 
were currently available within the university” (Peter). The Department of Teaching 
and Learning Development therefore thought that they were right in choosing the 
Microsoft development tools as these tools were available and accessible. The 
Department of Teaching and Learning Development claimed that they were not 
aware that the Division of IT had made the decision to build systems and 
applications only with Oracle.  
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Once the decision by the Division of IT about the use of Oracle databases was 
announced, the Department of Teaching and Learning Development then tried to 
“negotiate with the Division of IT around open data connections…gaining access to 
Oracle to link in the database used for teaching and learning applications to the 
student record information system” (Peter). However, this proved to be difficult. 
“The Division of IT started to argue that although they controlled the infrastructure, 
they didn’t control the data and the student information system was controlled by the 
Division of Administrative Services [a separate division]. We were getting the run-
around there” (Peter). Although the link required by the Department of Teaching and 
Learning Development was fairly easy to create, the Division of IT , it seems, did not 
want to do this. They made it explicitly clear that their role was to oversee the 
technological infrastructure of the university. At the time, there was an apparent gap 
emerging between the Division of IT and the Division of Administrative Services 
and other divisions within the university. This gap also seems to have extended to 
academic users, whereby the Division of IT and the Division of Administrative 
Services were limiting the potential choices of academic staff. 
 
According to the interviewees, the attitude of the Division of IT did not sit well with 
all other divisions of the university, except the Division of Administrative Services. 
Peter, from the Department of Teaching and Learning Development was still pushing 
for Microsoft-based systems taking the view that, although those using the Microsoft 
tools were traditionally “academic individualist and hobbyist,” there were still a 
large number of people interested in creating useful applications that “work really 
well for them.” However, when these people wanted to upscale their application, 
enabling it to work across the university, they were “doomed to failure” because “the 
university would not accept any Microsoft solution as being part of a corporate 
infrastructure” (Peter). Peter admitted that there was potential for Unix-based 
applications inside the university. However, based on the discussions of members 
interviewed, it was apparent that they believed that the Division of IT were being 
stubborn and controlling in terms of the decisions relating to the technologies that the 
University of Australia would be using for systems and applications. There was a 
belief at the time, expressed by many of the interviewees, that there would be many 
difficulties if the university decided to reject any Microsoft-based systems for 
teaching and learning applications. 
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As a result of the decision to develop the university’s IT infrastructure in 
Unix/Oracle only, policy was implemented by the Vice-President and the Division of 
IT requiring all systems to run on Unix and Oracle (cf Winner, 1986; 1992). The 
impact this had on other areas of the university was fairly significant. Systems had 
already been built, or were in the process of being built on different platforms, such 
as Microsoft Windows and Mac OS. Through this policy, the developers of 
previously built Windows and Mac OS systems were required to modify their 
applications and ensure that their system could be transferable to the Oracle system. 
The Head of the Department of Teaching and Learning Development believed that 
this was a poor decision as the teaching and learning components had not been 
considered when the decision to use Oracle was made.  
 
Although there was a belief by the Vice-President and the Head of the Division of IT 
that, by moving towards a central system, efficiency within the university would 
increase. However, academic staff seldom used the Oracle database. Instead, the 
Oracle database was utilised by the administrative divisions such as Finance, Human 
Resources and the Division of Administrative Services. It was apparent from the 
interviews tha t the academic staff in the university believe that there was little benefit 
for academic staff in this decision to select and implement systems that ran only on 
the Unix and Oracle platform. 
 
Whilst the technological infrastructure debate between the Department of Teaching 
and Learning Development and the Division of IT was going on, the use of the ETS 
by academic staff spread from the Faculty of Commerce and Administration and was 
being used in the Faculty of Creative Arts and in some units inside the Faculty of 
Medical and Health Sciences. Use of the early online learning management system 
was starting to grow organically throughout the university. As use increased 
throughout the university, members within the Faculty of Commerce and 
Administration decided to “see what was available commercially, because we 
couldn’t keep up with trying to adapt and modify the ETS ourselves, and we knew it 
was the wrong path to go down” (Paul). Rather than spend time and resources trying 
to build a system, whose use had increased exponentially, it was thought that an 
external company could offer a better solution that could handle the high number of 
users within the university. 
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In 1994, the University of Australia obtained a grant of over two million dollars from 
the Australia Research Council (ARC) to fund an information and communication 
technology enhancement program. There were four specific objectives derived from 
the information and communication technology enhancement program5. The first 
objective was to enhance and expand the telecommunications options for effective 
interactive teaching and learning though the development of the computer-mediated 
communications system, incorporating sophisticated multimedia capabilities to 
improve affordable access for large numbers of students. The second objective of the 
program was to investigate new forms of multimedia interactions with students 
through the use of desktop conferencing. The third objective was to extend electronic 
interactions with offshore students, particularly the Asia and Pacific region. The 
fourth objective of the information and communication technology enhancement 
program was to further develop computer-based LMS’s for multi-platform 
environments, incorporating teaching and associated administrative functions. 
 
One specific project of interest to this research was the development of a computer-
based LMS. Money was allocated to the Faculty of Technology, who would acquire, 
adapt and implement a LMS within their faculty. According to Peter, “the faculty 
trialled this in 1996-1997 and it didn’t quite work. In the end, they just gave up on 
it.” The interviewees reported that as the Faculty of Technology could not deliver the 
LMS, the Department of Teaching and Learning Development took it upon 
themselves to develop the LMS. However, as reported earlier, the Department of 
Teaching and Learning Development utilised Microsoft development tools. It was 
apparent from the interviews that this action had the effect of enhancing the conflict 
between the Department of Teaching and Learning Development and the Division of 
IT.  
 
Although money was allocated to the Faculty of Technology, the remaining four 
faculties saw the opportunity to receive extra funding and were starting to develop or 
purchase and implement their own LMS, incorporating computer-based technologies 
to provide distance education via the Internet. The Faculty of Commerce and 
Administration and schools within the Faculty of Creative Arts and the Faculty of 
                                                 
5 The final report of the information and communication technology enhancement program (October 
1997) 
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Medical and Health Sciences continued using ETS. Other schools within the Faculty 
of Medical and Health Sciences and the Faculty of Education were using an 
internally developed computer-mediated communication system and internally 
developed websites respectively. 
 
Because of the diverse computer-based learning management systems operating 
within the university, the development of technologies and the increasing complexity 
of the work of the Department of Teaching and Learning Development, the Senior 
Executive decided to restructure the department in an attempt to improve efficiency 
(Peter). It was decided to split the Department of Teaching and Learning 
Development into the Department of Teaching and Learning Resources and the 
Division of Academic Development (DAD). The Department of Teaching and 
Learning Resources was now responsible for delivering print, audio, video and 
printing services. The Division of Academic Development were responsible for 
education design, evaluation and research, technology/software development and the 
university’s academic professional development focusing on experimenting with and 
developing the new educational technology agenda, specifically computer-mediated 
communication, computer-assisted learning, multimedia and computer managed 
learning systems. Both newly formed groups reported to the Deputy Vice-
Chancellor. 
 
In late 1994, the University of Australia was recognised by the Australia Federal 
Government for its innovative use of technology in providing distance education. 
This recognition was due to the advances in technology used to provide computer-
based learning management systems within the university, albeit in a diverse manner 
with each faculty operating their own learning management system, and in some 
cases, different schools within each faculty running their own system. Upon 
receiving this recognition, the Faculty of Commerce and Administration decided to 
explore the commercial technologies available to enable better provision of distance 
education online. 
 
As a result, the Faculty of Commerce and Administration acquired a commercial 
LMS, EasyTeach, in 1995. EasyTeach is an Internet communications system that 
provided group conferencing, email, real-time chat, a community directory and file-
sharing, as well as the ability to facilitate inter-group and inter-personal 
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communication through both messaging and real-time chat. The Professor of Online 
Learning added that in her view, “this allowed the University of Australia students 
and staff from all around the globe to meet online and engage with peers, 
classrooms, services and support around the clock.” According to many interviewees 
who had used this system, EasyTeach further closed the gap between on- and off-
campus students, encouraging students to interact with one another, regardless of 
their location. 
 
Like other online technologies used for distance education, the use of EasyTeach 
increased rapidly within the Faculty of Commerce and Administration as members of 
the faculty became aware of the capabilities of EasyTeach. Paul, a lecturer in the 
Faculty of Commerce and Administration, recalls, “pretty soon we had just about all 
units, or major units, off-campus units, then we spread it to the BCA [Bachelor of 
Commerce and Administration] and this was a quantum leap, because nobody had 
tried to do it large scale.” 
 
Furthermore, as EasyTeach usage increased within the Faculty of Commerce and 
Administration, demand across the university increased. According to the 
interviewees, EasyTeach was receiving wide recognition across the university for its 
capabilities and potential in online education, and other academic staff were willing 
to adopt it for their units. Usage increased exponentially each year from 
approximately 19,700 students in 2000 to a projected 32,000 users in 20036. Rose, 
the Desktop Publishing Manager for the Faculty of Commerce and Administration, 
believed that usage grew “because it was used for a whole range of other things 
apart from direct teaching and learning, it was also for support for off-campus 
students.” Apart from individual units having their own area in EasyTeach, there was 
an area dedicated to general discussions, where students could post messages and 
discuss anything from music through to politics, which “all students had access to, 
for support and peer networking” (Rose).  
 
One of the advantages of using EasyTeach was that EasyTeach “was a client server” 
(Paul). Academic staff and students could essentially work offline. Users could log 
on, download all the necessary information, files and messages, logoff and work on 
                                                 
6 The University of Australia’s EasyTeach environment, Upgrade and expansion proposal 2000-2003, 
(Rose) 
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their local computer. Once they had completed their work, they could log on again 
and upload their responses. There would be no apparent disadvantages if students 
had a slow connection. They could work just like an on-campus student, 
downloading and uploading all necessary information. According to Norma, the IT 
Manager for the Faculty of Commerce and Administration, the academic staff 
members believed that EasyTeach was “particularly good for content. You can take a 
whole set of different sorts of formatted files on different protocols and just drag and 
drop them in.” According to users interviewed in this study, setting up the teaching 
area in EasyTeach was easy to do and a matter of ‘drag and drop’, regardless of the 
operating system. Staff members found this particularly easy to do, even if they were 
not technologically skilled. They knew what information they had to upload and how 
to do it. 
 
According to key informants, the use of EasyTeach within the university created 
tensions with the Division of IT. The Division of IT were not happy providing 
support for EasyTeach users, primarily, “because, the technology wasn’t consistent 
with the overall IT architecture that was the university’s corporate standard” 
(Helen). EasyTeach did not comply with the Unix and Oracle infrastructure as 
established by the Vice-President and the Division of IT, and as a result, the Head of 
the Division of IT claimed that EasyTeach was quite unstable. The Head of the 
Division of IT said that as a result they reduced the support for the use of EasyTeach 
across the University, primarily because “the Division of IT were being forced to 
support EasyTeach in an environment that did not suit them” (Helen).  
 
The use of online technologies for teaching and learning began in an attempt to 
supplement the large amount of print-based materials used to support off-campus 
students in their studies. The academic and support staff believed that the use of 
online technologies for teaching and learning would minimise the isolation of off-
campus students. The interviewees noted that various groups of academics within the 
university were developing their own systems in an attempt to solve this issue. This 
in turn, it was revealed, created tensions amongst divisions, departments and 
faculties. The Division of IT, working with the Vice-President, promoted the policy 
requiring all systems in the university to operate on a Unix and Oracle infrastructure. 
Apparently, departments and faculties were not consulted in this decision and 
continued to develop systems on different platforms.  
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Between 1995 and 1998 academic staff continually developed online teaching and 
learning systems across all five faculties in an attempt to receive funding from the 
ARC grant awarded for an information and communication technology enhancement 
program. Online learning had accelerated in use across the entire university. 
However according to the interviewees, there was little co-ordination between the 
various faculties and their systems, leading to a diverse and complex LMS 
environment. Due to this complexity and diversity, division restructuring occurred, in 
an attempt to aid faculties in their use of online technologies for teaching and 
learning. Essentially, the environment had become complex and messy In 1998, the 
Senior Executive, and specifically the Deputy Vice-Chancellor, who was responsible 
for the academic aspects of the university, decided that the benefits of technological 
use in teaching and learning needed a university-wide perspective as opposed to the 
diverse number of systems operating within the university. There was a need to 
create uniformity across the university and bring the faculties and schools together, 
which would ultimately be delivered via an enterprise-wide learning management 
system. 
 
4.4 Selecting the first enterprise-wide learning management 
system 
In 1998, the Senior Executive, senior members of the university including the Vice-
Chancellor, the Deputy Vice-Chancellor and the Vice-President, were concerned that 
the University of Australia was falling behind other Australian higher education 
institutions offering distance education in terms of the use of technology. The Senior 
Executive identified that there was a lack of resources available for supporting the 
multiple systems operating within the University of Australia. The Head of the 
Teaching and Learning Division, Helen, claimed that “a very high level decision was 
made that we would go and get a LMS to replace EasyTeach basically or at least get 
a LMS.” It was decided by the Senior Executive that to provide efficient and 
effective support, the university needed “one system to replace EasyTeach, 
EducateMe Standard Edition and internal websites, and get everybody into that one 
system” (Peter). The university could not sustain multiple learning management 
systems due to the large amount of resources required to support the various systems. 
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The Senior Executive believed that in order to maintain its niche market of off-
campus students, “there was the notion that we needed a LMS and what was 
conceived of was something that didn’t yet exist” (Elizabeth). Although no specific 
requirements were made available, the Senior Executive decided that the University 
of Australia “wanted not a campus thing but an institution-wide system” (Elizabeth). 
There was the understanding that this LMS would be only one system and it would 
run across the multiple campuses, faculties and schools. 
 
In order to achieve the goal of one learning management system, the then Deputy 
Vice-Chancellor and the Vice-President appointed a Director of Distance Education. 
In selecting the enterprise-wide LMS, two sub-committees were established in 1999, 
an educational sub-committee and a technical sub-committee. The two committees 
apparently worked independently, reporting back a short- listing of the best systems 
shown from their respective technical and education perspectives. Rose recollects, 
“we got a number of organisations to do presentations: QuickLearn; something 
developed for Telstra; and IBM...we did an evaluation process that largely checked 
off boxes.” In 1999, there were only a few organisations dealing with LMS’s. 
According to interviewees, the selection process almost became a quantitative 
selection, where if the potential LMS met a certain number of criteria, then that 
would be deemed to be the best LMS for the University of Australia. The three 
products available for consideration were QuickLearn, another system developed by 
IBM and a third system developed for an Australian telecommunication company, 
which could be modified to suit a higher education institution. 
 
According to the interviewees, when the two sub-committees met in July 1999, a 
recommendation was made to the Director of Distance Education that QuickLearn 
was the system that met most of the criteria. However, this decision came with many 
“caveats, qualifications, reservations” (Simon). QuickLearn had to deliver certain 
additional technical patches to improve the system, making it more stable and 
ensuring that it operated with a large number of users. As QuickLearn met certain 
requirements “on paper” it was deemed to be the best system. According to the 
interviewees this decision caused a degree of consternation amongst members of 
both sub-committees. As a result, representatives from other IT academic 
constituencies at the University of Australia withdrew from the selection and 
implementation team because, as the informants noted, they apparently had no 
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confidence in the selection process. Additionally, it was said members of the wider 
university community were not happy with the decision because there was little input 
from the schools and faculties. It was also believed by the informants that there was a 
great deal of behind-the-scenes ‘politicking’ going on, in order to have QuickLearn 
chosen as the enterprise-wide LMS. 
 
According to the Head of Teaching and Learning Support, Diane, QuickLearn was 
“selected for all the wrong reasons because it was the only system that sat on the 
Oracle database.” Peter further added that, “the issue was that QuickLearn was 
selected because of the non-negotiable technical criteria that any system acquired by 
the University of Australia had to run on Oracle at that point…in terms of front-end 
functionality QuickLearn was OK but not brilliant, but it ran on Oracle.” 
QuickLearn apparently was not the most user-friendly system available, but as it 
appeared to be the only potential system that ran on Oracle, it was selected. It was 
the perception of the interviewees that decision-making at the University of Australia 
was highly centralised with key centralised functions such as the Division of IT 
having a greater say than the decentralised schools and faculties.  
 
Paul, a member of the Faculty of Commerce and Administration, and a strong 
supporter of EasyTeach believed that the Director of Distance Education was going 
to support the selection of EasyTeach, claiming that “the Director of Distance 
Education was good because he thought EasyTeach was a fantastic product.” As 
Paul was familiar with EasyTeach and had been a strong advocate of the system, he, 
like many academic staff wanted someone who would ultimately select EasyTeach as 
the enterprise-wide LMS. However, many of the interviewees noted that there 
appeared to be interference coming from a number of areas of the university. They 
suggested that it was coming from the office of the Vice President, the Division of IT 
and the University of Australia’s Industry Division7. Paul continues, “all of a sudden, 
the Director of Distance Education came out batting for QuickLearn, which was 
bizarre, because the QuickLearn people came in to demonstrate and staff were just 
there watching and standing up and asking questions and being so critical and all he 
[the Director of Distance Education] was doing was defending the company. He was 
doing somebody’s business.” Norma confirmed this by adding “there were even 
                                                 
7 The University of Australia Industry Division is a sub-division of the University of Australia that 
works closely with the business community designing tailored training and education solutions for 
clients.  
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rumours at the time that the people who were charged with conducting this 
evaluation process actually had an agreement with the software company before they 
even started the process, but they were all rumours.”  
 
People in the distance education area, and specifically the supporters of EasyTeach 
and members of the Division of Academic Development were confused by the 
selection of QuickLearn asking “why the selection committee did not see [other 
known products of the time], ChalkOnline and EducateMe Standard Edition, which 
was being used in the Faculty of Technology. Those were the products which were 
being grown out of the higher ed system” (Paul). However, because of the policy 
requiring systems to operate on a Unix/Oracle infrastructure, the University of 
Australia was apparently not interested in looking at any system unless it ran on 
Oracle, which, according to Peter, “really did trip us up, eventually.” 
 
The supporters of EasyTeach continued to criticise the selection of QuickLearn 
creating rumours that the University of Australia Industry Division at that time “had 
a large North American client and they desperately needed a LMS as part of that 
contract…so I think there was a little bit of the University of Australia Industry 
Division behind key university decisions” (Peter). The decision, it was perceived, was 
not necessarily made by members of the sub-committees, but potentially by other 
divisions of the university, without consultation with the sub-committees. It was 
believed by members of the Faculty of Commerce and Administration and the 
Division of Academic Development that between July and November 1999 there was 
pressure on the university from the Vice-President and the Vice-Chancellor to have 
an enterprise-wide LMS. As QuickLearn complied with the technological 
infrastructure and met the majority of quantitative criteria, it was purchased and 
implemented.  
 
However, upon speaking to a member of the current Senior Executive at the 
University of Australia, there appears to be another side of the story. The decision 
about which enterprise-wide LMS would be implemented at the University of 
Australia was ultimately made by the Vice-Chancellor. The Vice-Chancellor relied 
on two colleagues, the Deputy Vice-Chancellor and the Vice-President for 
information about making this decision. As the Deputy Vice-Chancellor at the time 
of this decision was only in an acting position, most of the information relating to the 
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decision came from the Vice-President. The Vice-President supported the policy to 
only implement Oracle-based systems only and therefore recommended a new LMS 
comply with this requirement. The Director of Online Learning was ultimately left 
with no choice and was, it was reported told by the Vice-President, the Vice-
Chancellor and the Head of Division of IT to match the system that best fitted with 
the University of Australia’s corporate systems. The only available system available 
at the time was QuickLearn. 
 
Although the goal of choosing QuickLearn was to provide coherence within the 
university, there was no policy or requirement for schools and faculties to remove the 
systems they were currently using and adopt QuickLearn. As a result interviewees 
noted, there was significant reluctance to adopt QuickLearn. They also commented 
that due to the lack of consultation with the members of the sub-committees and the 
wider university community there was little ‘buy-in’ to QuickLearn across the 
university. Almost all of the interviewees noted that those academic staff members 
that had tried using QuickLearn for their teaching, once it had been implemented, 
were not overly happy with the system and both staff and students found it difficult 
to use. Furthermore, academic staff in the Faculty of Commerce and Administration 
and the Faculty of Technology vocally resisted the adoption and use of QuickLearn 
for their units.  
 
Key interviewees with members from the Faculty of Commerce and Administration 
noted that being the largest faculty and the accepted innovators in delivering 
distance-education, the academic staff members of the faculty were not happy with 
the need to change to QuickLearn, thus resisting the change and continuing their use 
of EasyTeach. Even though QuickLearn was implemented and everybody in the 
university had access to it, “EasyTeach continued to go, despite the new push for 
QuickLearn” (Rose). Helen claimed that QuickLearn “didn’t have the same sort of 
functionality as EasyTeach.” Academic staff that had used EasyTeach for their 
teaching claimed that QuickLearn was a step backwards, primarily because 
QuickLearn did not have the functionality, “or even a resemblance to the 
communication functionality that EasyTeach had” (Helen). No one in the Faculty of 
Commerce and Administration adopted QuickLearn due to this lack of functionality 
and apparently also because the academic staff of the faculty did not want to adopt 
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the new system, and because they perceived that there were high switching costs 
involved with adopting the new system.  
 
Interviewees also noted that schools within the Faculty of Technology had similar 
resistance to adopting QuickLearn. The majority of schools in that Faculty had been 
using a different system to facilitate their online teaching and learning, EducateMe 
Standard Edition. Diane, the Head of Teaching and Learning Support, recalled that 
one of the projects she worked on, implementing QuickLearn into some of the units, 
did not work, because “in the process of working out what they [the Faculty of 
Technology] wanted and what QuickLearn did, we worked out that QuickLearn 
didn’t do it [what they wanted].” The Faculty of Technology required more than 
what QuickLearn could offer. They had one LMS already implemented, EducateMe 
Standard Edition, so they decided to use that instead of transferring across to 
QuickLearn. 
 
However, there were some schools that actively adopted QuickLearn. The Online 
Learning Manager for the Faculty of Creative Arts stated that “there were some units 
in the Faculty of Creative Arts that had applied for support [to facilitate online 
teaching] and several units, or programs within the faculty had won that support and 
were then used as leaders in the trialling of QuickLearn.” However, QuickLearn was 
not adopted across the whole faculty. The Online Learning Manager for the Faculty 
of Creative Arts continued, “we had QuickLearn units supported by the Division of 
Teaching and Learning doing grand and glorious things and the rest of the faculty 
using EasyTeach because of its communicative focus and people within the faculty 
picked it up very quickly and found it easy to use. EasyTeach supported their way of 
teaching, which involved a lot of communication between themselves and their 
students.” A number of staff members did not transfer across to QuickLearn due to 
the lack of functionality, compared to EasyTeach, such as the ability to work offline 
and the easy-to-navigate structure of EasyTeach. 
 
By late 2000 it was apparent that there were significant problems associated with the 
adoption of QuickLearn. In setting up the contract and agreement for adopting 
QuickLearn, a number of requirements were made for QuickLearn to meet, in order 
for them to keep the university business. As the Project Manager of the latter 
enterprise-wide LMS stated, QuickLearn “had a number of requirements which the 
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product hadn’t met…it became clear that some of the requirements we thought were 
going to be fulfilled in this upgrade weren’t going to happen.” Interviewees noted 
that it was clear that QuickLearn was not going to provide the support and technical 
patches established in the signing of QuickLearn as the system provider.  
 
The company providing QuickLearn announced that they were changing business 
direction. Instead of QuickLearn supporting and working with the University of 
Australia in order to provide an efficient and effective LMS that would assist both 
lecturer and student, “QuickLearn was heading down the track of targeting the 
corporate training online marketplace” (Peter). No longer was QuickLearn 
promoting and supporting the higher education market, the organisation decided to 
head towards the corporate online training marketplace. QuickLearn was now being 
used to increase “the usage and effectiveness of training programs in businesses. 
QuickLearn enables businesses to provide employees with a single access point to all 
their training needs, and streamlines the management of Instructor Led Training 
(ILT).”8 
 
There was general consensus across the university that QuickLearn was not the right 
enterprise-wide LMS to use inside the University of Australia. QuickLearn had 
reneged on many of its promises of fixing and providing maintenance and general 
support for their LMS. According to Simon, “one of the biggest issues was that 
“promised” next version of QuickLearn had taken much longer to be delivered and 
they had not delivered the required enhancement.” The final push to remove 
QuickLearn occurred in a meeting of the Academic Board in 2000. According to 
Peter, “Samantha was very critical of QuickLearn and she was thoroughly alienated. 
They got up at Academic Board and asked very critical questions about it, and she 
was really on the outer politically in that period.” Samantha claimed that “the forum 
was the perfect opportunity as it was in front of the Vice-Chancellor, the Deputy 
Vice-Chancellor, and other academic and administrative staff.”  
 
As a result, it was perceived by members of the Senior Executive that the University 
of Australia “still had multiple systems operating within the university. One 
allegedly the Division of IT supported [QuickLearn] and actively not used, and you 
still had EasyTeach and EducateMe Standard Edition going” (Norma). The original 
                                                 
8 From the Website http://www.wbtsystems.com/products/lms  accessed 06-09-04. 
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goal for an enterprise-wide LMS was not achieved. The University of Australia still 
had more than the one LMS operating. The Division of IT would only support 
QuickLearn, as that was the system that adhered to the established policy on 
platforms. According to the head of the Division, they argued that supporting 
multiple systems was financially inefficient and tried to refuse to also support both 
EasyTeach and EducateMe Standard Edition. However, they did continue to provide 
IT support for EasyTeach until a new process was established because, according to 
the interviewees, so many staff were using that system. By mid-2000, it was obvious 
to the Senior Executive that this forced- implementation of an enterprise-wide LMS 
was not succeeding.  
 
In addition, a number of other changes had occurred in the late 1990’s as the decision 
to select and implement QuickLearn was made. Interviewees reported that there was 
a sense of confusion at the lower levels of the university about what the University of 
Australia was doing in terms of using technologies to deliver an enterprise-wide 
learning management system. At the same time as QuickLearn was being 
implemented, a new Deputy Vice-Chancellor was appointed and assumed the same 
roles and responsibilities of their predecessor. Shortly after this appointment, another 
re-structuring of the service divisions in the university occurred. There were 
concerns at several levels within the university that the Division of Academic 
Development was not servicing the faculties sufficiently. A restructuring in late 1999 
resulted in the software development group from the Division of Academic 
Development being disbanded, with a large number of these members forming a new 
Division, the Division of Teaching and Learning. The goal of the Division of 
Teaching and Learning was to collaborate with the faculties and divisions of the 
university in order to support the university's strategic goals and operational targets. 
The two support areas of the Division of Teaching and Learning were the Library 
and teaching and learning aspects of the university. Academic development in the 
university was then managed by the newly appointed Deputy Vice-Chancellor.  
 
Restructuring of the Division of Academic Development had a significant impact on 
the push to have one central LMS. The choice of a particular LMS, was now “driven 
by a much more top down strategic view which has seen the concentration of power 
and decision over resources, much more strongly located at the top, and much less at 
the grass roots level” (Peter). The reasoning behind this restructuring was to adhere 
 
 
96 
to the corporate policy established in the University of Australia, to achieve a 
centralised structure.  
 
The Division of Academic Development was no longer meeting the needs of the 
faculty or function as it needed to. The structure of the University of Australia that 
resulted is shown in Figure 4.2. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: The structure of the University of Australia in 2004. 
 
To achieve the goal of migrating to an enterprise-wide LMS, schools, faculties and 
divisions would need to centralise their processes. As a result, all schools across the 
university would be treated equally and have access to the same information, in the 
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4.5 Analysis  
This chapter has established the context of this study, by reporting the history of 
University of Australia up to the decision to select a new enterprise-wide LMS, and 
the use of technologies for teaching and learning to service off-campus students. It is 
by establishing this context, that the reader is able to understand the impact of how 
the University of Australia was created, what its goals were and why it viewed 
distance education as important. Furthermore, it has been established that there were 
apparent disagreements amongst academic staff, particularly once the merger 
occurred between an off-campus-focused University of Australia and Johnsonville 
University campus and the on-campus-focused University of Erewhon campus, with 
each campus pushing for their style of teaching. There were also apparent 
disagreements amongst members of various divisions as decisions, which affected 
the structure of systems within the university, were being made without consultation 
with other divisions and faculties. The interviewees all have a perception that there is 
a centralised structure in the University of Australia, which affected the LMS 
selection process.  
 
By utilising social dramas as a tool to analyse the data (Chapter 3.6), we are able to 
approach the themes and issues from two perspectives. The first perspective is the 
obvious, or what Goffman (1959) claims is, the front stage. This is what is apparent 
to all and is plainly visible; it is what is written in policy as text, what happens in 
meetings, and what happens in front of an audience. This is the context of 
contestation.  The second perspective is the hidden, or backstage. This is where the 
politics and discourse lie. This is where discourse emerges, is constructed and 
reconstructed. In the backstage of social relations in an organisation, discourse 
creates the intersubjective context for the front-stage, and fosters ideologies and 
values that inform the politic nature of the dramas acted out in public. It is this 
moving from the hidden to the obvious that enables the actors, academic staff and 
administrators, to recontextualise and institutionalise practice and exposes the 
discourse underpinning action. 
 
In a social drama, obvious issues are apparent to everyone (Turner, 1957). The 
obvious front stage issues that emerged in this first phase of the implementation of 
the enterprise-wide LMS at the University of Australia included: the introduction of 
an in-house developed LMS, the ETS; the winning of a substantial grant to foster and 
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promote the use of technology in teaching and learning; the adoption and use of the 
LMS, EasyTeach, by one faculty and of other systems in different schools and 
faculties; the appointment of the Director of Distance Education; the process of 
selecting and implementing QuickLearn; the appointment of a new Deputy Vice-
Chancellor; the directive from the senior executive to implement an enterprise-wide 
LMS as a corporate solution to the variety of LMS’s operating inside the University 
of Australia; two restructurings of the divisions servicing teaching and learning, from 
the Department of Teaching and Learning Development to the Division of Academic 
Development, and then from the Division of Academic Development to the Division 
of Teaching and Learning; and the decision to prescribe Oracle as the technological 
infrastructure platform of the university. Each of these issues underpinned a 
sequence of social dramas. Each drama was a key event that affected the social 
relations operating within the university. Each social drama was connected to the key 
directions and purpose of the university - that of being a provider of high quality 
distance education. 
 
In this first stage, there were four particular social dramas that appeared to be of 
more significance than the others. These were firstly, the continuous debates about 
implementation of a policy requiring all IT systems in the university to run on an 
Oracle platform. Secondly, there was a drama concerning the discussions about 
whether the various LMS’s were being supported appropriately or in any planned 
way. Thirdly and fourthly, there were a series of dramas associated with the 
appointment of senior staff to senior positions.  
 
In the first social drama, tension emerged between the Department of Teaching and 
Learning Development and the Division of IT over the decision to only use Oracle as 
the platform for all IT systems within the University of Australia. The Division of IT 
did not have the resources to support the variety of systems across multiple 
platforms, as had been the case. Rather, the Division of IT and, through the influence 
of the Vice-President, the Senior Executive wanted one central system in place, 
bringing coherency, efficiency and cost effectiveness operationa lly to the university. 
The Division of IT claimed that they were specifically employed to administer the 
technological infrastructure of the university, not to administer the teaching and 
learning, so any decisions made were purely technologically-oriented. The  
implications for teaching and learning were considered only in the context that the 
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chosen operating system would be the support tool for any emerging or new 
technologies. The Head of the Division of IT had made the decision not to support 
those technologies for teaching and learning which did not operate on an Oracle 
platform. Essentially, this issue reflected tension created by an apparent change from 
a distributed and decentralised system with campus autonomy, based historically in 
the origins of the various institutions that make up the University of Australia, to a 
centralised system. The previous systems were believed by academic staff to be 
serving their needs well.  Control of the IT systems was important because the 
university had made a serious attempt to become as IT service driven as was possible 
and had invested substantially to achieve that.  IT was crucial for not only the 
administrative processes of the university, but from the story, it is also apparent that 
it is very important for the distance education identity of the university resulting from 
the adoption of new technologies by academic staff. Who then controlled the IT was 
in a strong position. The interviewees noted that academics had control of teaching 
and learning but felt that their inability to use the systems they wanted or were used 
to threatened this control. Thus any attempts to remove that control were contested. 
 
The extent of the tensions created and the public debate that ensued created a 
situation where a whole series of pre-existing tensions between academics and the 
service and support divisions of the university emerged. This created a second social 
drama. The drama was created by the tension between the academic staff and general 
staff as service provision was increasingly centralised. The interviewees had also 
noted tension between the academic and general staff over the way the university 
was being managed. Academic influence had become more limited, in their view, to 
philosophical debate in the Academic Board. General staff had to ensure that work 
was completed and processes managed that would support academic staff. However, 
this immediately created conflict as many of the duties general staff were 
undertaking had previously been under the control of academic staff. The 
interviewees noted that the academics were critical of the move towards centralised 
IT and support systems because they argued that this action limited their academic 
freedom in teaching and learning, an area considered ‘sacred’ by the academic 
community (Almond, 1981; Worgul, 1992; Miller, 1996). Furthermore, the debate 
between the academic and general staff extended to what academic staff wanted and 
what general staff provided. Essentially, according to the interviewees, divisions 
such as the Department of Teaching and Learning Development were not seen as 
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doing their job effectively by the academic staff. This led to the restructuring of this 
department occurred (Section 4.3).  
 
A parallel social drama emerged at the senior staff level of the university. Debates 
about support and centralised services, including IT infrastructure platforms, created 
tension between the Vice-President and the Deputy Vice-Chancellor about control of 
the technologies being used to support teaching and learning. The Deputy Vice-
Chancellor, who led the academic interests of the university, and the Vice-President, 
who controlled the management and administration of the university, represented the 
separation of purpose and responsibility that was being acted out in Academic Board 
and in faculty boards. According to interviewees, academics believed that the Vice-
President was trying to gain control of all aspects of the use of information 
technology where it affected any part of the university. The Vice-President was 
fixated to the notion of a single operating system, and a single data platform, Oracle, 
because of perceived efficiency gains and cost effectiveness.  
 
As part of a process of quality improvement and the need to achieve efficiencies 
within the university, interviewees believed that the Senior Executive was 
determined to strengthen centralised control of IT. According to the interviewees, 
those areas of the university responsible for teaching and learning, the faculties and 
schools, contested this process. Their adherence to the policy was, it seems, at best 
problematic. There was agreement amongst the interviewees that academic staff 
perceived that it was the intention of the university administration to bring all areas 
under some form of centralised control, including teaching and learning, a process 
they claimed derived from the structures and processes put in place by the first Vice 
Chancellor of the amalgamated university. One way of gaining that control was to 
maintain a centralised, single platform, IT policy.  
 
An acting Deputy Vice-Chancellor was selected to fill that position from 1998 to 
1999 until a new Deputy Vice-Chancellor was appointed. However, this acting 
Deputy Vice-Chancellor apparently had little power or influence as the position was 
only temporary. The control the Vice-President had over the IT infrastructure 
determined that he had a significant impact on what could or could not be done in 
teaching and learning, where it depended on technologies. According to the 
interviewees, it was perceived that the then Vice Chancellor and the Vice-President 
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used the impact of differentiated uses of technologies for teaching and learning 
across the university to try and force the university community to adopt one 
enterprise-wide LMS. To facilitate and strengthen this centralisation, the Senior 
Executive appointed a Director of Distance Education, reporting to the Vice-
President. As was apparent in the reported story, it was perceived by academic staff 
that the appointee appeared to be influenced strongly to choose a system that worked 
with Oracle-based databases, irrespective of the desires of academic staff. The new 
Deputy Vice-Chancellor, when appointed was then given direct responsibility to 
implement a Senior Executive proposal that the university run an enterprise-wide 
LMS.  The nature of control and the exercise of power in this context were driven by 
a long-standing need to bring a number of disparate institutions into one and to 
ensure that the delivery of services, including teaching and learning, was at least 
standardised across the institution.  There was no sense in the interviews that this 
acquisition of power and the influence derived were for any purpose other than 
efficiency or cost effectiveness. However such moves were perceived by academic 
staff to challenge their responsibilities and the power that they felt was rightly theirs 
for teaching and learning. This perception was the root cause, it appears, of the 
contestation that emerged and the key formation of the social dramas that resulted. 
 
The fourth social drama emerged once it was decided that the Deputy Vice-
Chancellor would implement the newly selected enterprise-wide LMS, QuickLearn. 
QuickLearn was made available to all schools and faculties as the enterprise-wide 
LMS. It was also fully supported by the Division of IT. The Senior Executive, 
through the Deputy Vice-Chancellor, recommended to the Deans of the faculties that 
they adopt QuickLearn as their system for delivery of distance education programs. 
However, only the Faculty of Creative Arts and the Faculty of Education accepted 
this directive. The remaining faculties, it was reported by the interviewees, resisted 
implementing the enterprise-wide LMS solution, recontextualising the use of LMS’s 
by arguing that their programs were already effective with the systems they were 
using and that changes would significantly affect students too much. Ultimately the 
other three faculties did not comply. Instead, the Faculty of Commerce and 
Administration, the Faculty of Technology and the Faculty of Medical and Health 
Sciences all continued using their own LMS’s, EasyTeach, EducateMe Standard 
Edition and an internally developed system.  
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Documents in the university show that the notion of having one enterprise-wide 
solution was challenged openly in Academic Board, in faculty boards and at the 
school level. The three resisting faculties were able to continue using their own 
system with apparently no repercussions, excepting that they had to sustain the cost 
of running and supporting the technologies themselves. Effectively, although one 
enterprise-wide LMS had been put in place, few schools and individual academics 
had actually adopted the use of this system, continuing a scenario of apparently 
chaotic use of multiple technology systems in the university for teaching and 
learning. It can be suggested that the intended hegemony of the university was 
resisted, as were the perceived attempts to implement uniformity and control.  
 
However, such descriptions of the obvious are in themselves limited. Whilst some  
explanation for crises, conflicts and dramas can be ascertained from what people say 
and from artefacts such as policy texts and minutes of meetings, none of these inform 
the researcher about the real reasons behind what is apparent. It is by identifying the 
reasons behind the apparent that is of interest to this research in order to uncover the 
social issues involved in systems selection and implementation. As was noted in 
Chapter Two, so much of social relations are informed by political action driven by 
discourse. There exists a regime of discipline which attempts to coerce and 
subjugate. Real emancipation from this regime can only occur through the 
recognition and understanding of discourse. By moving to the hidden, backstage 
aspect of the social dramas, the discourse that is operating can be identified and 
disclosed. 
 
From an analysis of the transcripts of the interviewees and the documentary artefacts 
within the university, it can be argued that the key discourse operating in the 
university was autonomy. This created confusion through complexity, which resulted 
both from and in differentiation of processes inside the university. This discourse of 
autonomy related to an acceptance that whilst everyone was part of a single 
university, differences in practices and educational philosophies between campuses 
and between faculties were accepted as the norm. It wasn’t an issue that was debated. 
It was acceptance in practice. 
 
The new Deputy Vice-Chancellor, when appointed, noticed that there were 
discrepancies between the different campuses, even though the merger had been 
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created ten years earlier. This was of significant concern. There had been a constant 
differentiation between on-campus and off-campus students, leading to differences 
between face-to-face teaching and online teaching. In conjunction with this 
differentiated view of what a university is and who the target market of the university 
was, faculties, and in some cases, individual schools, were given free reign to 
implement any type of system they wanted. As a result, multiple systems were 
running, across various platforms, making the university a chaotic and differentiated 
environment. The then Vice-Chancellor and Senior Executive, it appears, were not 
concerned by this complex environment as they perceived that the university was in a 
strong position (Elizabeth). Morale amongst staff in the university was high, and the 
university had won two national awards, one in 1995 for its innovative use of 
technology in teaching. There was no perceived need to challenge the status quo 
inside the university. 
 
However, other Australian Universities were starting to promote distance education 
via the Internet, providing competition to the University of Australia. Although it 
was early days for LMS’s, the University of Australia believed they had to have one 
in order to remain competitive and attract a greater number of off-campus students. 
The perceived problem though, was that the University of Australia was still 
operating with its discourse of autonomy for each administrative and functional 
group, running multiple systems. However, this discourse of autonomy, it can be 
argued, was politically effective. It meant that only centrally was there any 
semblance of organisational coherence. It can also be argued, based on the evidence, 
that it was by classifying this situation as one of a lack of coherence that the Vice-
President was able to centralise control of the Division of IT, and the Division of  
Administrative Services, thus being able to focus power in that structure and 
maintain control. There was an apparent  acceptance that the political weakness 
created by differentiation should be addressed and that this offered an opportunity to 
centralise control and standardisation of process within the university. Documentary 
evidence from Academic Board shows clearly that the deputy Vice Chancellor was 
concerned about the differentiated academic practices within the university and 
expected that a more coherent, standardised approach be adopted. 
 
In order to combat the perceived problem of multiple LMS’s and the impact that this 
was having on the delivery of distance education programs, the Director of Distance 
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Education was appointed and given the task of selecting and implementing an 
enterprise-wide LMS. Despite this appointment and the restructuring of divisions, 
there was still the perception by academic staff that the divisions were not meeting 
their requirements in providing assistance for teaching and learning. The obvious 
dramas of discontent and debate in open forums of the university were informed by a 
discourse of academic authority. Academic staff believed that their qualifications, 
expertise and experience gave them authority over and responsibility for decisions 
about academic matters. Their judgement was reconciled in this discourse. The 
accepted hegemony of teaching and learning in the university derived from that. This 
discourse, it can be argued then, was another root cause for academic staff trying to 
maintain their hegemony in contest with university decisions which were perceived 
to have the purpose of re-establishing the power of the university where it matters, in 
teaching and learning based on academic credibility. It can be argued that this was 
the academic staff’s attempt to remove the coercion of discip line associated with 
centralisation and to free the academic staff to engage in ‘pure’ academic work. As 
one would expect, the ramifications of this discourse spilled into the public arena and 
both informed and, at times, drove public debate within the university. The level of 
academic freedom achieved by academic staff was significant. Three of the faculties 
did not change their use of specific technologies for teaching and learning and in the 
other two faculties the take up of the systems directed by the university for adoption 
was limited.  
 
Documentary evidence from Academic board and policy documents suggests that the 
administration of the university believed that this autonomy by academics was out of 
their control and that the university was losing its focus in terms of its vision. 
Another discourse emerged. This was a discourse of centralisation. It was the driver 
to bring all academics into one system and enable control of academic matters of the 
university to be maintained and managed centrally. The Deputy Vice-Chancellor 
noted that the corporate modus operandi was to centralise control and ensure some 
degree of standardisation to assure quality. The Deputy Vice-Chancellor wanted 
uniformity in academic matters within the university, rather than having the different 
campuses, schools and faculties arguing about the best method of teaching, and how  
teaching and learning should be facilitated at the University of Australia.  
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The Deputy Vice-Chancellor wanted to bring the different groups together and have 
them work under the one label – the University of Australia – through an enterprise-
wide LMS, thus creating a centralised structure. However, the concept of one 
enterprise-wide LMS was contested. Each Faculty, apart from the Faculty of Creative 
Arts and the Faculty of Education, kept their existing system running, challenging 
the decision for one LMS, challenging the notion of centralised control, and 
essentially maintaining the discourse of autonomy. However, there was no resolution 
to the situation where two strong discourses were underpinning action and reaction 
within the university. In the next chapter the continuation of the story explores the 
selection process of the new enterprise-wide LMS in detail. 
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Chapter Five – A Story of Systems Implementation – 
Part 2 – The selection of a new enterprise-wide 
learning management system 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter the history of the University of Australia and the use of 
technologies in teaching and learning was provided. Social dramas and events that 
occurred in that phase of the story described changes often associated with issues 
other than the technology-specific issues of a learning management system. This 
chapter continues the story of the selection and implementation of an enterprise-wide 
LMS at the University of Australia. 
 
The goal of having one enterprise-wide LMS, QuickLearn, had failed. In fact, quite 
the opposite effect was achieved. The number of EasyTeach users had increased, 
particularly in the Faculty of Commerce and Administration and the majority of units 
in the Faculty of Creative Arts. Other systems, such as personal websites or locally 
developed systems were operating in the Faculty of Medical and Health Sciences. It 
was only the Faculty of Education, and a small number of units inside the Faculty of 
Creative Arts and the Faculty of Technology that were using QuickLearn.  
 
The company responsible for QuickLearn reneged on their contract with the 
University of Australia in two ways – firstly, they did not deliver on any promises of 
updates and modifications as requested by the University of Australia, therefore 
breaking the contract established between the two organisations; and second, 
QuickLearn as an organisation, was moving into the corporate training market and 
away from the higher education market. The University of Australia did not renew 
their contract with QuickLearn and renewed the search for one LMS to be used 
across the university. 
 
Despite the experience of unsuccessfully implementing an enterprise-wide learning 
management system, various departments, divisions and individuals were still 
pursuing a university-wide LMS solution. This chapter recounts the story of the 
process of establishing a new committee to investigate potential LMSs, as well as 
creating the terms of reference and responsibilities of the new committee. The 
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process of generating a list of requirements and the cutting down of potential 
alternatives to the enterprise-wide LMS will be discussed, with the overall 
recommendation of a LMS being the final step. 
 
5.2 Setting up of a new committee 
Although the first attempt at implementing an enterprise-wide learning management 
system at the University of Australia failed, the directive for continuing the push for 
one system remained. Essentially, the desire to implement an enterprise-wide 
learning management system was now a directive of the university, becoming a 
strategic goal that had to be implemented. This was a position led by the Deputy 
Vice-Chancellor, the senior person responsible. The Deputy Vice-Chancellor 
delegated this selection process to Helen and the groups. However, the Deputy Vice-
Chancellor was keenly interested throughout the process and offered advice where 
appropriate. Although the Deputy Vice-Chancellor played no part in the 
recommendation developed, they were essentially the real driver behind this process. 
 
In order to start the search for a new enterprise-wide LMS, a new selection and 
implementation committee needed to be established. The Project Manager, Martin, 
provides his view of the process of removing QuickLearn and beginning the search 
for a new LMS. He claimed that “we started up a new project with completely new 
objectives and started looking at what our requirements were for a complete 
enterprise teaching and learning system.” Elizabeth further claimed that when the 
new selection process started, “there was a change of players and the new players 
didn’t want to acknowledge the old system [QuickLearn]. They wanted to focus on 
the new LMS.” The University of Australia, and most notably, the new committee, 
did not want to focus too much on QuickLearn. This supposedly allowed the new 
committee to concentrate on potentially getting the best system for the University of 
Australia without having to deal with the transition from the old failed system. 
 
A working group was formed and came to be known as the Executive Group. This 
group consisted of six members, the Head of the Division of Teaching and Learning 
(Helen); the Head of the Teaching and Learning Support Group (Diane); a Senior 
Lecturer from the Faculty of Technology (Samantha); the IT Manager for the Faculty 
of Commerce and Administration (Norma); the Head of School from the School of 
Information Management (John); and the Project Manager (Martin). The chair of the 
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Executive Group was the head of the Division of Teaching and Learning, Helen. 
According to the Head of the Division of IT, “the other notable approach [in this 
Executive Group as opposed to the QuickLearn selection and implementation group] 
was the use of an IT project manager.” By having a member of the Executive Group 
with knowledge about project management methodologies, the Executive Group 
believed that they were now able to work through the selection and implementation 
process with a methodological approach eliciting requirements from the wider 
university community as opposed to the quantitative “box-ticking” process used in 
the selection of QuickLearn.   
 
There was a belief by members of the Faculty of Commerce and Administration that 
setting up the working group was done in order for the chair of the Executive Group, 
Helen, ‘to make herself look good’. EasyTeach supporters believed that there already 
was a LMS solution operating within the University of Australia, EasyTeach. They 
did not see a need to go through the selection and implementation process again. This 
belief was prompted by Paul, the Lecturer from the Faculty of Commerce and 
Administration who claimed that “Helen stepped in and said, “okay, you did it 
wrongly last time, I can do it better than that, I’ll run the process of choosing a 
product”.”   
 
In an interview Helen claimed that she had the best of intentions for the university - 
to enable the University of Australia to be the best provider of distance education, 
and fulfil the requirements which QuickLearn had failed to do – to have one LMS 
and remove all other LMSs currently being used throughout the university. Having 
had a close involvement with the QuickLearn selection and implementation, Helen 
believed that she was able to identify the weaknesses in the original selection process 
and attempt to eliminate those weaknesses in the new selection and implementation 
process. In order to do this, Helen noted that “I used my experience of the 
QuickLearn fiasco to drive the process [of setting up a new LMS], identifying what 
was going to be the successful criteria and involving people seriously in the 
evaluation of the products and developing ownership to that decision.” 
 
Once the Executive Group had been established, the members then decided to “get 
an Evaluation Group from different faculties together, so that we [the Executive 
Group] could have a broad spectrum of people to be involved in the whole evaluation 
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process. We built up a Evaluation group, which had about twenty-odd members with 
representatives from different faculties and the Student Association Division as well” 
(Martin). By involving many representatives in the selection process, it was believed 
that the best system would be selected, as it complied with the requirements of each 
faculty or division. This decision locked these members into the decision-making 
process, and ultimately into the final recommendation.  
 
The Chair of both the Executive Group and Evaluation Group, Helen, provided her 
reasoning as to why certain people were selected onto the two groups, targeting one 
group specifically. She said, “some of the people who were on the Evaluation Group 
had a very big vested interest in EasyTeach. If I didn’t bring them along, they could 
white ant [undermine] anything… So I needed to get the most vocal opponents 
potentially to be involved and to buy-in, feeling that they really had a contribution, 
so that they would turn into my champions to work with the other people who were 
going to need a little bit of cajoling [persuading and supporting] along.” Helen 
believed that by having many people involved, especially the “vocal” ones, 
participation, feedback and ultimately user buy- in would increase, because those 
people on either group were allowed to speak their mind and the views of their 
respected constituency. The other reason as to why Helen pushed for EasyTeach 
supporters to be involved in the selection process was that the majority of EasyTeach 
users are in the Faculty of Commerce and Administration, the largest Faculty in the 
University of Australia. By having the largest faculty on her side, Helen believed that 
buy- in would increase, because if EasyTeach users could see the benefit of the new 
system, then the rest of the university would hopefully follow suite, assuring a new 
system was chosen. This could be perceived as a strategic move by Helen in an 
attempt to remove targeted criticism of the selection process from supporters of other 
LMS’s, a view supported by the Pro-Vice Chancellor (Distance Education). 
 
Another group Helen targeted were the students, “and we actually got a really, really 
big buy-in from the students.” By having the President and Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) of the Student Association Division involved in the process, it gave the 
Evaluation Group the student perspective. Helen continued, “when we [the 
Evaluation Group] wanted students to check the system, the [student representatives] 
just got piles of students, so we really did have genuine interest and participation, 
and I think that it made it an even more robust sort of system because the students 
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were there.” As it was not only the teaching staff that would be using the new 
enterprise-wide LMS, but also students, Helen needed to ensure that students were 
fairly represented on the Evaluation Group, as it was important to get both their 
views on potential systems and also their overall buy- in.  
 
The Evaluation Group contained the Chair of the Executive Group, the Head of the 
Division of Teaching and Learning, Helen, as the Chair of the Evaluation Group. All 
other members of the Executive Group were also members of the Evaluation Group. 
In addition, there were two representatives from each faculty, one academic staff 
member and one technical staff member. As Helen mentioned, there were two 
student representatives on the Evaluation Group as well as representatives from the 
Division of IT and the administrative divisions (the Division of Teaching and 
Learning and the Division of Administrative Services). There was an expectation of 
the representatives to consult with their respective constituencies to bring a wider 
experience and opinion back to the process. Some representatives communicated 
regularly with their respective schools, others did not provide this communication. 
 
There was a hierarchical aspect enforced on the newly formed groups. Although the 
Executive Group would make the decision of what the best system for delivery of 
distance education and also online education at the University of Australia, the final 
say and overall decision would be made by the Senior Executive of the University of 
Australia. It was the members of the Evaluation Group, who were supposedly 
communicating back and forth between their respected constituencies and the 
Executive Group that would do the majority of the work in identifying the “best” 
system to recommend. This hierarchy was highlighted by Simon, the IT Manager in 
the Division of Teaching and Learning, who claimed that “the decision [of which 
system to recommend] was to be made by the Executive Group, but it [the 
recommended decision] was based purely and simply on the work and the 
information that was coming through the Evaluation Group. It was always made 
clear that the decision would ultimately be made by the Executive Group, and they 
were going to make a recommendation to the Senior Executive, who would ultimately 
make the decision.” Rather than giving the Executive Group and Evaluation Group 
the power to make the decision about the recommended LMS, it is suggested that the 
Senior Executive believed that this was a method to increase acceptance, by 
involving many members of the university in the recommendation process. 
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Helen also had two other groups operating to the side of these two larger groups, a 
technical group and a corporate governance group. “So while most of the effort had 
been put into getting the functionality of the product right and getting commitment 
from all the people who are going to be users of it, if it wasn’t going to fit in with the 
technical environment, it wasn’t going to be purchased. If the company was not 
something to be touched with a barge-pole according to the Head of Finance, well, 
we weren’t going to go there” (Helen). Although the majority of work was conducted 
by the Evaluation Group, there were other requirements that had to be met in order to 
purchase the new LMS. With strict technical requirements and problems with 
QuickLearn losing money, the University of Australia did not want to risk a system 
that could potentially cost the university millions of dollars and bad publicity. The 
focus of selecting and implementing the enterprise-wide LMS had shifted from that 
in the initial stage. The original focus was on the importance of student and staff 
teaching experience and uniformity of use. The new focus was on bringing the 
university into alignment internally. This alignment was with both the need to meet 
the technological management of IT systems within the university and to ensure that 
there was comparability across all parts of the university in terms of teaching and 
learning.  
 
Once the Executive Group and the Evaluation Group were formed, the roles and 
responsibilities of each group had to be established. In terms of the responsibilities of 
the two groups, the Head of School of Information Management, John, recalled that 
the Executive Group “were given management responsibilities to do a review of 
LMSs, with a view, as I understood it, designated by the Deputy Vice-Chancellor, to 
move the University of Australia from having five LMSs, to one.” There was still a 
push to bring coherence to teaching and learning at the University of Australia by 
having one system which all teaching staff and student would participate in.  
 
This, however, did not stop challenges from the majority of members of the 
Evaluation Group. The Executive Group was required to recommend one LMS 
system for the university and each faculty representative believed that the system 
they used in their faculty should be that system. There was never an option to 
recommend more than one LMS. In the first meeting of the Evaluation Group, Helen, 
the Chair of the Group, recalled that “there was enormous opposition...it was 
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extraordinarily hostile, because I had outlined that the purpose was to end up with 
one corporate application, not two or any other number, and that that was the task 
that I had been given.”  
 
In order to deal with the faculty members pushing for their existing systems, the 
Evaluation Group were given a list of generic reasons as to why a new system was 
needed to give to their respective constituencies. The list of reasons included: the  
high cost of supporting multiple systems that were currently operating at the 
University of Australia – EasyTeach, QuickLearn, EducateMe Standard Edition, the 
cost and effort in supporting locally developed websites, and other individual staff 
members who were using ChalkOnline’s hosted service. Technology had also 
improved significantly since the currently-used products were acquired and LMSs 
had properly arrived on the market and had become more sophisticated (Martin). 
There was also an emphasis strategically on an enterprise-level solution, something 
that could be utilised by the entire university. The new system would push to provide 
greater pedagogical flexibility to deliver learning environments, and there was a 
university move towards an integrated online learning environment. The faculties, 
schools and divisions appeared to have accepted this, because they could see the 
potential benefits of having such a system. As the decision to explore potential LMSs 
was accepted by the wider university community, the Executive and Evaluation 
Groups were able to begin their search for a new enterprise-wide LMS. 
 
5.3 Eliciting the requirements and selecting the new learning 
management system  
Rather than using the same specifications and requirements from the QuickLearn 
selection process, which was a quantitative selection, the Executive Group decided 
that “we should actually go to the university community and ask them what they 
want” (Simon). By involving the greater university community, it was believed that 
the Executive Group would potentially increase the user-buy- in as academics and 
students would have possibly felt that they were being heard and contributing to the 
selection process.  
 
As a result, the Executive Group performed a wide scale survey of staff and students, 
generating a list of requirements that the new enterprise-wide LMS should meet. The 
wider university community were invited to provide their list of functions that 
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individual staff members believed were necessary for them to adopt a new LMS. The  
Head of School of Information Management, John, further added that the Executive 
Group believed that the list of requirements should be “developed by everybody 
[including the wider university community], which was really an excellent process. It 
was the only probably non-political part of the whole deal, everybody had input into 
the list of all the functions that the new LMS should perform.”   
 
The IT Manager in the Division of Teaching and Learning, Simon, claimed that the 
Executive Group “took a much more detailed evaluation of the university’s 
requirements and then a look at the various products that were out in the market and 
tried to match these two things.” Helen further believed that the Executive Group, 
“used the methodology that the Project Manager from the Division of IT [Martin] 
brought, which was to have streams and various steps under the evaluation process. 
That is, to have focus groups to get input to creating success criteria and 
functionality requirements.” A set of “must have” criteria were established in order 
for any potential product to be considered. Part of this set of criteria, the technical, 
had been imposed on the Executive and Evaluation Groups by the Division of IT. 
The technical criteria included the ability to scale the product across enterprise level 
and handle large classes as opposed to the typical small classes of 25 students that 
the majority of LMS were designed for. For the technological infrastructure, the new 
LMS had to operate on a Unix and Oracle platform, as well as have open standards. 
The list of criteria also included many items related to teaching, learning, use of 
multi-media, integration with subjects lists, integration with the students 
administrative systems, the ability to transfer grades, the importance of integrated 
chat rooms and interactive teaching and also included that the LMS owner 
organisation’s primary market is higher education and that the organisation is sound 
financially. This was an identified  problem with QuickLearn as the company has 
stated tha t it was moving towards the corporate training market. The organisation 
was also expected to have a significant market share, so that it had a good reputation 
across the industry9. The Executive and Evaluation Groups also ensured that there 
was common local use and support across Australasia. 
 
The wider university community assisted in creating the educational requirements for 
the new LMS. This was done via a six-step process, which Helen, as Head of the two 
                                                 
9 Presentation to the University of Australia staff members by Simon Price, 2001 
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groups claimed, “was a very robust process.” The first step was gathering 
requirements from focus groups of staff and students. Seven focus groups were 
conducted across the three campuses. One hundred and twenty members participated, 
which consisted of academic, technical and administrative staff, and undergraduate, 
postgraduate, on- and off-campus students. A total of some 75 requirements were 
generated in the focus groups. This was then narrowed down to eighteen key 
features, based on the number of times the feature appeared in the lists generated by 
the wider university community. The list of key requirements generated with the 
input from the wider university community, is shown in Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1 The list of requirements generated from surveying the University of 
Australia’s wider community10 
Ease of Use Personal presence 
Platform and browser capability Assignment submission 
Synchronous communication Surveys and evaluations 
Asynchronous communication Easy course content creation 
Collaborative work Course material to suit individual styles 
Assessment Import 3rd party content 
Results management Groups 
Online help Database driven web-pages 
Customisation Records management and reporting 
 
An external consulting company was then employed to give the Evaluation Group a 
prioritisation method to identify the key requirements from the list created earlier, to 
which the new enterprise-wide LMS had to comply with. The external consulting 
company brought the Evaluation Group into one room and “gave every person in the 
Evaluation Group a personal pad with a wireless transmitter on it, and you went 
through all the questions relating to the different requirements of the system, and the 
members of the Evaluation Group were able to allocate priorities based on what they 
felt and respond back through this wireless receiver system ” (Martin). This method 
allowed members of the Evaluation Group to allocate anonymous priorities to each 
requirement, allowing the Executive Group to identify what the key requirements for 
the new enterprise-wide LMS were. Results of the rankings were immediately 
available depicting the group rankings, allowing the members to see exactly how the 
                                                 
10 Presentation to the University of Australia staff members by Simon Price, 2001 
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rest of the group overall thought about the current requirement. Having been through 
that process, the Executive Group “came out with basically a prioritised set of 
requirements for the system, things we felt were not negotiable, things that were 
really high in terms of what people required from the system” (Martin). This process 
was repeated for a group of students, selected by the two Student Association 
Division representatives on the Evaluation Group. 
 
Through the web survey and prioritisation process described above, the list of 
requirements were reduced and split into two groups, staff and students, as their 
perspectives would be different. There were similarities amongst the two views, as 
can be seen below, shown in Table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2 Priority requirements for staff and students11 
Rank Students Staff 
1 Ease of use Ease of use 
2 Platform compatibility Platform compatibility 
3 Results management Collaborative work 
4 Assignment submission Asynchronous communication 
5 Collaborative work Assignment submission 
6 Asynchronous communication Results management 
7 Assessment Assessment 
8 Synchronous communication Customisation 
9 Customisation Synchronous communication 
10 Personal presence Personal presences 
 
                                                 
11 Easy to use - intuitive, user-friendly interface and navigation  
Platform and browser compatibility - users can access the system from different computer platforms 
and use a range of browsers  
Synchronous communication - real-time communication features such as chat, shared whiteboard, 
audio and video communication  
Asynchronous communication - features such as threaded discussion, announcements and messaging  
Collaborative work - upload, download and sharing of files  
Assessment including online assessment and self-assessment  
Results management - tracking of student progress and performance, providing students access to their 
own marks  
Customisation - allowing users to customise their view of the system  
Personal presence - user résumés, personal websites and portfolios  
Electronic assignment submission – the ability to submit assignments online 
Source: Price, S., and Hodgson, T. (2002). Requirements for Online Teaching and Learning at the 
University of Australia: A Case Study. (Upon request to the authors, full details can be disclosed). 
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As can be seen in the list, the requirements are similar, but have different priorities 
attached. For example, although the ability to perform collaborative work rated 
highly for staff, because they want students to be able to work in groups online for 
some assessment tasks, it was fifth on the list of students. Understandably, the 
students would rather have results management in order to see their results, marks 
and grades for assessments and units. 
 
With the list of requirements settled, the project manager was required to “find all the 
LMSs that existed…and they came up with a list of 64 potential LMSs” (John). 
Knowing that the university required an enterprise-wide LMS, the Executive Group 
decided to identify every potential LMS, and then compare the potential systems 
against the list of key requirements established in order to produce a short list for 
intensive evaluation. 
 
The list of 64 potential LMSs were then evaluated against the criteria established 
earlier in order to “reduce them [the list] down to the smallest working subset” 
(Simon). If the potential LMS did not meet the key requirements established earlier, 
they would be removed from the list. This allowed the Executive Group to condense 
the potential systems to a set of real contenders and a smaller subset in which the 
Executive Group and Evaluation Group could analyse and ultimately select one from 
that list.  
 
The Executive Group reduced the set down to “about five [potential systems] and 
started to do some fairly in-depth analysis of these five determine whether they had 
products that would actually suit what we had specified as to the criteria” (Martin). 
The five systems were then reduced to three potential LMSs by comparing the 
elicited requirements from the wide university community against the potential 
systems. Systems that did not meet these key requirements were then eliminated. The 
three systems were, EasyTeach, EducateMe International, and ChalkOnline. 
 
5.4 Conflict in the selection process 
The elimination process did have problems, particularly from the staff in the Faculty 
of Commerce and Administration, as they were predominantly EasyTeach users. 
QuickLearn users, on the other hand, were already “dissatisfied with the lack of 
functionality [of QuickLearn] …so they were almost too happy to jump in to look for 
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new products” (Simon). However, users of EasyTeach claimed confusion about why 
EasyTeach was not considered as a serious contender as the new enterprise-wide 
LMS, and ultimately claimed further confusion as to why the University of Australia 
needed a new product.  
 
There was on-going debate within the Evaluation Group about considering 
EasyTeach as a viable option for the enterprise-wide LMS. The EasyTeach 
supporters believed that EasyTeach should be the overall system for the University 
of Australia. However, EasyTeach needed further features, which became apparent in 
the requirements elicitation process. These features included implementing a grade-
book feature, which would hold student information and could be updated with 
information such as marks as the semester progresses. By investing in EasyTeach, it 
was argued by the EasyTeach supporters that the University of Australia could 
implement an enterprise-wide LMS at a better price than selecting and implementing 
an entirely new system. An example of the claims of EasyTeach supporters can be 
seen in the following quote from Paul. He claimed that “we had a product 
[EasyTeach], it was good. We needed these additional tools to work with, but the 
guts of the product was really good, and we could have done it [strengthen 
EasyTeach to be the overall LMS for the University of Australia] very cheaply.”  
 
This debate caused “a fair bit of angst in the Evaluation Group as there were a 
number of people who wanted to include EasyTeach because of the experience and 
the long breadth and depth of the experience they had of using the product” (Martin). 
The project manager and other members of the Executive Group believed that this 
strength of belief in EasyTeach was due to the fact that they had used the system for 
at least five years and had developed a wealth of experience and knowledge in 
utilising EasyTeach for their teaching and learning practices.  
 
The Executive Group considered keeping EasyTeach and running it parallel to the 
new enterprise-wide LMS at one stage of the selection process. This decision was 
due to the large number of users and the amount of experience developed in using 
EasyTeach over the last five years. However, the Executive Group believed that “it  
wasn’t worth going down that two system approach for a number of reasons, mainly 
because the university decided they didn’t want to continue with the EasyTeach 
license for commercial reasons, but just from an internal support issue, having to 
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maintain two products, two support systems and so on, is just an enormous extra 
effort” (Simon). Although a decision to keep EasyTeach would have kept many 
members of the Faculty of Commerce and Administration happy, it would have 
created difficulties in terms of providing adequate support through the Division of 
IT. It was decided by the Executive Group to eliminate the possibility of having 
EasyTeach as the LMS for the Faculty of Commerce and Administration and another 
system for the rest of the university. In addition it was noted in the Executive Group 
that EasyTeach did not meet the Unix/Oracle platform requirement as established in 
university policy for all systems.  
 
However, this decision did not change the level of support for EasyTeach. 
EasyTeach was supported strongly throughout the remainder of the selection process. 
For example, Rose, a member of the Faculty of Commerce and Administration with 
responsibility for supporting academic staff with teaching and learning claimed that 
“the Faculty of Commerce and Administration had been very happy with EasyTeach 
but there were certain things that they additionally wanted. For example, computer 
mediated learning, on-line assessment, and all those other features that EasyTeach 
didn’t offer…we could put more money into EasyTeach to get those aspects of it built 
or possibly integrate it with other systems to provide a total solution. The modified 
system could have been a very powerful system, but that did not happen.” 
 
Supporting Rose, Paul, a Lecturer in the Faculty of Commerce and Administration 
believed that “we’re choosing a new product, as opposed to saying, “here is the LMS 
we have in place with all the investment in professional development and acceptance 
by the staff and students.” If we’re going to replace it [EasyTeach] with anything on 
the list, then it had to be pretty good, it has to clearly be superior to this product, 
otherwise you wouldn’t bother to do it [replace EasyTeach]. They didn’t do it that 
way.” This continued to increase the tension amongst members of the Evaluation 
Group, particularly between the EasyTeach users and those that did not want 
EasyTeach as the new enterprise-wide LMS in the University of Australia. As Rose 
claimed, for the EasyTeach supporters, “there was enormous frustration about the 
inability to put EasyTeach on the table as a legitimate contender.” 
 
Another perspective, offered by Simon, the IT Manager in the Division of Teaching 
and Learning, “it was people who were genuinely concerned about the fact that they 
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had learnt to use one product and could see that from their own selfish perspective, 
that moving to another LMS was going to be a step backwards, because for what 
they wanted to do, wasn’t gaining anything to then and it was extra work required to 
learn how to use it.” Martin, the Project Manager, further claimed that “this was a 
pretty interesting political scenario, and I suppose if you analyse where it came from, 
it came from the fact that a lot of people had a lot of vested interest in it. People had 
a lot of experience with this product, there were a number of these people on the 
Evaluation Group who were administrators with EasyTeach, maybe I am selling 
them short, but I think a lot of them basically didn’t want to change, they knew the 
product, they didn’t want to move from it.” Experience of using EasyTeach seemed 
to have been the key argument from members of the Executive Group as to why the 
EasyTeach users wanted to keep that system. EasyTeach was a system that had been 
adopted across the university and was readily used in many locations.  The adoption 
process had been organic and gradual. Academic had adopted that systems by their 
own choice, They strengthened the support for the maintenance of EasyTeach..  
 
Martin claimed that the experienced EasyTeach users knew how well EasyTeach 
performed communication functions, and they felt that a new system would not be 
able to improve on this aspect of teaching and learning. As a result, “it wasn’t just a 
stubbornness to change, but a belief that EasyTeach did provide something that a 
new product would not. This, coupled with the fact that EasyTeach was quite fast, 
was a compelling argument for them” (Martin). 
 
In terms of the technological background, EasyTeach as a LMS was based on client-
server technologies. Rather than operating just through a website, which EasyTeach 
was able to do, a user installed software onto their local computer and interacted with 
the main server through the Internet. Many arguments about speed ensued, with 
EasyTeach advocates claiming that EasyTeach offered students a fast communication 
method. Opponents of EasyTeach, however, argued that the Web was the way of the 
future for distance education. Martin believed that “if you used the client [in 
EasyTeach], it was quite fast, and there were a number of people in the Evaluation 
Group who felt that we wanted to try and replicate the aspects of that product. 
Basically, they weren’t so much interested in the teaching and learning facilities it 
offered, they just thought  it was fast and we would never be able to get anything that 
basically matched the speed, so they wanted to have EasyTeach as the final 
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application.” The EasyTeach advocates believed that EasyTeach offered more to 
users in terms of speed because of the client server setup, requiring users to install 
software onto a local computer in order to access the EasyTeach site. A solution that 
did not use client server software was going to be a slow solution, as it would require 
all users to interact with the World Wide Web, therefore slowing down interaction 
speeds, and causing frustration, depending on the connection speeds. Furthermore, 
the project implementation team also had a long term view. It was apparent to the 
project team that over time, the speed advantages offered by the EasyTeach client 
server software would be comparatively reduced by new technologies (Martin).  
 
The EasyTeach supporters believed that there was ‘more to this debate than what 
they could see’. Paul, from the Faculty of Commerce and Administration stated that, 
“we heard the excuses that EasyTeach was flaky and kept falling over and everything 
because it can’t handle numbers. We had 20,000 users on it and had very few 
problems. We knew there were other reasons.” EasyTeach had been gaining 
momentum and use, not only in the Faculty of Commerce and Administration, where 
every unit was running on EasyTeach, but also in the Faculty of Creative Arts and in 
some parts of Education and Technology. EasyTeach advocates believed that 
EasyTeach could handle the user load without failing, or decreasing in speed.  
 
The debate about including EasyTeach as a serious contender continued, with a focus 
on technical issues. Paul believed that the Division of IT were behind the push to 
remove EasyTeach from the list of potential LMSs. He believed that the reason “I’m 
pretty sure, you may of heard this elsewhere, was that the Division of IT and in 
particular the Head of the Division of IT didn’t accept anything that wasn’t Unix 
based, and this wasn’t Unix based, that’s one reason, so he wanted to get rid of it.” 
As EasyTeach was not running on a Unix platform, it did not fit the corporate policy 
of the university, requiring all systems to run on Unix and Oracle. 
 
What emerged from this was the belief by EasyTeach supporters that control of 
information technology platforms was an issue affecting which enterprise-wide LMS 
was to be selected. Paul believed that “the Division of IT wanted control over the 
sorts of technology, they didn’t understand the educational aspect and didn’t care I 
don’t think.  Their concern was to have the Unix -based stuff that they want with all 
their products. Anything we go outside of that, anything Windows or anything else, 
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they didn’t want to know, no go, can’t have that product you’ve got to come back 
here, so to some extent that technology is driving the way people teach or in conflict 
with the way they are teaching which neither is very healthy.” By adhering to 
university policy, the Division of IT were able to eliminate any products that did not 
comply or run on Unix and Oracle. EasyTeach advocates believed that this was a 
poor decision and reminiscent of the debate between the Department of Teaching and 
Learning Development and the Division of IT in the early 1990’s. By accepting only 
one platform, the Division of IT was limiting potential solutions. 
 
However, there were also rumours that EasyTeach was not considered a serious 
contender for the enterprise-wide LMS because of some technical difficulties 
experienced. As Norma, the IT Manager for the Faculty of Commerce and 
Administration believed, “the Division of IT had actually set EasyTeach up 
incorrectly the first time by creating an administrator set up, and then later on the 
system crashed and needed to be upgraded to a new server. A second administrator 
was set up, which created conflict because the rights were assigned from the original 
setup to the new setup and when they went to clean things out at one point, we had a 
big crash.” By creating two administrator roles, the system could not handle the 
various permissions set up, creating conflict in the system and ultimately crashing. 
Students and academic staff were affected by this crash and were dissatisfied with 
the poor service provided as the teaching resources they relied on were lost. 
 
The Head of the Division of IT believed that “there was substantial tension between 
the Division of IT and the faculties running EasyTeach. The people from EasyTeach 
were not really investing money in the development of the software and as such it 
had quite a few very serious bugs and this directly impacted on the quality of the 
EasyTeach services that was being experienced by the students.” The technical 
difficulties, according to the Division of IT, were because not enough money was 
invested into developing and maintaining EasyTeach. The Division of IT would not 
offer support because EasyTeach did not fit the corporate policy of running on 
Oracle, and they were already providing support for the initial enterprise-wide LMS, 
QuickLearn. As a result, ‘bugs’ in the system ultimately affected the way the system 
ran, and this affected the teaching and learning of staff and students, leading to a 
number of disgruntled students, the ones paying for the teaching and learning. 
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It was no secret that the Head of the Division of IT stated, “were very, very happy to 
move off EasyTeach.” Although EasyTeach did not fit the corporate line of the 
university, the Division of IT were required, or expected to support the system, as 
many staff believed that was the Division of IT’s role. However, the Project 
Manager, Martin, believed that the “EasyTeach users certainly didn’t understand the 
Division of IT’s perspective in terms of what they were willing to support and why 
they wanted to support it because it’s a cost to maintain.” As there were high costs 
involved with supporting multiple systems, the Division of IT claimed that they were 
placed under considerable strain as they could not provide adequate enough 
resources to provide support for multiple systems. It was therefore believed by the 
Division of IT that if there was a possibility of removing EasyTeach indefinitely and 
thus eliminating the need for support, then the Division of IT were happy to support 
that. As Martin further claimed, “I don’t think people, including the EasyTeach 
users, necessary knew all the ins and outs of some of those issues.”   
 
The EasyTeach group was not succeeding in getting support via the technical issues 
arguments, by the long-time use argument, and by the growing number of users’ 
argument, so they attempted to debate the educational aspects of EasyTeach. This 
debate focused on an argument about pedagogy. As Rose, from the Faculty of 
Commerce and Administration believed, “a lot of people saw the essence for 
teaching and learning as communication and alongside that we also see that you’ve 
got to have computer mediated learning, and you’ve got to have interactive activity 
and all those sorts of things which are all the bells and whistles, but fundamentally, 
it’s about communication.” There was little disagreement that EasyTeach provided 
excellent communication. Essentially, the new LMS would be about pedagogy, 
which was the last hope for EasyTeach supporters to continue to push for their 
adopted LMS. 
 
Users of EducateMe Advanced Edition, in the Faculty of Technology, believed that 
the new LMS should “revolve around a technology delivery of databases” (John). 
Members of the Faculty of Technology believed that the new system should be set up 
around the delivery of database information. However, members from other faculties 
were not as interested in a technological solution as the Faculty of Technology and 
were not willing to operate a database-driven system.  
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A third group of uncommitted users of technology in teaching and learning believed 
that the system should incorporate aspects of communication and databases but 
should not rely solely on those technologies. Essentially, the new enterprise-wide 
LMS should “revolve around teaching and the delivery of teaching” (John).  The 
Chair of the Executive  Group, Helen, believed that “there was an educational debate 
going on about communication versus technology versus teaching itself or pedagogy, 
a word that everybody uses and there was no-one winning the debate at all.”  
 
This debate created extra tension in the Evaluation Group and Paul claimed that 
“those meetings were really tense because the EasyTeach advocates were never 
listened to. In fact, one staff member said that they just felt so sick going to those 
meetings she couldn’t come, because no one’s listening, it was too tense.” The 
EasyTeach supporters would not accept any argument against EasyTeach as being 
the chosen system for the University of Australia, even though they were not 
winning any of the debates or arguments, believing that they were not being listened 
to.  
 
It was not until a significant piece of information regarding EasyTeach was revealed 
that the decision was made to totally eliminate EasyTeach from contention.  Martin, 
the Project Manager, claimed that, “we got our finance division to do an evaluation 
of the financial viability of the company which owned EasyTeach. It quickly became 
clear that the company had major financial problems. It turned out that the company 
had a major cash flow problem and the Head of Finance in the University of 
Australia said “we are not going with this company, full stop, I’m not going to 
support buying this product, or proceeding with it any further.” So the Evaluation 
Group were given an ultimatum by the finance department basically which said take 
this off your short list… that solved a big issue for us.” Upon further clarification 
from other members interviewed, the finance group were seen by the members 
interviewed, to evaluate the three companies, EasyTeach, ChalkOnline and 
EducateMe International, independently of the Executive and Evaluation Group. The 
finance group were not aware of the politicking occurring in the selection process, 
and were asked to perform a financial evaluation and report back to the Executive 
and Evaluation Groups. Essentially, there was legitimacy behind the financial 
evaluation and no system was going to be accepted had it failed the evaluation. This 
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could potentially mean that EducateMe International and ChalkOnline could have 
been eliminated, had it failed the financial eva luation. 
 
Lara, the Online Learning Manager in the Faculty of Creative Arts, agreed with this 
reasoning, believing that  “EasyTeach was out of the running because somebody 
from the financial area had examined the business plan of EasyTeach (company) and 
decided that they weren’t good at responding to the University of Australia’s needs 
and didn’t provide adequate support and that was probably true and that they were 
aiming for a market for a more commercial market rather than an education market 
and as such that would constitute a risk for the University of Australia to be going 
for a product that may not continue to be responsive to our educational needs.” 
 
EasyTeach was ultimately eliminated from selection contention due to perceived 
financial difficulties identified by the financial group within the university. In 
conjunction with concerns about poor cash flow, EasyTeach was recognised as not 
being able to provide adequate support for the higher education market. It was 
believed that EasyTeach was going to follow the direction of QuickLearn and move 
into the corporate training market, which would have left the University of Australia 
with a system that would not be supported by the vendor. The University of Australia 
had already been down that path with QuickLearn and did not want to be in that 
position again. Therefore the decision was made by the Executive Group to eliminate 
EasyTeach as a contender for the new enterprise-wide LMS. 
 
The Head of School of Information Management, John, claimed that the 
announcement that EasyTeach was not financially viable and potentially moving out 
of the higher education market, and ultimately eliminated from contention was made 
to the Evaluation Group. This in turn “caused a lot of consternation. In fact [one 
member] burst into tears in the meeting… it meant that was the end of EasyTeach, it 
wasn’t even going to get down to the last two and it was a difficult decision but it 
came about essentially because of that meeting” (John). There was very little that the 
EasyTeach advocates could do now, as ultimately, they “couldn’t come back on the 
financial thing” (Paul). The announcement to drop EasyTeach was emotional and 
heart-breaking as many advocates had spent a lot of time training and gaining the 
knowledge and experience to effectively run EasyTeach. There was also very little 
the EasyTeach advocates could do in terms of the financial announcement because 
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they did not have access to the same information that the finance group did. Only the 
report was available to members of the Executive and Evaluation Group.  
 
However, even staunch supporters of EasyTeach, such as Rose from the Faculty of 
Commerce and Administration, believed that by removing EasyTeach from 
contention, there was a possibility that a better system could be found. She claimed 
that “there was a recognition that you had to go a few steps backwards to go a few 
steps forward. People were very optimistic that there would be benefits, longer term 
however.” The decision to eliminate EasyTeach from contention ultimately left the 
Executive Group and the Evaluation Group with “two potential LMSs, ChalkOnline 
and EducateMe International” (Martin). 
 
5.5 Selecting the enterprise-wide learning management 
system  
Having started with a list of requirements and 64 potential LMSs, the Evaluation 
Group had reduced the list of potential systems to two. The Chair of the Executive 
Group and Evaluation Group, Helen, organised for both companies to come to the 
university and give presentations on their products to members of the Evaluation 
Group.  
 
The Project Manager retells his perspective of the two presentations. “ChalkOnline 
came in and did some very good demonstrations, I think that the picture you got from 
the demonstrations was that this product was very well developed in terms of it’s 
user interface, very simple to use but was probably a little inflexible in the way that it 
could be used by teaching staff and probably didn’t have all the bells and whistles 
that we’d like to see in terms of our requirements.” Those that saw the ChalkOnline 
demonstration were impressed because it seemed to be an easy system to use. It 
appeared to members of the Executive and Evaluation Group that ChalkOnline 
would require very little training as it had a good user interface, where staff could 
update their area, and students could interact and access the necessary resources for 
the unit.     
 
EducateMe International, on the other hand, performed, what the Project Manager 
believed as “the most dismal demonstration that I have ever seen in my life.” The 
reasoning behind this description was due to the fact that EducateMe International 
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was still a new product, essentially being “in alpha state and not a beta version” 
(Simon). The product was green and this came across in the presentation, as the 
Australian representative for EducateMe International “ended up using his mobile to 
talk to one of the people in the States while he was actually trying to set up the 
demonstration. He started the demonstration up, and things started falling over” 
(Martin). As the product was still in its early days, there were still many bugs in the 
system and this affected the way members of the Executive Group and the 
Evaluation Group perceived the reliability and usefulness of EducateMe 
International. This led a negative perception, and many of the members were 
surprised that EducateMe International made it to the final short list of two potential 
systems. 
 
As EducateMe International fitted the criteria earlier, they were still in contention. 
As a result, EducateMe International were determined to fix its mistakes and get the 
contract. To do this, they sacked the representative that gave the demonstration. This 
indicated to the Executive Group and the Evaluation Group “how serious EducateMe 
were about actually trying to get our business because they were so upset by the way 
things had happened that they were willing to actually sack their Australian rep” 
(Martin). By sacking their Australian representative EducateMe International 
demonstrated that they were willing to do anything and everything to work with the 
University of Australia, ensuring that the University of Australia would receive the 
best support and service. 
 
EducateMe International was given a second chance to improve their presentation. 
There was considerable discussion about the presentations at both the Executive and 
Evaluation Group meetings. It was decided that there had to be a choice in the 
evaluation process and since there two LMS systems on paper, were the only two 
that came anywhere near meeting the university’ s list of requirements, it was 
considered important to bring them back again. As the Project Manager recalls, “so 
we went back to EducateMe and said look this thing was an absolute cock -up, if we 
are going to keep you on the shortlist you’ve got to basically do something to prove 
it. They got somebody else on board, and then they, you know, pulled out all the 
stops to try and negotiate with us to help us see that yes EducateMe International did 
have a product, it was, well in the running. The second demonst ration indicated that 
the product looked a whole lot more flexible than ChalkOnline’s product from a 
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teaching and learning perspective.” Through this second opportunity, EducateMe 
International was able to indicate that they had a competitive product that not only 
rivalled ChalkOnline, but had greater flexibility in the ability to provide a variety of 
resources such as audio-streaming, e-whiteboards and the ability to upgrade features 
to enhance teaching and learning. Although ChalkOnline may have been easier to 
use, it was perceived to be limited in what users could and could not do. EducateMe 
International, on the other hand, was perceived to be able to provide more flexibility 
to further enhance and improve the richness of teaching and learning. 
 
Despite the issue of flexibility, EasyTeach advocates continually criticised both 
EducateMe International and ChalkOnline in terms of speed. These members were 
comparing EasyTeach, which runs on client server software therefore requiring less 
intensive interaction via the Internet, with EducateMe International and ChalkOnline, 
both of which run via the Internet. The IT Manager for the Division of Teaching and 
Learning made it clear that the Executive Group and Evaluation Group knew that any 
web-based system would be slower than a client-server based system. As Simon said, 
“speed was part of our evaluation criteria and ultimately, we recognised that the 
advantages of going with a purely web-based product far outweigh the disadvantage 
of speed.” It was believed by members of the Executive and Evaluation Group that 
by being a web-based system, staff and students can access the system from 
anywhere around the world, provided they have a connection to the Internet. This 
would supposedly make accessing the system easier as staff and students were not 
required to install software, which they would have to do with EasyTeach. 
 
Many of the EasyTeach supported believed that having a slow system can turn a lot 
of current and potential students away from the University of Australia. Arguments 
for a client-based LMS included the ability to keep distance education students in 
close connection with other students as well as on-campus students, effectively 
reducing the gap between the two cohorts. EasyTeach supporters on the Evaluation 
Group believed this would not happen with EducateMe International or ChalkOnline. 
Typical of the criticism of the new system in the evaluation stage was this comment 
from Paul, from the Faculty of Commerce and Administration mentioned, “the web 
based system is just slow and clunky, not very nice to use.  So students don’t feel like 
using it. They think if I go in there I’m going to spend another bloody half an hour in 
there at home and I haven’t got time for that.” As a result, “in terms of our strategic 
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priority of being a world class distance educator, I think the technology can actually 
destroy that, but nobody listens.” However, there were implications of having a web-
based system from the user perspective. A fast connection to the Internet and World 
Wide Web would be necessary for accessing some of the content in the enterprise-
wide LMS. Not all users have access to broadband, limiting their accessibility of 
online content. 
 
When comparing the two systems, ChalkOnline and EducateMe International, 
members of the Evaluation Group recognised that EducateMe International had 
advantages over ChalkOnline, particularly in regards to product flexibility. 
EducateMe International was seen as being easier to modify in terms of the way the 
front-end design could be modified to incorporate the latest technologies, such as 
video- and audio- streaming and flash animation. The back-end hardware of 
EducateMe International was also easier to adjust if need be. For example, an 
increase in student numbers would require another server for an increased load. This 
could be implemented easily, requiring little downtime or numerous software 
patches. For students the flexibility of EducateMe International would not make a 
great deal of difference but for people on the development side, such as building 
courses, EducateMe International was significantly easier and more flexible to 
modify. As Diane, the Head of the Teaching and Learning Support Group, said, “It 
was the flexibility for the academics being able to teach using EducateMe 
International which was the sort of overriding deciding factor.” The IT Manager, 
also from the Division of Teaching and Learning, supported Diane’s comments, 
“EducateMe International was chosen because of its pedagogical flexibility. The fact 
that EducateMe International allowed me to do much more flexible things with the 
product than some of the other systems was a major advantage. The Evaluation 
Group almost unanimously decided that ChalkOnline was far less flexible. It may 
have been much easier to use because it was less flexible, but people went for 
pedagogical flexibility rather than easy use.” 
 
The members of the Evaluation Group felt that EducateMe International gave 
teaching staff a greater set of tools and options, which they could use to enhance 
their teaching abilities. ChalkOnline, although it gave staff tools such as a gradebook 
to monitor student progress throughout the semester, the ability to incorporate flash 
animations and video- and audio-streaming, to enhance their teaching, did not offer 
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as much as EducateMe International in terms of future additions or modifications to 
the product. As a result, the Evaluation Group believed that EducateMe International 
would be the better product to implement as the enterprise-wide LMS.  
 
However, with greater flexibility comes greater difficulty in actually learning how to 
use the product to enhance teaching and learning. Diane recalls the predicament that 
the Evaluation Group were in. She said, “the biggest negative of the decision to 
select EducateMe International is that it is much harder to learn, so we knew we 
were in for a much bigger training staff development support load by selecting 
EducateMe International, but it was decided that it was worth it.” Should the 
Evaluation Group select a system that is recognised in the selection phase that is 
difficult to learn, but offers greater flexibility? Or should the group select a system 
that has less flexibility, but is ultimately easier to use? By selecting a system that is 
more difficult to learn how to use, the Division of Teaching and Learning recognised 
that greater support and training staff would have to be supplied,  
 
After the conclusion of approximately 50 meetings the members of the Evaluation 
Group met to make their recommendation based on the requirements analysis, the 
testing of both products within the university, the financial analysis and the opinions 
of other academic staff they had consulted with. There was significant support for 
EducateMe International but the members of the group were no t entirely convinced. 
It took a very persuasive argument by the Faculty of Technology representative 
Samantha, a passionate advocate of EducateMe International, to move the group. 
Samantha was a senior lecturer in the Faculty of Technology, a faculty that had 
already used EducateMe International. She advocated that of the two systems under 
consideration only EducateMe International offered the university the flexibility it 
needed for the LMS to be adopted in the various distinct ways each faculty wanted. 
She discussed each of the requirements noting how similar the systems were in many 
ways. However she advocated that what the university community wanted was the 
ability to deal with differences in style and approach to teaching. She argued that 
only the flexibility in EducateMe International offered that.  
 
The final meeting was filled with both exasperation about the exclusion of 
EasyTeach and acceptance by those same people about accepting EducateMe 
International. It was only the consistency of the argument by Samantha that forced a 
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final deliberation. Only one member of the group remained an advocate of 
ChalkOnline. The finality of the decision was accepted. For example, Rose noted 
that, “there was pretty overwhelming support for EducateMe International.” 
EducateMe International met the technological requirements of running on an Oracle 
system, and the majority of members on the Evaluation Group believed that 
EducateMe International provided a greater flexibility for enhancing teaching and 
learning for both staff and students. Although the company initially gave a poor 
presentation, members of the Executive Group “did a lot of talking to existing 
customers and found out that they had a pretty good interaction with the company 
and they were very happy with their maintenance and support, so we started to get a 
much better feel for how the company would operate with us” (Martin). By talking to 
other users of EducateMe International, the Executive Group got a better idea of how 
EducateMe International actually interacts with their customers. The outcome of this 
selection process was to recommend EducateMe International to the Senior 
Executive of the university as the best solution according to the Executive and 
Evaluation Groups.  
 
Once the decision was made to recommend EducateMe International, some members 
from the Faculty of Creative Arts, Commerce and Administration, Medical and 
Health Sciences, and Education believed that the Faculty of Technology were being 
favoured, as they were already using a version of EducateMe, whereas the other 
faculties would have to learn from the beginning on how to use EducateMe 
International. However the proposed new enterprise-wide LMS, EducateMe 
International, was different to the EducateMe version being used by the Faculty of 
Technology (EducateMe Standard Edition). Martin, the Project Manager, explains, 
“there was a fairly major group already using a EducateMe product internally, but 
we weren’t looking at campus edition, we were looking at a completely new product 
that EducateMe had been developing which was an enterprise teaching and learning 
product, which had been completely redesigned and re-architected from the ground 
up.” So although some members of the University had been using EducateMe, it was 
the EducateMe Standard Edition, which was then upgraded to the EducateMe 
Advanced Edition. There were differences between the two products (Advanced 
Edition and International), meaning that training was required for someone who has 
used EducateMe Standard or Advanced Edition, to switch over to EducateMe 
International. Effectively, those who had been using EducateMe Standard or 
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Advanced Edition, still had the same amount to learn as someone who used 
QuickLearn, EasyTeach or individually developed LMSs, thereby placing all staff 
and students on in equal position in terms of training and previous system knowledge 
(Simon). 
 
After a lengthy process, with a lot of discussion and arguments, the Evaluation 
Group had reached its decision that would then be passed onto the Executive Group 
and the University Council. The Chair of the Evaluation Group and the Executive 
Group, Helen, recalls when the decision was made, “the Evaluation Group were 
unanimous in their choice, even students. I remember students saying, well, it might 
take longer to get to know how to use it, but it will be better in the end…it was 
unanimous and they [the Group] wanted the decision NOW. So that was an absolute 
turnaround from the first meeting, with, “Helen, you are dead meat, we hate your 
guts because you are doing this to us,” to, “come on, we’ve got this 
recommendation, can we get on with it please?” There were tears, people were so 
relieved at the process, and it was an extraordinarily emotional thing.” 
 
The main difference between the two systems was that EducateMe International was 
perceived to have had greater product flexibility in terms of modifying the system to 
incorporate new hardware and software to assist the delivery of teaching and learning 
materials than ChalkOnline. This difference ultimately gave EducateMe International 
the approval as being the system to recommend to the Senior Executive.  
 
The Evaluation Group had made its recommendation to the Executive Group and 
now it was time for the Executive Group to put the recommendation to the Senior 
Executive of the university. This recommendation had been through an arduous 
journey that took approximately one year to come to the conclusion that EducateMe 
International was the best product based on the list of criteria and list of functionality 
established by the Evaluation Group and the wider university community. As the 
Chair of the Executive Group and the Evaluation Group, Helen, recapped, “it took a 
long time, but it was worth the process because this is the corporate system of the 
university. Despite the process, we’ll still have people who whinge, but we couldn’t 
really have gotten to where we are without having had significant political 
justification. It was a “so many of your colleagues have recommended this” sort of 
thing. So it had legitimacy at the faculty level.” Although it had been through a year 
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long and intense process, the decision was viewed as legitimate, because there was so 
much involvement from the various schools, faculties and various divisions.  
 
All that was left for the Executive Group to do was now provide the recommendation 
to Senior Executive. The Head of School of Information Management, John, recalls 
that the meeting with the Senior Executive “was actually a very calm meeting if I 
remember rightly and people just accepted that was the decision. It was accepted by 
the Vice-Chancellor and the go-ahead was given.” Because the support was provided 
by the wider university community, members of the Senior Executive were happy 
with the recommendation.  
 
The Project Manager, provided more detail as to what was included in the 
recommendation made to the Senior Executive, “We actually put the 
recommendation up to the Executive April 2002 and the recommendation said, 
EducateMe International has the functional requirements that we need or will have 
in certain time frames they’d given us certain guarantees, in fact part of our contract 
negotiation was that they had to provide certain functionality within certain periods 
of time, or penalties would be incurred.” Although EducateMe International was 
practically brand new on the market, the Executive Group wanted the University of 
Australia to take the risk and implement this new product. The justification given to 
the Senior Executive was that the software is cutting edge, and with promises set up 
in the negotiation stage, EducateMe International would deliver the “viable teaching 
and learning system.” There was also the added advantage that EducateMe 
International was more flexible in terms of delivering content than any of its 
competitors. As a result, EducateMe met more functional requirements than its 
competitors and was the “must-have” system. 
 
One other potential difficulty encountered with the recommendation related to 
budgetary restrictions. As the Project Manager explains, “when we put the 
recommendation up to the Senior Executive, we put together a complete budget, a 
five-year plan to implement EducateMe International. Twelve and a half million 
dollars over five years for initial implementation including support and maintenance 
of the product, faculty staff input to development of unit teaching online. The 
response we got from Executive was that you can’t have that much but you’ve got to 
implement it anyway, literally.” In order to implement EducateMe International, a 
 
 
133 
significant budget was required. The bulk of the $12.5 million was recognition of the 
faculty requirements to train and support staff in the new environment. As Martin 
claims, “when the Senior Executive ignored this request, they effectively 
marginalised the capability of the project implementation team to manage the 
faculty-related issues well. A lot of work was subsequently put into providing “work-
arounds” to resolve these issues.” The Head of the Division of IT claimed that “the 
University of Australia typically recognised that for the implementation of the 
EducateMe International system to be successful, adequate planning and resources 
would need to be budgeted for.” Not only does the system need to be purchased, 
there were also issues of training and further support to ensure that EducateMe 
International would be a successful LMS. 
 
The Senior Executive gave the Executive Group “two-thirds of the budget that we 
needed to do the initial implementation and they said that we want you to take all of 
the faculty costs out of the equation completely, so forget about your five year plan, 
and forget about all of the costs of faculty staff. All we want to know about is what 
it’s going to cost you to actually implement this product quote unquote” (Diane). As 
a result, some of the money was provided, the rest had to be borrowed from various 
areas of the university budget. As the full 12.5 million dollars could not be granted 
by the Senior Executive, staff in the Division of Teaching and Learning noted that 
inadequate training and implementation would probably occur, which was frustrating 
to members of the Executive and Evaluation Groups, because so much time and 
effort had gone into doing an exhaustive analysis of what the university required, 
what was commercially available and what was deemed to be the best system. Rather 
than holding off the decision and exploring the market for potential new systems that 
were more affordable, the Executive Group attempted to get the extra money by 
using money from other areas of the ir sections, particularly the Division of Teaching 
and Learning.  With that the project was moved into the implementation phase.  
 
In this chapter, the focus has been very much on a requirements elicitation and 
evaluation process, followed by a selection process based on the set requirements. 
The whole of the university issues and appointment processes, so obvious in the 
previous chapter were not as obvious. However there is clear evidence that what was 
going on backstage was certainly extant. 
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5.6 Analysis 
The social dramas (Chapter 3.6) that emerged in this second phase of the systems 
selection and implementation of the enterprise-wide LMS at the University of 
Australia included the formation of the Executive Group; the establishment of the 
Evaluation Group; the elicitation of requirements from users, including academic 
staff and students; making the decision and putting forward that recommendation to 
the Senior Executive. 
 
In the first social drama, tension initially emerged about the composition of the 
Executive Group. The Deputy Vice-Chancellor gave the Head of the Division of 
Teaching and Learning responsibility to establish the Executive Group and, in 
consultation with her, its composition. The Head of the Division of Teaching and 
Learning was aware that the previous process was flawed, that there was a significant 
difference of opinion about LMSs within the university and that both pedagogical 
and technical issues had to be addressed. She was also aware that vested interest 
existed in various stakeholders groups within the university and their influence was 
deeply set within the teaching and learning practices of the university. Each 
stakeholder group expected representation but that would have created a huge 
committee. The Head of the Division of Teaching and Learning decided that the 
Executive Group would be kept small and that to enable representation a larger 
Evaluation Group would be established. The more vocal academic staff members 
involved in the use of technologies for teaching and learning believed that the Head 
of the Division of Teaching and Learning was trying to refocus teaching and learning 
development within the Division of Teaching and Learning out of the faculties. Their 
response was to act out their disapproval in faculty boards and at school meetings. 
They also argued for their case to be taken up by each of the relevant Deans. This did 
not have any impact as the Deans reported to and were appraised by the Deputy 
Vice-Chancellor and they were expected to follow university policy. 
 
Similarly, the second social drama emerged over the composition of the Evaluation 
Group. It was openly argued that all stakeholder groups be represented. 
Subsequently, staff that had a vested interest in LMSs were appointed to this group, 
together with students. Once established it became obvious that this drama merged 
with other tensions over the criteria for selection of the LMS, and over the 
continually argued existing strength of EasyTeach. There was contestation amongst 
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members of the Evaluation Group about which system should be selected. There was 
also continual debate over the importance of each requirement that was listed as 
important and especially debate over the technology parameters that had to be met. 
The obvious extent of concerns about various LMSs emerged during these meetings 
when participation in testing occurred, following presentations by vendors. 
 
The most serious social drama in this phase of the selection process emerged when 
the Evaluation Group had to recommend a decision. Initially, tension focused on 
whether EasyTeach should be considered a serious contender as the enterprise-wide 
LMS at the University of Australia. The EasyTeach advocates were initially 
confused as to why the University of Australia was looking for a new LMS, as they 
believed that EasyTeach was the obvious choice, based on their criteria. However, 
the requirements process had produced a more comprehensive list that included 
criteria that EasyTeach was not able to meet. The apparent narrow focus in 
EasyTeach on communications was the source of the tension that emerged and which 
was challenged by the list of requirements that emerged from the university-wide 
elicitation process. As a result, the various groups of stakeholders and technology-
user factions contested each others sets of requirements. Ultimately, when 
EducateMe International was recommended by the Evaluation Group, it was selected 
on the comprehensive list of requirements, including pedagogy, technology and 
financial, that had been evaluated by all groups and tested on each alternative LMSs.    
 
Three sets of criteria were contested publicly in this process, pedagogy, for which 
there was never going to be a consensus as different stakeholder groups had differing 
opinions; technology, about which there was a deep, long-held dispute already 
reported in Chapter Four, concerning IT support for a specific university-wide 
infrastructure based on Oracle. This too was never going to be resolved as the 
argument was long held and unresolved; and the financial viability of the companies 
providing the software. It was the last criteria that forced the supporters of 
EasyTeach to accept that it was not a viable alternative. It was the sustained 
advocacy of one member of the Evaluation Group that persuaded the decision to 
recommend EducateMe International. However, these obvious deliberations were 
being informed by political processes and the wielding of power that was set within 
more substantial discourse. 
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The discourse of discipline appeared to be still underpinning the decisions taken in 
the creation and composition of the Executive Group and the Evaluation Group. By 
incorporating advocates of other LMSs, the Deputy Vice-Chancellor and the Head of 
the Division of Teaching and Learning wanted to coerce the advocates of other 
systems into the new enterprise-wide LMS. Politically, it was important that the 
university objectives of centralisation and uniformity were achieved. The discourse 
of centralised rather than differentiated control was now foremost in the actions of 
the Senior Executive of the university and senior managers. The discourse of 
differentiation and diversity, so much a part of the early university, was being 
replaced by a discourse of integration and sameness. This was most probably a 
response to the policies of the Federal Government who were demanding compliance 
with new directions in Australian Higher Education, based on a discourse of free 
market competition and graduate outcomes directed to economic rather than social 
goals (Lingard, 1991, 1993; Lingard, et al., 1993; Corbitt, 1995; Angus, 1984, 1988). 
The State was attempting to coerce universities to ‘toe a corporate line’ and meet the 
demands of business, challenging the traditional discourse of universities of 
intellectual freedom and the betterment of society (Davis, 2004). 
 
Although the advocates of other LMSs were members of the Evaluation Group, there 
was still an element of confusion and disintegration amongst academic staff. There 
was no clear statement from the Senior Executive about what type of university the 
University of Australia is. Staff were still confused as to whether the University of 
Australia was an on-campus university, providing some units to off-campus students, 
or whether the university was still targeting off-campus students as its prime market. 
There was still a focus politically on the academic emancipation. Academics sought 
emancipation from the directed policies of both the university Senior Executive and 
the heavily criticised policies of the Federal Government, where there was a 
discourse of sameness and uniformity, enforced by compliance requirements through 
reporting to the Department of Education, Science and Training. 
 
The Senior Executive was attempting to modify and limit academic emancipation by 
centralising processes and systems inside the university. The academic staff were 
still working individually; still working to their individual agendas and not towards 
the strategic goals of the university. Essentially, it could be argued that the Senior 
Executive wanted to coerce staff politically to comply with the requirements of 
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government policy as the government had attached disciplinary penalties to non-
compliance. However, the Senior Executive did not directly drive this. They were 
required to adhere to government requirements, which had flow on effects for the 
academic and general staff within the University of Australia. It is through these 
flow-on effects that academic staff end up with less power than general staff and the 
Senior Executive. The academic staff were required to adhere to requests by 
members of the divisions operating within the university. 
 
However, most academic staff objected to being forced into one central system. This 
was brought into the front stage in this process through the resistance offered by the 
EasyTeach advocates who resisted any attempt to lose the LMS they were already 
using. Compliance with requirements to have one system only, they believed, 
eliminated their academic emancipation. The discourse of standardisation driving the 
actions of the Senior Executive was perceived by the academic staff to be 
disempowering of their responsibilities as academics. Thus they contested this with a 
discourse of academic emancipation and differentiated choice, expressed openly as 
debate about pedagogy, about technological compliance and about what LMS best 
suited their individual and faculty needs. Politically, there were two distinct 
discourses in operations within the university during this time. The bases of the 
contest were fundamental to both sides in the debate and thus the debates in meetings 
and forums of the university were intense and emotional. There was an essential 
contest of the driving ideology of the university and about what had served the 
university well to this stage in its history. 
 
These challenges were ultimately overturned, as the Senior Executive strongly 
believed that academic staff needed to be using one central system. The Deputy 
Vice-Chancellor continued the drive to achieve standardisation in teaching and 
learning across the university. The Senior Executive wanted to create an environment 
of all staff, academic and general, working together towards the same goal, pushing 
the requirement for academic staff to comply with the newly selected enterprise-wide 
LMS and create uniformity and ultimately control over the academic staff. Thus, at 
the point of implementation of an enterprise-wide LMS, the discourses contested in 
the open forums of the university were to have a significant impact. It is to this final 
part of the story that we now turn. 
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Chapter Six – A Story of Systems Implementation – 
Part 3 – Implementing the enterprise-wide learning 
management system  
 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous two chapters have described the process leading to the decision to 
recommend EducateMe International as the enterprise-wide LMS at the University of 
Australia. This chapter provides the story of the implementation of that new 
enterprise-wide LMS. Following acceptance of the recommendation from the 
Executive Group by the Senior Executive, a plan was developed to purchase the 
software and begin an initial pilot implementation of the LMS.  
 
6.2 Key Events Impacting the Implementation of EducateMe 
International 
During this phase of the implementation of EducateMe International, a number of 
key events occurred. The process started with the  implementation of EducateMe 
International in November 2002. Four significant changes to staff in the Senior 
Executive occurred in early 2003. The Vice-Chancellor retired after being involved 
with the University of Australia for seven years and a new Vice-Chancellor was 
appointed, to begin in January 2003. In February 2003, the Deputy Vice-Chancellor 
resigned. John, who was on the Executive Group and the Evaluation Group and the 
Head of School of Information Management, was promoted to the position of Pro 
Vice-Chancellor (Distance Education) in February 2003. A review of Academic 
Board occurred in March 2003. The online teaching and learning policy was 
developed and implemented in May 2003. A new Deputy Vice-Chancellor was 
appointed in June 2003.  
 
The resignation of the Vice-Chancellor, appointment of the new Vice-Chancellor, 
appointment of the Pro Vice-Chancellor (Distance Education), the resignation of the 
then Deputy-Vice Chancellor and appointment of a new Deputy Vice-Chancellor 
changed the role of faculties and divisions. These changes, signalled to some 
members of the University of Australia that there was a change in role and direction 
of the university. For example, Paul believed that “the new Vice-Chancellor believes 
strongly in the role of the Academic Board, as it is the academic who should be 
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making the decisions. The Division of Teaching and Learning and the Division of IT 
would have been told what to do… the Vice-Chancellor noticed straight away that it 
was the administrative units and divisions ignoring the faculties and calling the shots 
for the faculties.” 
 
Due to the complexities involved in telling this story in a chronological order, there 
are moments of repetition. These have been provided to keep as close to the 
implementation timeline as possible 
 
6.3 Incorporating Online Services into the University 
Structure 
Once the decision to implement EducateMe International was made by the Senior 
Executive in 2002, the Executive Group were ready to bring the Evaluation Group to 
an end, replacing this group with an Implementation Group. The Executive Group 
believed that they needed to remove the Evaluation Group and establish a new group 
to oversee the implementation of EducateMe International. The reasoning was about 
both the intensity of the work done by the previous Evaluation Group and the need to 
reinvigorate the process with additional new faces replacing some former members 
of the Evaluation Group. As the IT Manager in the Division of Teaching and 
Learning claimed, “we wound up the Evaluation Group saying, ‘thanks very much 
you’ve done a fantastic job, now we appreciate that you’ve spent a year doing this, 
we’ll let you off the hook now and we’ll go out and get another bunch of people to 
work on the implementation’.”  
 
The Evaluation Group members wanted to continue their involvement in the 
implementation of EducateMe International, because so much of their time had been 
devoted to evaluating and recommending the potentially best system (Chapter 5). 
They wanted to see this project finalised. As Simon continued, “the Evaluation 
Group was unanimous in saying ‘no, no, no we’ve got this far, we’re demanding to 
continue in the involvement in the implementation’ and so even the people who were 
sort of anti during some of this thing had decided that it was actually worth 
continuing with and persisting into that implementation phase. We effectively had 
buy-in by having a consultative process during the evaluation.” Members of the 
Executive Group were pleased with this enthusiasm shared by the Evaluation Group 
and believed that user buy-in would increase due to these members wanting to be 
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involved right through to the end. The Evaluation Group now became the 
Implementation Group and members would effectively be the ones promoting the use 
of EducateMe International and encourage other members of their respective division 
and faculty to use EducateMe International for their teaching and learning.  
 
Before the position of Pro Vice-Chancellor (Distance Education) was created, the 
Head of School of Information Management created an online services structure, as 
seen in Figure 6.1, incorporating the Evaluation/Implementation Group and the 
Executive Group.  
 
Figure 6.1: The structure of the office of the Pro Vice-Chancellor (Distance 
Education), the Deputy Vice-Chancellor and the Vice-President. 
 
In this structure, the Pro Vice-Chancellor (Distance Education) would report to the 
Vice-Chancellor, similar to the Deputy Vice-Chancellor and the Vice-President. The 
online services structure contained three groups: 
· The University of Australia Online Support Group, which managed the LMS, 
the university portal and the student record information system, and reviews 
the implementation of any University of Australia online project, suggest 
changes and innovation to existing University of Australia online projects, 
provide feedback on University of Australia online projects from a teaching 
and learning perspective, and report on the impact of University of Australia 
online projects in faculties and divisions.  
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· Executive Group, which leads planning, such as goal and strategy setting of 
EducateMe International, draft proposed policy to support EducateMe 
International for the Senior Executive, identify issues that need to be raised 
within the university context to meet the goals of EducateMe International 
and monitor university-wide planning and implementation of the adoption of 
online technologies. 
· Implementation Group, which replaced the Evaluation Group and planned the 
implementation of EducateMe International, monitoring and evaluating the 
implementation of EducateMe International, identify problems with the 
integration of EducateMe International with other university systems, and 
propose policy to support EducateMe International to Senior Executive.  
The Division of Teaching and Learning linked in and provided support for issues 
relating to the Executive and Implementation Group, and the Division of IT linked in 
and supported all three online services groups. 
 
Once the structure of the online services in the University of Australia was decided, 
the Executive Group created a timeline for the implementation of EducateMe 
International. Implementation would begin in July 2002 with existing QuickLearn 
Units only being transferred to EducateMe International and then all other units 
offered across the university would be phased-in having an online presence on 
EducateMe International by January 2005. As the Head of the Division of IT 
claimed, “our approach was to slowly ramp up the use of EducateMe International 
and set out to acquire the skills required at the same time through the piloting of 
EducateMe International for selected units. The idea was to isolate and identify 
operational and performance issues, if any, so that they could be worked on and 
addressed. It is easier to have issues with a smaller number of units than to contend 
with all the units in a given semester.” This approach also enabled some staff to 
move across without being forced onto the one system straight away. With such a 
large number of units offered each semester, it was considered by members of the 
Senior Executive that it would be commercial suicide if the University of Australia 
decided to switch off all existing LMSs and turn on EducateMe International. As a 
result, a phase- in and parallel implementation process was adopted, in order to 
minimise the impact of ‘bugs’, fixing up those problems before releasing all units 
online, where there is much more at risk. 
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It was believed by some members of the university’s academic staff that the 
University of Australia was going to shut off the old system and turn on the new one. 
There was confusion between members of the Executive and Implementation Groups 
and the wider university community. Some members of the university community 
believed that the University of Australia was going to adopt a poor implementation 
methodology by putting all users onto the new system in one go. This turned out to 
be not the case. This confusion was explained by John, the Pro Vice-Chancellor 
(Distance Education) who claimed that “there were perpetrators around the 
university who spun the story that we were going to introduce EducateMe 
International full stop, and that this was wrong project management and that we 
were doing everything wrong. I sent emails through to these staff members where I 
said, ‘no, we’re not doing that, we are running a pilot study of EducateMe 
International in first and second semester and the summer semester of 2003,’ and 
that’s what we did.”  
 
Those members of the university that were spreading rumours about a poor 
implementation process also highlighted that EducateMe International was originally 
developed and typically used by American universities for the delivery of online 
tutorials. EducateMe International was developed for smaller class sizes of thirty to 
forty students. The University of Australia had class sizes that ranged from thirty 
students to 1,400 students. The Head of the Teaching and Learning Support Group 
believed that, “the way that we’re using EducateMe International is not what it was 
designed to do, they designed it for an American market and the first thing we did 
was say we want to have 35,000 users in a section.” This was a new product being 
tested outside of its typical class size. The potential for something going wrong was 
there.  
 
Ultimately, the push to implement the pilot of EducateMe International now came 
from the Senior Executive rather than the Executive Committee that recommended 
EducateMe International, regardless of what members of the university were saying. 
Members of the Division of IT and the Division of Teaching and Learning expected 
that people would not be happy being forced to use this new system. As the Head of 
the Division of IT claimed, “I adopt a simplistic view of the world where I believe 
you cannot please everyone all the time and so you’ve got to do the best with what 
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you have got. Set up a process and run it as best you can and consider it a success if 
you are able to satisfy a majority need of the university.” 
 
Forcing users to use EducateMe International was going to be an issue from the 
Division of IT and the Division of Teaching and Learning point-of-view, primarily 
because it required a re-evaluation of their current teaching practices, and a re-
conceptualisation of how an enterprise-wide LMS would affect and enhance their 
teaching. It was recognised immediately that pleasing everyone would not be 
possible and that the implementation team should aim to support and work with the 
majority of the wider university community. This was exemplified by the quote from 
Helen, the Head of the Division of Teaching and Learning, who believed that “most 
academic staff are appointed because of their research skills…they’ve not done any 
teaching, so we throw them in front of a class and we expect them to teach. In 
conjunction with this, academics need to reconceptualise how to use a tool such as a 
LMS, to change their pedagogical approach, to think of engaging the learner in 
totally different ways.”  
 
Although there would still be people resisting the adoption of the new system, the 
University of Australia Online Support Group, the Division of Teaching and 
Learning and the Division of IT believed that there was a need to implement 
EducateMe International in order to start migrating users across from existing LMS, 
and create exemplar units to spread and promote the use of EducateMe International 
across the university.  
 
6.4 Installing EducateMe International 
Ten teams were established to start implementing EducateMe International and 
transferring units across from the existing LMSs to EducateMe International (Figure 
6.2). These teams were established to manage one specific area of the 
implementation process and reported operationally to the Head of the Division of 
Teaching and Learning. These teams were: application builders, who were 
responsible for the interfaces of the EducateMe International and how users would 
interact with the LMS; technical builders, who were responsible for setting up the 
hardware platforms and making sure they could support and run the EducateMe 
International software and the expected user load; the academic teaching and 
learning planning stream, who were responsible for policies relating to EducateMe 
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International (such as the online presence policy outlined earlier), and change 
management issues; unit migration and development, who were responsible for 
getting users out of their old system, into the new; administration access, who were 
responsible for making sure people were authorised to use the system and what sort 
of privileges those users were allowed to have; implementation planning, which were 
primarily the project managers; training development, who were responsible for 
training users, making sure they would be able to use the system, at least in its basic 
form; support planning, who were responsible for issues of support to the staff and 
students at the University of Australia; communication strategy and delivery, who 
were responsible for conveying messages and important information relating to 
EducateMe International; and vendor/contract management, who were responsible 
for communications and negotiations between the University of Australia and the 
company, EducateMe International. The relationship between the Head of the 
Division of Teaching and Learning, the Pro Vice-Chancellor (Distance Education) 
and the created teams is shown in Figure 6.2. 
 
 
Figure 6.2: The structure of the ten teams and the office of the Pro Vice-Chancellor 
(Distance Education) 
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The Pro Vice-Chancellor (Distance Education) worked in conjunction with the Head 
of the Division of Teaching and Learning and was responsible for the University of 
Australia Online Support Group, the Executive Group and the Implementation 
Group. The Head of the Division of Teaching and Learning was responsible for the 
ten tens implementing and migrating units across from old LMSs to EducateMe 
International. The ten teams all reported back to the Head of the Division of 
Teaching and Learning. 
 
It was perceived that representatives of the wider university community needed to be 
on these teams to provide information from each faculty and division. This would 
ensure that people had the opportunity to express opinions about the software and 
about implementation and ultimately have a sense of ownership of the system. This 
was supported by Diane, who believed that with a number of these teams, “we had 
representatives from all the faculties and divisions, relevant divisions, and those 
streams were mostly seen to be making decisions so that we had the faculty buy-in to 
how we set up the interfaces, how we ran training.”  
 
Another important step in creating ownership in this process was by the 
establishment of the Online Educational Managers in March 2003. The Online 
Educational Managers were sponsored by the Deputy Vice-Chancellor and the 
faculties and were involved in training in the use of EducateMe International, 
collaborating with members of other faculties and the Division of Teaching and 
Learning, providing mentoring and professional development for other academic 
staff in their faculties, and conducting a project resulting in an exemplar in the use of 
EducateMe International12. Diane believed these Online Educational Managers had a 
great influence in promoting EducateMe International to their colleagues. She 
claimed that, “we had them on board and I think they, as much as anybody else, 
started being able to talk in the tearoom about EducateMe International…they had 
more information than lots of other academics about what we were desperately 
trying to do, so they started saying, ‘yeah, the Division of Teaching and Learning 
and the Division of IT are working really hard to get EducateMe International 
working in order for you to use it in 2004’.” By establishing the Online Educational 
Managers, it was believed by the Division of Teaching and Learning and the 
                                                 
12 The Online Educational Management Program 
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Executive Group that they were able to have supporters and contact people 
throughout the faculties. 
 
By slowly phasing in aspects of the enterprise-wide LMS, any bugs would be 
identified early on and removed. According to the Head of the Learning Support 
Group another advantage of the phased- in approach was that the Executive Group 
“had good feedback and good representation from all the faculties, staff and 
students. It really gave us a good idea of what was going to be accepted and not 
accepted. I think the objections have come out in the piloting phase.” Not only would 
any hardware and software ‘bugs’ be identified, but the Executive Group were able 
to identify any user issues and objections of having to teach their unit with a basic 
online presence and resolve these before all units had to go online. The Head of the 
Division of IT claimed that “success is very much dependent on the software 
working with not too many bugs and the availability of adequately configured 
hardware to handle the load.”  
 
This phased- in approach brought a significant issue with users to the notice of the 
Executive Group that EducateMe International ran entirely on the Internet. Many of 
the old EasyTeach users were still familiar with, and identified a perceived benefit 
of, client-server software that enabled quick transactions and interactions with the 
central server. It was clearly acknowledged by the Executive and Implementation 
Groups that the system would be slower than previous systems, regardless of which 
enterprise-wide learning management was selected. This belied was supported by 
Diane who believed that “people are happy to conceptualise it, but then when they 
face reality you know you’ve hit a problem as soon as they say, it’s web-based… It’s 
not EasyTeach, and it’s not going to be, and it’s never going to be that fast, there’s 
just no way. We could have chosen ChalkOnline and we would have had exactly the 
same problems. They’re both web-based systems.”  
 
In order to install EducateMe International, new hardware was required. However, 
when the Executive Group submitted their recommendation to implement 
EducateMe International as the enterprise-wide LMS, they received a limited budget. 
As a result, there were difficulties getting the hardware to run the system well. The 
Project Manager claimed that “we had a lot of problems with actually getting the 
hardware we needed because we didn’t have the budget to meet the requirements we 
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had set.” The Executive Group set EducateMe International up on test hardware, but 
needed to bring in completely new hardware in order to have a full-scale 
implementation across the university. As the Head of the Learning Support Group 
stated, “we said to the Senior Executive, ‘we need to put in new hardware for all this 
stuff to successfully work and it’s going to cost us in the vicinity of $1.4 million to do 
it’…we eventually managed to get the Vice-President to agree to spending the 
money.” Having trialled the use of EducateMe International on test hardware, the 
Executive Group knew what type of infrastructure was needed in order to have a 
university-wide implementation. By approaching the Senior Executive and in 
particular the Vice-President, the Executive Group was able to obtain the money 
required for the implementation. 
 
Once the hardware infrastructure was established, issues arose in regards to the 
software supplied by EducateMe International. The Project Manager claimed that 
“EducateMe International started off with a beta version of a product back in the end 
of 2002. Once we started off with the beta version they gave us version one of the 
product to implement for semester one 2003, then quickly decided that there were 
problems and gave us version 1.01 and then started applying patches every couple of 
weeks to apply to this product because they were finding problems with it, obviously 
it hadn’t been tested.” Once the software was implemented, bugs appeared. The 
EducateMe International company provided appropriate patches and upgrades to the 
product in order to make it successfully work on the infrastructure. The Head of the 
Division of IT further believed that these software problems were experienced during 
the teaching semester. He said, “during the first semester in 2003 we came up with 
major problems, students lost assignments and emails disappeared from the system 
which caused us a fair bit of heartache. Ultimately, it was nothing that we couldn’t 
resolve but they were some fairly intense issues at the time.” Although these 
problems could be resolved, there was a sense by a vocal minority of the university 
from various faculties, typically EasyTeach supporters, that perhaps the product was 
released too early and that the University of Australia should have waited a little 
longer for the ‘bugs’ to be fixed, rather than relying on EducateMe International to 
continually provide updates and patches. 
 
In summary, the technical implementation of EducateMe International was driven 
fundamentally by an interaction between the vendor and the university. The 
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implementation of the enterprise-wide LMS was run by the Division of IT and 
followed a typical project management (Martin). According to the Project Manager, 
“the structure of the software user interface was actually determined by the policy, it 
determined what was actually going to be in the system. So the interfaces that the IT 
guys had to put in place were all related to what the policy said they should or 
shouldn’t do.” After the first trial implementation, an interesting outcome occurred. 
Technically the software seemed to work, however, with the operation of one 
particular trial of one function the whole system failed. Furthermore, there were a 
number of small technical bugs that needed to be put in place (Simon).  
 
The outcome of this was to change the structure of the implementation. According to 
the Pro Vice-Chancellor (Distance Education), “the technical structure was driven by 
one extremely large server, which had the capacity to run four or five applications 
but because of the way EducateMe International sent queries to its databases, it was 
overloading the server and slowing the whole process down to the point where it 
actually stopped when there were very large numbers of concurrent users.” The 
University of Australia in conjunction with the vendor decided to trial, in the second 
phase, a clustered arrangement of servers to see if that would improve the query 
processing from the system to the databases. That decision was fundamentally made 
between the vendor and the Division of IT, driven by the Pro Vice-Chancellor 
(Distance Education), who was concerned that the system was getting a bad 
reputation from a technical perspective (John). The decision proved to be successful.  
 
During the second phase, more units were migrated across to EducateMe 
International. However, the  other LMSs running in the university were still running 
for most units. Furthermore, some units were running both systems. Technical issues 
decreased dramatically in the second phase, and as a result, a higher load testing was 
undertaken with 30,000 simultaneous users tested (Martin).  
 
In February 2004, all four of the old LMSs were turned off and on March 1st 2004, 
the EducateMe International became fully operational with all of the required units 
being put in place. Throughout the technical implementation, there was a typical 
process of trial and error on different infrastructure, initially using one large server, 
which was purchased specifically for this purpose. That had not worked as well as it 
was hoped, so to deal with the technical problems associa ted with queries to 
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databases, which was slowing it down, the move to a cluster of servers solved the 
problem (John).  
 
At the same time as this technical implementation was occurring, with dedicated 
resources given to it by the Division of IT, all under the guidance of the Project 
Manager reporting to the Pro Vice-Chancellor (Distance Education), there was 
constant evaluation with the vendor about technical issues. Meetings were arranged 
for every Wednesday morning to facilitate the evaluation process. Every Wednesday 
afternoon there was a meeting of the Implementation Group, which monitored all 
aspects of the implementation, from November 2002 through to November 2004. 
This group dealt with problems, strategies to overcome problems and comprised of 
academic staff, technical staff from the Division of IT, administrative staff from the 
Division of Teaching and Learning and was headed by the Pro Vice-Chancellor 
(Distance Education). The success of the technical implementation can be 
determined by statistics ga thered between March 2004 and November 2004, where 
the system uptime for EducateMe International was 99.98%. There were issues 
occasionally with slowness, which were associated with Internet and Web problems, 
but the system itself didn’t seem to have any technical problems at all (John). This 
implementation process can be seen in Figure 6.3 below.  
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During the negotiation of the contract between the University of Australia and 
EducateMe International, the University of Australia negotiated a chair on the 
EducateMe International Product Advisory Board. As the IT Manager in the Division 
of Teaching and Learning claimed, “when we negotiated the contract with 
EducateMe International, we negotiated that the Head of the Division of Teaching 
and Learning should sit on the product advisory board for the first 18 months of the 
contract.” This helped resolve software issues with EducateMe International a lot 
quicker than normal. According to the Head of the Division of Teaching and 
Learning, “we could directly say this is what is happening with our system in a 
meeting with a number of other representatives from the US institutions, so that was 
quite good because it meant that we could basically say it like it really was in the 
ears of other people who were either buying or had bought the product with their 
executive.” By having this relationship with EducateMe International, the University 
of Australia through the Head of the Division of Teaching and Learning, was able to 
have a say in which direction EducateMe International would go, as well as highlight 
any problems with the actual product, leading to a quicker response from EducateMe 
International.  
 
This close working relationship helped identify and resolve issues with the software. 
The Head of the Division of IT believed that having someone on the EducateMe 
International board, “was extremely beneficial to the University of Australia because 
it gave the people from EducateMe International an understanding that our staff are 
very competent and knowledgeable. This then led to the establishment of trust and 
credibility.” Not only did the University of Australia have the Head of the Division 
of Teaching and Learning on the advisory board at EducateMe International, but also 
EducateMe International visited the University of Australia to provide some 
assistance. Additionally, the University of Australia was also able to send two staff 
members over to work closely with EducateMe International and build a technical 
relationship. As the Head of the Division of Teaching and Learning claimed, “David 
and Andrew have been really, really instrumental in helping us develop an 
extraordinary professional close technical relationship with EducateMe 
International…We sent them over for a couple of weeks and they worked in the 
development office and talked to them about the problems we were having and got 
inside the code. I don’t believe any other customer has done that, or been allowed to 
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do that, but we now have a mutual respect.” The University of Australia was in a 
close working relationship with EducateMe International, which helped resolve any 
problems and ‘bugs’ identified in the system. As the original design of EducateMe 
International had been based in smaller classes, EducateMe International valued this 
interaction as it helped them experiment closely and improve their product with a 
large institution. 
 
Although the speeding up of the implementation timeline impacted the delivery of 
the product, the Head of the Learning Support Group believed that the system would 
not have worked if this close working relationship with EducateMe International had 
not been possible. Diane believed that she “didn’t think it was actually possible for 
software vendors to be that supportive, but really every time the University of 
Australia said ‘jump’ they said ‘how high and how far?’ We were getting the best 
support we could possibly buy in terms of actually making it work for this year.” The 
close relationship with EducateMe International helped implement the system in the 
required timeframe, minimising problems with hardware and software. 
 
6.5 Migrating and transferring from five learning management 
systems to one 
As the ‘bugs’ in EducateMe International were being minimised, teaching staff were 
starting to transfer their units across from their respective old LMSs to EducateMe 
International.  The Faculty of Commerce and Administration previously used 
EasyTeach. As a result, there was a bit of resistance in migrating across to 
EducateMe International. As Rose believed, “the Faculty of Commerce and 
Administration had been through more angst than anybody else in terms of when 
EasyTeach went down.” As was outlined in Chapters Four and Five, the Faculty of 
Commerce and Administration had a lot of experience invested in EasyTeach and 
therefore had a lot to lose as a completely new enterprise-wide LMS was selected. 
The EasyTeach advocates in particular felt that they were being treated unfairly 
because EasyTeach was never considered as a solution by the Executive Group in the 
previous phase to the enterprise-wide LMS. As a result, EasyTeach users were one of 
the last groups to be migrated across to EducateMe International. The Faculty of 
Commerce and Administration also had established methods of teaching online 
through the extensive use of EasyTeach. Staff in this faculty knew what it meant to 
teach online as well as work around problems encountered and maximise the 
 
 
153 
advantages of EasyTeach to the extent that they were utilising EasyTeach to its 
greatest ability. The faculty were now migrating to a new system where they 
perceived that they did not have the same abilities in EducateMe International and 
their expectations were high. 
 
Another driving factor for the decision to slowly migrate users from EasyTeach 
across to EducateMe International was that the licence for EasyTeach expired in 
September 2003. Rather than rushing people from EasyTeach onto EducateMe 
International, it was perceived by the Executive Group that it would be better to 
slowly migrate people across from EasyTeach to EducateMe International. As the IT 
Manager for the Division of Teaching and Learning claimed, “although the license to 
EasyTeach ran out in September 2003, we continued that license till the end of 2003 
because it made no sense to finish in the middle of semester. So it was already 
decided that at the end of second semester 2003 is when EasyTeach will wind down 
so that gave us a full year to migrate people off that.” This would also stop the 
problem of large number of units simultaneously transferring to EducateMe 
International. The Head of the Learning Support Group stated that the “long phase-in 
process actually helped as it gave people the opportunity to have a look at 
EducateMe International, and see how other people were using it.”  
 
Being such a large faculty, it was fairly important to get their units across to the new 
system, so exemplars could be created to show the rest of the faculty that it was not 
difficult to transfer across to EducateMe International. As a result, the Pro Vice-
Chancellor (Distance Education) believed that the faculty migration to EducateMe 
International was too slow. He believed that the Faculty of Commerce and 
Administration “were too slow to adopt it, sitting back and waiting for other people 
to make mistakes. That was a bad error on their part, we would of certainly have 
changed that.”  
 
As a result, the Pro Vice-Chancellor (Distance Education) put pressure on the Dean 
of the Faculty of Commerce and Administration to get units offered by the faculty to 
migrate across to EducateMe International. Norma, the IT Manager for the Faculty of 
Commerce and Administration, believed that the pressure from the Dean flowed 
down to the members of the faculty, “there was pressure that we weren’t doing 
enough and I felt that some people were being unjustifiably targeted for making bad 
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decisions when in fact are making very good decisions based on experience.” This 
was further supported by Rose, who claimed that “yes, we did get questioned why we 
didn’t take a more mainstream rolling out of units onto EducateMe International.” 
However, Paul, a Lecturer in the Faculty of Commerce and Administration claimed 
that, “you have to work out where all the problems are.” By slowly migrating units 
from EasyTeach across to EducateMe International, the Faculty of Commerce and 
Administration was able to assess what ‘bugs’ were in the system without affecting 
any units.  
 
Fortunately for the Faculty of Commerce and Administration, every unit had been 
operating online via EasyTeach. As Rose from the Faculty of Commerce and 
Administration stated, “many of our units had been fully online already because our 
Faculty had a large distance education student base.” This sped up the process 
slightly, however, it was still perceived by the members of the Executive Group that 
the Faculty of Commerce and Administration was not migrating their units quickly 
enough compared to other faculties.  
 
The Dean of the Faculty of Commerce and Administration helped support the 
schools, by pushing for all academic staff to attend training sessions for EducateMe 
International. There were some difficulties in getting some people to attend, as the 
Pro Vice-Chancellor (Distance Education) claimed, “everybody complained that they 
didn’t have the time to attend training and doing it late 2003 had an impact on staff 
workloads.” By the start of 2004 only 70% of the academic staff in this faculty had 
attended training on EducateMe Internationa l, compared with over 95% in each of 
the other four faculties. This lack of response frustrated members of the Division of 
Teaching and Learning. The Head of the Division of Teaching and Learning 
suggested, “there are people who are using EducateMe International who haven’t 
been trained, so we’ve got idiots writing emails because they just don’t now what to 
do, so they’re blaming the system. We’ve got academic staff members who were 
using it probably inappropriately or not in any way that will enhance learning, 
they’re just saying that the basic requirements are being met, but there’s no 
deliberate educational advantage for now, having done it and they may take a little 
more time to be into thinking about new ways of teaching. They’ve been told to use it 
without adequate support training, so they’ve got their backs up.” As some people 
were not properly trained in the use of EducateMe International to enhance their 
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teaching of distance education-based students, they took a lot of their anger out on 
the system. 
 
By having a supportive Dean and extensive use of teaching online via EasyTeach, 
the Faculty of Commerce and Administration was able to eventually make the 
transition across to EducateMe International. Many members of the Executive Group 
believed that there would be difficulty with some members of this faculty due to their 
long association and experience with EasyTeach. However, through the online 
presence policy, they had little choice but to learn how to use EducateMe 
International. 
 
The Faculty of Creative Arts were the earliest adopters of EducateMe International. 
This was because these staff members had little choice about what system they 
adopted, particularly those who had been using QuickLearn. As the IT Manager for 
the Division of Teaching and Learning believed, “with QuickLearn the decision was 
made for us because we weren’t going to continue the license and that finished at the 
end of 2002.” By the end of 2002, the Faculty of Creative Arts had migrated all users 
off QuickLearn and into EducateMe International. Essentially, the second semester 
of 2002 was a pilot test of how EducateMe International would work as an 
enterprise-wide LMS. This enabled the Executive Group, the Division of Teaching 
and Learning and the Division of IT to ensure that EducateMe International was 
working. In 2003, the Executive Group had to turn off the QuickLearn software as 
the University of Australia’s license with QuickLearn had expired. As Simon 
claimed, “the way the license was structured, the software simply would not work 
after the license date, so the server didn’t respond to anybody, so you didn’t have a 
choice.” There was little choice for those using QuickLearn in when they could 
migrate across to the new system.  
 
The migrating of units from QuickLearn to EducateMe International caused 
problems for faculty members. According to the Online Learning Manager, “we did 
not have the skills or the resources in the faculty to take those units from QuickLearn 
into any other format.” When the decision was made to originally select and 
implement QuickLearn, the Division of Teaching and Learning had a large 
involvement with setting up units inside the Faculty of Creative Arts to run on 
QuickLearn. Due to the Online Learning Manager for the Faculty of Creative Arts 
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not being involved in the setting up process, there was little support in terms of the 
skills or resources required to migrate across to EducateMe International. As the 
Project Manager suggested, “the Division of Teaching and Learning had a lot of 
knowledge in their heads about how they had originally developed those units on 
QuickLearn and how they worked.” This ultimately made the migration from 
QuickLearn to EducateMe International more difficult than what it should have been. 
The Online Learning Manager for the Faculty of Creative Arts supported this by 
claiming that “the migration was quite awkward and some of the disgruntled 
responses that came through about EducateMe International in the early stages were 
largely due to the fact that that learning services were managing the piloting of 
EducateMe International.” 
 
Despite the lack of skills and resources available in the migration of Faculty of 
Creative Arts unit to EducateMe International, units were eventually moved across 
from QuickLearn to EducateMe International. In terms of the training provided, the 
Dean of the Faculty of Creative Arts played an instrumental role in getting 100% of 
faculty academic staff members to attend training for EducateMe International. As 
the Head of the Learning Support Group claimed that “the Dean said that everybody 
had to do EducateMe International training. However, in recognition of the time put 
into attending training, staff would be paid in the form of marking release.” By 
offering members time release for completing their training, faculty members felt 
this was a good incentive and participated in the training. 
 
As the Faculty of Creative Arts were one of the early adopters of EducateMe 
International transferring across from QuickLearn, there was a push to migrate the 
remaining faculty members from EasyTeach onto EducateMe International. In the 
migration process, one of the early adopters developed the metaphor of pioneers and 
settlers. The pioneers, or early adopters, according to the IT Manager for the 
Division of Teaching and Learning, were able to try “out things and finding 
problems. They were screaming out for help which was wonderful. Ultimately, some 
of our pioneers were pushing boundaries and their stories were valuable to the 
settlers who eventually came after the pioneers.” The early adopters were the 
exemplar units, who could go to the remaining members of the faculty, the “settlers”, 
that had not moved across to EducateMe International and say that it is not all doom 
and gloom and that there are ways of overcoming problems encountered. The Head 
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of the Division of Teaching and Learning believed that “the people who went to 
EducateMe International were innovators, they didn’t seem to be too fussed about 
moving to Advanced and I think they’ve done some pretty amazing stuff.” In order to 
increase the opportunity for success, particularly in the Faculty of Creative Arts, 
innovators were necessary to push the boundaries and experiment with teaching 
online, convincing the remaining members in the faculty that EducateMe 
International was a good enterprise-wide LMS and enhanced the online learning 
experience. 
 
The Faculty of Technology were perhaps the easiest of the faculties to transfer across 
to EducateMe International. This was primarily because they had been using one 
version of EducateMe, the Standard Edition and had upgraded to EducateMe 
Advanced Edition in the early implementation stages. As Samantha, a Senior 
Lecturer in the Faculty of Technology suggested, “we moved to EducateMe 
International because EducateMe International came with a Advanced Edition 
licence for free, so the Executive Group handed the free upgrade to EducateMe 
Advanced Edition so we didn’t have to pay for EducateMe Standard Edition any 
more.”  
 
The migration process taking units from EducateMe Advanced Edition to EducateMe 
International was fairly easy in the Faculty of Technology compared to the other 
faculties. By the second semester in 2003, nearly all units were in EducateMe 
International. In conjunction with migrating units across to EducateMe International, 
the faculty had a good opportunity to review their online teaching standards. Simon, 
the IT Manager from the Division of Teaching and Learning believed that the 
Faculty of Technology “made an initial decision that, not to use the technical 
solution for migrating from EducateMe Advanced Edition to EducateMe 
International.” There was a simple solution to migrate units across from EducateMe 
Advanced Edition to EducateMe International, whereby the structure of EducateMe 
Advanced Edition could be taken straight out and locked into EducateMe 
International. Rather, the Faculty of Technology decided to get their teaching staff to 
review their pedagogy and understand what it means to teach online. 
 
The Faculty of Technology made the decision to enforce all teaching staff to re-
evaluate their teaching pedagogy onto the online environment. The Division of 
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Teaching and Learning was able to assist the faculty in the re-evaluation process. 
The Head of the Division of Teaching and Learning suggested that the Faculty of 
Technology “took a long term plan rather than a short term, easy option to re-
evaluating and migrating units from EducateMe Advanced Edition to EducateMe 
International.” Migrating across to the EducateMe International allowed the faculty 
to re-examine their pedagogy and update it if necessary. This action was enforced by 
the Dean. The faculty were keen to have people review their current online teaching 
system and practices and look at why they will be using it and how it could be used 
better. 
 
The Faculty of Education migrated their units in a similar fashion to the Faculty of 
Commerce and Administration. As the Online Teaching and Learning Manager in 
the Faculty of Education claimed, “there were teaching staff using EasyTeach to 
provide their online teaching, and they loved to go into EducateMe International, so 
that it wasn’t a problem, they coped with the difference. However, some members of 
the faculty decided to keep the internally developed EducateOnline system running.” 
The Faculty of Education used two LMSs to provide online teaching, EasyTeach, 
and the internally developed EducateOnline. Those who used EducateOnline for their 
teaching believed that students were given access to more information in an easy to 
use manner. As Diane believed, “members of the Faculty of Education developed 
EducateOnline so that a student would be able to log in and have access to their 
whole major sequence of units whereas EducateMe International only allows a 
student to access units that they are currently enrolled in.” Users in EducateOnline 
had access to all twenty-four units that they would have to complete in order to 
graduate, whereas EducateMe International only gives access to the four units the 
student is currently enrolled in, in a given semester. As a result, some teaching staff, 
and users, typically third-year students, were dissatisfied with this lack of access to 
major sequence information. 
 
There were some disgruntled users in the Faculty of Education, which, according to 
the Head of the Division of Teaching and Learning, were the ones “that weren’t 
really wanting to use EducateMe International, but now have to be online as their 
units have to have a basic online presence.” However, the Online Teaching and 
Learning Manager in the Faculty of Education suggested that “there is a lot of 
support within our faculty to help with issues relating to EducateMe International. 
 
 
159 
So rather than say to a colleague that they haven’t done the Division of Teaching 
and Learning training, we let them go into the system and work it out themselves. If 
they get stuck, we have folk in the faculty who are able to help, we’ve got our Online 
Educational Managers who are there as well, so that was a good initiative, to have a 
couple of people on the ground, who are actually doing a project themselves and 
made themselves to help others.” The Faculty of Education tried to adopt an organic 
adoption process, allowing teaching staff to migrate and experiment with EducateMe 
International in their own time. The Faculty of Education did not force members to 
attend training offered by the Division of Teaching and Learning, which other 
faculties utilised. As the faculty had Online Educational Managers, they had people 
who had good experiences with EducateMe International and were happy to push the 
boundaries, finding new and better ways of teaching online with the new system. The 
Online Educational Managers were then able to help struggling members improve 
their online teaching practices. 
 
However, unlike the Faculty of Technology, the Faculty of Education did not utilise 
the opportunity to review their pedagogy with the shift to the new enterprise-wide 
LMS. As the IT Manager from the Division of Teaching and Learning suggested, “I 
think the Faculty of Education could probably be a little bit more out there as far as 
pedagogy, what teaching and learning is all about and how online can help that, 
utilising different models of teaching. Unfortunately, they haven’t been doing that.” 
In response to this lack of review, the Online Teaching and Learning Manager in the 
Faculty of Education claimed that “there are probably a few reasons for the lack of 
review. I think the major one is that it takes time and resources and we just haven’t 
got that…I think it becomes a resource issue because you have to learn to use the 
system, so there is training involved, and people have to find time to do that.” As 
other academic staff members have stated, staff workloads were a major inhibiting 
issue as academic staff did not have enough time to review their online teaching 
methods, due to other teaching commitments. 
 
Ultimately, as the Head of the Division of Teaching and Learning stated, academic 
staff members in the Faculty of Education “that made the most noise about 
EducateMe International were those who did not have a good experience with the 
new system. However, they have not done enough to have a good experience. That’s 
my suspicion because we’ve had people at the same time saying that EducateMe 
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International has been fantastic.” It was believed by the Head of the Division of 
Teaching and Learning, that once those Faculty members who had started 
experimenting with EducateMe International realised that the new LMS was not as 
bad as members of the university were making out, adoption and use of EducateMe 
International would increase. 
 
The Faculty of Medical and Health Sciences presented challenges to the 
implementation team. As the Head of the Division of Teaching and Learning 
suggested, “the Faculty of Medical and Health Sciences were a problem in that they 
were very independent of everybody in the university and tried to remain 
independent.” The Faculty of Medical and Health Sciences is predominantly an on-
campus faculty. The schools and units inside the school’s typically offer practical-
based work, where students have to work hands on with experiments. Putting 
practical-based work into an online environment is extremely difficult. As a result, 
the Online Learning Manager for the Faculty of Medical and Health Sciences 
claimed that “we had very little to do with the Division of Teaching and Learning by 
way of support for off-campus material and therefore for online migration.” The 
Head of the Learning Support Group therefore believed that this faculty was 
“probably very insular. They didn’t embrace EducateMe International and the 
support that could have been provided by the Division of Teaching and Learning.”  
 
The Faculty of Medical and Health Sciences therefore chose to run training 
themselves. As the IT Manager for the Division of Teaching and Learning believed 
that “in some ways they helped us because we didn’t have to concern ourselves with 
their training. But at the same time it meant that we still needed to be aware of what 
they were doing because of the support issues.” As the Faculty of Medical and 
Health Sciences was typically independent, they ran the training themselves, which, 
although the Division of Teaching and Learning were happy with the faculty 
providing their own training as it reduced their training workload, the Division of 
Teaching and Learning still needed to be aware of what the Faculty of Medical and 
Health Sciences members were learning, to ensure that no members of the university 
were disadvantaged when it came to training. 
 
The reasons given as to why the Faculty of Medical and Health Sciences provided 
their own training, according to the Online Learning Manager in the Faculty, was 
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that “most of the trainers from the Division of Teaching and Learning were ex-
editors with no teaching experience and therefore had no experience of what 
academics do and ultimately were barely on top of the system they were having to 
teach. The decision to teach staff one-on-one was made in desperation having seen 
how bad the Division of Teaching and Learning trainers were and seeing how 
academics reacted – badly - in a group computer lab settings.” Members of the 
faculty did not believe this was a conducive way to learn how to use a new system, 
particularly as they are a “hands-on” faculty that learns practically, by using the 
system. As a result, the Online Learning Manager decided to approach unit chairs 
and provide individual training, “by sitting down with them in their office for two 
hours, stripping down the training needs to the absolute rock bottom.” By teaching 
them one-on-one, staff could learn and experiment with the system with the 
experienced Online Learning Manager close by, offering help when the user got 
stuck. Although this was a slow and tiring method, it has worked and the majority of 
users are using EducateMe International with a basic presence to teach the ir unit.  
 
6.6 Risk Management Issues 
One issue the Pro Vice-Chancellor (Distance Education) had to deal with in his new 
role was an increasing focus on the risk management associated with the 
implementation of the new LMS. The reasoning behind the focus on risk 
management was that another Australian University had publicly suffered from the 
massively expensive (over $50 millions) implementation failure of their student 
record information system, a year previously and had as a result received a great deal 
of bad media coverage. The University of Australia did not want to suffer the same 
bad press as that university. As the Head of the Division of Teaching and Learning 
claimed, “the implementation at another Australian university caused such a degree 
of nervousness with the Vice-Chancellor that I am sure she wanted us to all swear on 
a pack of bibles that there would be no bugs, there would be no problems, there 
would be no surprises…so there’s been a lot of managing on the Senior Executive 
trying to manage expectations to minimise uneasiness, to chill out a bit.” 
 
This was supported by the Online Learning Manager for the Faculty of Creative Arts, 
who believed that, “Another Australian university helped us greatly in raising the 
issue of risk management because when you have a Vice-Chancellor splattered 
across the front page of the local and national newspapers, because there was a 
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mess up with their system, that’s not the kind of publicity that a new Vice-Chancellor 
might not want to have.” 
 
The Pro Vice-Chancellor (Distance Education) responded to this by claiming that the 
issue of risk management was blown out of proportion. According to him, 
EducateMe International was piloted in 2003, and “people in the university took 
every opportunity to say ‘well the system’s no good.’ We even started to hear people 
ask questions at Academic Board. The Union went to the Vice-Chancellor and said 
the systems a failure, it’s going to be terrible, and she believed them, because they 
kept saying that question over and over again.” The issue of risk management 
became significant as a vocal minority took the opportunity to criticise EducateMe 
International.  
 
However, a risk management policy had been in place since the end of 2002 (John). 
As the Head of the Division of IT claimed, “we actually developed two risk 
management plans. There’s the formal risk management plan and there’s the 
informal risk management plan. From an informal perspective the system has been 
recovered many, many times because we tested the experimental nature of the pilot 
last year. For a formal perspective two disaster recovery tests were conducted, one 
last month and another just last week to show we are able to successfully recover 
from fairly stringent disaster scenario posed.” 
 
The Project Manager confirmed the existence of the risk management plan, claiming 
that, “the Risk Management Plan I created at the beginning of the project, actually 
had more than one hundred risk items and associated actions on it. We’ve done 
disaster recovery tests ensuring that the system could actually recover everything 
online and offline if we had to we could install yesterdays stuff within 24 hours. 
There’s been a lot of work put in to make sure that this thing is actually very 
rigorous. The disaster recovery actions mentioned were only small one component of 
the plan. I think that the real issue with the Vice-Chancellor was that if anything, the 
Risk Management Plan we had in place was too detailed.”  
 
The Pro Vice-Chancellor (Distance Education) further confirmed that a risk 
management plan was in place. However, he claimed that the Vice-Chancellor failed 
to understand this. He believed that, “because the Union had raised the risk 
 
 
163 
management point with the Vice-Chancellor so often, she started believing that the 
risk management plans were not good enough. This started a big argument between 
her and me and between her and the Division of IT because we said here is the risk 
management plan, but we had a constant debate about the accuracy because she 
couldn’t understand the risk management plan.” 
 
The bad publicity received by the failure of an implementation of a student record 
system in another Australian University put pressure on the Pro Vice-Chancellor 
(Distance Education) to ensure that appropriate risk management plans were in place. 
Essentially, the Vice-Chancellor did not want to be put in that same situation of 
having a failing system and bad publicity. The Vice-Chancellor ultimately pressed 
the issue of risk management with the Pro Vice-Chancellor because she was being 
pushed by the Union to disclose the risk management plan. A risk management plan 
had been in place and at least two simulations had been run in order to identify any 
issues arose if the system failed. Both of the simulations proved to be successful. 
However, the Vice-Chancellor was not happy with this and still put pressure on the 
Pro Vice-Chancellor (Distance Education), and went so far as to request external 
consultants to come in and evaluate the risk management plan. These evaluations 
proved to be successful, confirming the depth and quality of the already developed 
risk management plan. Once the Vice-Chancellor understood that an appropriate risk 
management plan was in place, she wanted to ensure that academic staff would use 
the system. In order to do this, the Vice-Chancellor requested the Pro Vice-
Chancellor (Distance Education) to create policy ensuring that all staff and students 
would use EducateMe International. With these changes to the Senior Executive and 
policy within the university, a decision was made by the Senior Executive to create 
an Online Services Division to oversee the implementation of EducateMe 
International. 
 
6.7 Change and Policy Directives 
The first decision of the new Vice-Chancellor was to establish an independent review 
of the existing Academic Board. This was conducted in March 2003. It is believed 
that the Vice-Chancellor wanted to strengthen and extend the role of the academics 
and the Academic Board. Fifty-eight recommendations were made to improve the 
Academic Board and covered areas including the role and functions of Academic 
Board; the Composition of Academic Board; the Committees of Academic Board; 
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the Chair and Deputy Chairs of Academic Board; the Conduct of Business of 
Academic Board and its committees; Interactions and Communications; and 
Directions of the University and Academic Board. The review panel believed that the 
current Committee structure was cumbersome and limited the development of an 
effective and responsive Academic Board. A new Academic Board was formed.  
 
In addition to this strengthening of the Academic Board, the new Vice-Chancellor 
wanted to speed up the process of implementing EducateMe International and have 
all units online by semester one, 2004, bringing forward the implementation timeline 
by twelve months. The IT Manager for the Division of Teaching and Learning 
claimed that, “the new Vice-Chancellor came on board and said, ‘I want to increase 
the University of Australia’s online presence, let’s have some online presence from 
every unit by the start of 2004,’ which was a big change to the way we specified how 
the project was going to work. That ramped up the ante very quickly for us.” 
 
Not only did the decision to speed up the implementation of EducateMe International 
affect the work of the implementation team, it also affected every academic user. 
Everyone now had six months, instead of eighteen months, to learn how to use the 
new system. By forcing all teaching staff and students online earlier than anticipated, 
it was recognised by the Executive and Evaluation Groups that any bugs that would 
appear would be more severe and would affect more users, because of the wider use 
of the LMS. This concern was voiced by the Online Learning Manager for the 
Faculty of Creative Arts, who believed that “had we been aiming for the 2005 target 
of having all units online deadline, I’m quite confident that the bugs would have been 
ironed out and there would have been far less heel dragging and far less angst on the 
part of the people who perceived that they were being dragged from one technology 
to the next, through to something unknown, unwillingly.” 
 
Similarly, the Head of the Division of Teaching and Learning also claimed that, 
“having a new Vice-Chancellor affected the implementation of EducateMe 
International by bringing the implementation forward by a year with six months 
notice that we were going to have all the units with a basic online presence for 2004. 
That was originally going to be first semester 2005, which absolutely threw into 
disarray our training program, because we were going to run concurrently 
pedagogical sessions about what it is to teach online and how you can do it on 
 
 
165 
EducateMe International. Instead we just had to train 2,500 lecturers on how to use 
EducateMe International basic. It had a big impact and we will suffer the 
consequences for the next couple of years probably. I think that the decision to come 
forward by a year was a disaster, and we were not funded to accommodate this new 
timeline.”   
 
In order to increase user buy- in and use of EducateMe International, the Vice-
Chancellor requested the Pro Vice Chancellor (Distance Education) to write a policy 
requiring every unit taught at the University of Australia to have one of three forms 
of an online presence in EducateMe International by the beginning of the academic 
year in 200413. According to the policy, each unit offered had to have at least a basic 
online presence. This required each Unit Chair, the head of a particular unit, to have 
a designated area in EducateMe International for their unit. In that area, there was 
required to be the unit guide (outline of the unit, including associated resources and 
unit objectives), a ‘resources area’ where an electronic version of the readings (if 
applicable) and other resources might be placed, and the opportunity for the teaching 
staff to communicate with students through a noticeboard (a one-to-many 
communication, for example, announcements). A facility for structured online 
interaction between teacher and students was also made available to use at the choice 
of the lecturers involved in the unit, with the proviso that all students in units that do 
not meet face-to-face had to have the opportunities for facilitated online interaction 
at least once per week. The Unit Chair had to be prepared to report to their unit 
community through the EducateMe International area established for their unit.  
 
Units could extend themselves to be more online under two further options, also 
defined by the policy. These were extended online units and wholly online units14. 
The extended online unit stipulated that these units will have all of the components 
of the basic online presence plus the study guide for that unit; the unit should have 
additional EducateMe International options included in the unit and available for 
students, such as self-paced assessments; and additional resources available to 
students (through, for example, additional electronic content, CD ROMs with 
additional material, video and audio streaming). 
                                                 
13 Online Technologies in Courses and Units – procedure approved by Academic Board on 25 July 
2003 
14 Online Technologies in Courses and Units – procedure approved by Academic Board on 25 July 
2003 
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The wholly online unit was to have all teaching resources online and undertake all 
teaching interaction online and include all content (commercial print-based textbooks 
or commercial e-texts could be used as supplementary material); all communication 
and interaction with students was to be online together with assignment submission 
and feedback; each unit was required to have at least one session of interactive 
communication (synchronous, asynchronous, or both) between teacher and students 
online at least weekly, or as established at the beginning of the unit. Such interactive 
sessions were required to have an assessable component where appropriate. As a 
caveat, the policy noted that “to ensure access for all students until bandwidth issues 
in Australia are addressed, additional resources such as video and audio will be 
provided on CD-ROMs for off-campus students where appropriate.”  
 
This policy was approved by Senior Executive and then the Planning and Resources 
Committee of the university. The policy was then sent to the Academic Board for 
discussion and was approved to be implemented immediately as the first decision of 
the new Academic Board on 25 July 2003. 
 
The policy meant that all teaching staff had to undertake EducateMe International 
training before the end of December 2003. For some it was more essential as they 
would be using EducateMe International for their unit from the beginning of the 
summer semester, starting at the beginning of December 2003. The academic staff of 
the university were put under a lot of pressure to attend training sessions to become 
compliant with the policy and to have the skills to enable their unit to have a basic 
online presence in 2004. The sheer logistics of the decision to speed up the 
implementation process required the Division of Teaching and Learning to train a 
large number of academic staff (over 2000) and at the same time pressure the 
faculties to get academic staff to attend those training sessions. The IT Manager for 
the Division of Teaching and Learning, implementing EducateMe International and 
providing user training believed that they were “hampered through their human 
resource capacity. We had to ramp up the team much more quickly in order to cope 
with that training load. I suspect it hampered the activity that was going on in the 
faculties, because all of a sudden people had to attend training sessions…We had 
1600 staff go through training programs between June last year and January of this 
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year. I think in some ways it changed the relationship that we had with the faculties 
as well.”  
 
Not only were the Division of Teaching and Learning staff members complaining 
about the pressures of having to deliver so many training sessions is such a short 
time, the demands of the Academic Board adoption of the new policy was also 
perceived by academic staff to be increasing their workloads. Lara, from the Faculty 
of Creative Arts, believed that members of the university “perceived the new system 
as being a change and therefore something to resist, because they felt they had 
enough on their plates and workloads, you know, there still are ongoing discussions, 
arguments, bun fights about workloads.”  
 
Many members of the university community felt alienated and disappointed that they 
were not given a choice of using another system. As the Online Learning Manager 
for the Faculty of Creative Arts claims, “there was an enormous challenge from 
users in terms of change management to get them to come on board and accept 
EducateMe International. They sort of went through those stages of grieving, there 
was the denial and then, you know, the anger.” To strengthen the impact of their 
feelings of alienation about this issue, some members of academic staff approached 
the National Tertiary Education Union (NTEU) to assist those academic staff 
members in making sure that they were heard. In a document of issues relating to 
EducateMe International sent to the Senior Executive dated in early November of 
2003, the issue of imposition of the new LMS system without choice was raised. The 
Union representative argued that, “the all unit implementation of EducateMe 
International has brought with it a perception of imposition. There have been 
statements that academics have a choice about the use of EducateMe International, 
and contradictory statements that ‘you can teach online or teach elsewhere!’ As has 
been pointed out, the best implementations of online practice occur where there is no 
imposition.” The Union capitalised on the previously documented growing use of 
EasyTeach, claiming that EasyTeach was successful as a LMS because it grew 
organically. No one was forced to use EasyTeach, yet members were still willing to 
use it for teaching and learning because they saw their colleagues use it and were 
happy to trial it. This was not the case with EducateMe International as all staff and 
students were to be forced onto this one system. 
 
 
 
168 
The Union were also alerted to the impact on workloads and started campaigning to 
lighten the workload of staff. However, the Head of the Division of Teaching and 
Learning believed that having to learn EducateMe International and the imposition 
on workloads seemed to be a convenient issue to raise in the eyes of the Union with 
the university. They claimed that the workload issue “was linked very closely with 
the fact that the University of Australia was redoing their Enterprise Bargaining 
Agreement and it just seemed to be a very angry hook to raise.”  
 
The pressures of training academic staff by the Division of Teaching and Learning 
exposed the service provision of the Division of Teaching and Learning to criticism 
by the academic staff completing the training. The Head of the Learning Support 
Group recalled that members of her training team “would go to the EducateMe 
International training sessions and the implementation would be criticised…the 
facilitators of EducateMe International training were being told that the university 
policy of having online presence was crap.” The training staff were being wrongly 
blamed for a decision that was out of their control, and affected a number of the 
training staff, requiring them to “go on stress leave, they just couldn’t do the training 
any more” (Helen). The Head of the Division of Teaching and Learning “sent out an 
email to the Deans saying ‘could you please advise the staff to stop taking it out on 
the facilitators’.” The faculty Deans complied and the criticism was redirected away 
from the training staff. 
 
The pressures to provide a large amount of training in such a short time, and the 
stress on staff in the Division of Teaching and Learning being blamed by academic 
staff for implementing EducateMe International were eased by the appointment of 
the Pro Vice-Chancellor (Distance Education). It was important to have someone 
appointed to the Pro Vice-Chancellor (Distance Education) position, who had been 
involved with the selection and  implementation process. This enabled the Pro Vice-
Chancellor (Distance Education) to recognise those that opposed EducateMe 
International and encourage them to experiment with EducateMe International, 
enabling them to use it in their Unit and enhance their online teaching. The IT 
Manager for the Division of Teaching and Learning believed that “it’s been good 
having John in the Pro-Vice Chancellor position, because John has been involved 
from the beginning, understood where the process was at and who the loud people 
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and the powerbrokers were…that’s a legitimate thing, that you do have to 
understand who those people are in order to work with them not against them.”  
 
The Pro Vice-Chancellor (Distance Education) claimed that he was fundamentally 
the driver. This claim was made as the Pro-Vice Chancellor (Distance Education) 
was a member of the Senior Executive, and thus had more management and 
university-wide influence. The Pro-Vice Chancellor (Distance Education) was able 
to speak to individuals, schools and faculties about the benefits of EducateMe 
International with authority and the strength of the Senior Executive behind him. 
There was also a need by the Pro Vice-Chancellor (Distance Education) to be able to 
communicate the intent of the policy to teaching staff as well as to encourage staff to 
implement their units with a basic online presence. As John claimed, “I am the one 
who had to go out and speak to people on-campus, conduct campus meetings, school 
meetings, and Faculty Board meetings, highlighting the strategic plan and 
operational plan and assuring everyone that EducateMe International is a good 
LMS.”  
 
The Pro-Vice Chancellor (Distance Education) was also responsible for establishing 
two groups to manage the implementation of EducateMe International. John stated 
that, “we created two committees, one being the University of Australia Online 
Executive Group, which consisted of key stakeholders, and was a very small group. 
This group made sure that the implementation was driven in the direction we all 
wanted it to go. In other words, we overviewed performance, looked at problems, 
and put forward bids for funding. The other group was the University of Australia 
Online Implementation Group and consisted of a lot of people from the Division of 
Teaching and Learning, some from faculties. It’s looking at what’s actually 
happening on the ground.” These two groups mirrored the original Executive Group 
and the Implementation Group used in the selection process. By having these 
members involved from the original selection process increased the sense of 
ownership of the system, as well as gave all members completion with the 
involvement of implementing the system.  
 
As time went on, there was less of a need to have these two differentiated groups. 
According to the Project Manager, “in 2004 we combined the two groups into one 
because we are in the operational stage now and we don’t need to differentiate the 
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two, we’ve decreased the size of them and they’re now put in together. We’ve also 
created a EducateMe International support group, which involves a group of 
teaching staff to discuss problems with EducateMe International.” Rather than have 
the two groups look at fundamentally the same aspects of online teaching and 
EducateMe International, the Executive Group decided to merge the two groups and 
create a totally different support group. As the Head of the Division of Teaching and 
Learning claimed that, “we wanted to give teaching staff a forum where they could 
just discuss it, as an implementation process. So that was one of our ways of 
involving as many people as we could in the university.” By giving teaching staff the 
opportunity to raise problems in a specific forum, they felt that they were being 
listened to, and their problems would be resolved in some form, whether it is a new 
way of teaching, or whether a new patch is needed, the support group provided a 
forum for staff to vent their anger, and discuss and resolve any problems with 
EducateMe International and online teaching, essentially increasing user buy- in. 
Although these forums enabled users to voice their opinions of EducateMe 
International, other issues, such as risk management, were given to the Pro Vice-
Chancellor (Distance Education) to resolve. 
 
6.8 The Current Situation (December 2004) 
Despite both technical and risk management issues, as well as the policy requiring 
the use of EducateMe International as the enterprise-wide LMS, members of the 
University of Australia could see the benefit of using EducateMe International for 
online teaching and learning. As the Online Learning Manager for the Faculty of 
Medical and Health Sciences claimed, “the migration process has been a difficult 
time but people seem to soldier on. The University of Australia staff sometimes can 
go a little bit forgotten, because you can get very strategic and very political and 
very external and competitive. Those are the decisions made by the Senior Executive, 
yet it is these people who are on the ground and they’re the ones thinking how does 
this make me a better teacher and how can I help my students learn better?” 
Implementing a new system of any kind, can be a stressful time for all members 
involved. However, rather than keeping the selection and implementation process a 
hands-off experience for the teaching staff, the Online Learning Manager for the 
Faculty of Medical and Health Sciences argued that it is these members that need to 
be acknowledged as they, and the students are the end-users, the people actually 
using the system.  
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By the beginning of 2004, all units offered at the University of Australia did have an 
online presence as required by the policy. In four of the five faculties, almost all staff 
had been trained to use the system. In the Faculty of Commerce and Administration 
it was 70% (John). In addition each faculty had put wholly online units in place so 
that all undergraduate students could complete at least one unit wholly online in their 
degrees. Each faculty had Online Educational Managers to take responsibility for 
online teaching and learning. Furthermore, each faculty was now concerned about 
how to improve the quality of their teaching, supported by the policy which had 
attached to it a list of quality elements for online teaching and learning, against 
which they could evaluate their performance. A new group of twelve Online 
Educational Managers was appointed in January 2004. Risk management issues were 
no longer an issue. The performance of EducateMe International was running at 99% 
uptime with no system created outages (John; Helen). The university had upgraded 
EducateMe International to a new version and all staff and students were using the 
system for all units from March 2004. 
 
Since EducateMe International was implemented fully in 2004, the most significant 
issue became staff workloads. The majority of faculty members interviewed raised 
the issue of staff not having enough time to attend training, as they already have a 
full workload. Those that have been unable to attend training have heavily criticised 
the system, simply because they do not understand how it works (John; Helen). As 
has been highlighted earlier by the Head of the Division of Teaching and Learning, 
any problems the staff who did not attend training face, they blame the system.  
 
The matter of workloads drew a lot of attention from the Union. One staff member 
from the Union argued that the Union “is concerned about whether our members will 
suffer through the increased workloads and stress as they attempt to work with 
technology that should not have been implemented.” When the issue of increased 
workload was raised with the Senior Executive, the Union represented its members, 
claiming that they would “typically respond to our complaints about workload issues 
and so on would say ‘oh it’s only a level 1 that’s required.’ But that’s simply not 
true. If staff were teaching on EasyTeach, which a lot of our people were, when 
EasyTeach disappeared, they had to substitute that with EducateMe International, 
that’s immediately off level one.” The Senior Executive believed that learning and 
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adopting a new sys tem would take time, as it had done in previous changes in 
technology. However, the Senior Executive believed that the implementation and 
training for EducateMe International required the same amount of time as previous 
implementations had. As all units had to have a basic online presence, all staff would 
have to learn the new system, as opposed to previous systems implementation when 
only a small number of users would have to learn the system. The implementation of 
EducateMe International immediately forced the teaching staff to recontextualise 
their teaching via the new enterprise-wide LMS and work out how that new system 
would enhance their teaching online. 
 
However, the University of Australia, despite initial reservation from faculties and 
schools, has had EducateMe International in operation for one full year. As a result, 
the Implementation Group, according to the Head of the Learning Support Group, 
has had the opportunity to “regroup after the implementation process and start 
establishing exemplar units to get a better idea of good online structures, as well as 
experiment with ideas to start fostering a more extended online practice.” By getting 
more of these exemplar units established, the wider university community will see 
the benefits and capabilities of EducateMe International and see how it will help 
them in their teaching methods. In addition, EducateMe International is improving its 
product, typically based on the feedback received from the Executive Group and the 
Implementation Group at the University of Australia. 
  
In conjunction with the exemplar units and the improving product, the Head of the 
Division of Teaching and Learning believes that time also helps, “we’ll start getting 
rid of people who are used to EasyTeach, we’ll change the culture of about what this 
thing is, so some of it is just a matter of patience and some of it’s a matter of working 
with EducateMe International.” In order to increase the user buy- in, a further change 
in mindsets is required. A majority of the University of Australia teaching staff have 
used their own systems, in some cases for eight years. They are used to their system 
and know exactly how it works. Once they start working with EducateMe 
International for a few semesters, they will eventually become more and more 
familiar with the capabilities and limitations offered by the product. As a result, the 
teaching staff will also be able to use EducateMe International to support their 
teaching with the potential benefits of the LMS, such as the gradebook (Chapter 5.4). 
 
 
 
173 
Since the pilot and implementation, EducateMe International has been operating 
across the entire university for twelve months. There were technical and user 
difficulties along the way. Users, both academic and student, continually complained 
about the slow speed of the system, and the fact that it was not as good as previous 
systems they had used in various faculties and schools. However, the system has 
survived one full academic year with over 33,600 total users logging on during the 
first half of the semester15. 
 
The Head of the Division of Teaching and Learning reported that student response 
has been good, particularly for off-campus students. Non first-year students have 
complained a bit, mainly due to the speed of the system. Ultimately time will change 
these perceptions, as students who have used previous systems graduate and first-
year students come in and only know of EducateMe International. The Head of the 
Division of Teaching and Learning claimed that “the off-campus students have 
always appreciated technology, so we’ve got 40% of our students that are off-
campus and they find it a good thing…we’ve had some complaint, very minimal I 
have to say, but from 3rd year students who say it’s slower than EasyTeach, because 
it’s web-based and not client server.” The Project Manager agreed with this and 
further added that “I think we’ve got a generation of students and staff who knew 
another system well, so we’re probably going to have to graduate a few students and 
retire a few staff members to have the history erased.”  
 
To ease the transition from the old system to the new system, the Pro Vice-
Chancellor (Distance Education), believed that “we should have probably written to 
all of the students and said that we are introducing a new system, so there might be 
some variation.” As a result, some of the students might have come in with different 
expectations, which EducateMe International may have met. This may have resulted 
in wider and quicker acceptance. However, EducateMe International is in use.  
 
When speaking to the Head of the Learning Support Group about the future of 
EducateMe International, she claimed that, “EducateMe International does not do 
everything that we want it to do.” As a result, the Online Learning Manager for the 
Faculty of Medical and Health Sciences believes that the University of Australia now 
needs to “get another product that does the things that EducateMe International 
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doesn’t do.” Ultimately, EducateMe International is the core system and over time, 
EducateMe International will be built on and supplemented with extra functionalities. 
As the Head of the Division of Teaching and Learning suggested, “at the moment 
EducateMe International is the central system, but we are already looking for a 
communication tool which will plug into and enhance EducateMe International.” 
This LMS is now to be supplemented with other tools and applications available on 
the market. By adding more to the product, the University of Australia is making 
EducateMe International a more robust system that increases the potentialities of 
teaching online and distance education. In other words, the search for the LMS that 
meets the majority of staff requirements is on-going. 
 
6.9 Analysis 
The third phase of the systems selection and implementation of the enterprise-wide 
LMS at the University of Australia was marked again by a series of dramas (Chapter 
3.6). These included events and decisions associated with and the impact of the new 
Vice-Chancellor; the process of adoption of EducateMe International by academic 
staff; the enactment of policy requiring all academic staff to use EducateMe 
International; and the process of migrating units from existing LMSs to EducateMe 
International. Of these social dramas, the first three were significant events and will 
be discussed in detail. 
 
When the Vice-Chancellor was appointed, there were significant changes. Firstly 
there was a decision to review the Academic Board. The Vice-Chancellor saw a 
perceived imbalance of power and control held by the service divisions relative to 
academic staff and wanted to change this, giving academics more control over 
academic matters in the university. The result was a complete restructure of 
Academic Board, removing all members who were not academic staff. This move 
effectively removed power from the divisions and empowered the academic. Senior 
members of the divisions opposed this restructure, and some even persisted and 
attended the new Academic Board meetings, even though they had no input into the 
decisions being made. 
 
The Vice-Chancellor now had the appropriate structure of the Academic Board in 
place to develop and institute policy that would change the operations of the 
university. The institutionalisation of policy would give the Vice-Chancellor control 
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of greater aspects of the university, both academic and administrative. The specific 
policy that had most affect in this story of systems implementation was the 
institutionalisation of the policy: Online Technologies in Courses and Units, which 
required all units to have an online presence on EducateMe International. With 
policy comes the expectation of compliance (Ball, 1990; Corbitt, 1995; 1999; Corbitt 
and Thanasankit, 2002). Once the policy was enacted, there were no exceptions, 
ensuring that the new enterprise-wide LMS was going to be used. The aim was to 
institutionalise practice of this policy. 
 
One significant difference between the adoption of EducateMe International, and the 
previously used QuickLearn, was in the enactment of policy. Academic staff were 
not forced by policy to use QuickLearn. Instead, academic staff were given a choice 
to either migrate across to QuickLearn, or continue using other technologies. 
However, obvious resistance was still apparent. Debate was expressed openly in 
Faculty Boards, questions were asked at Academic Board, emails were sent to the 
Heads of Schools, Deans and the Senior Executive about the new system, 
complaining about its functionality (John), and staff continually approached 
members of the Implementation Group and the Executive Group about the new 
system’s performance and functionality.  
 
The adoption of EducateMe International by academic staff combined with the 
enactment of policy created a series of dramas contesting authority. The Union 
challenged the functionality of the new systems with the Vice-Chancellor, who as a 
result was so worried by the potential repercussions of having a non-working system, 
publicly informed the Pro Vice-Chancellor (Distance Education) that if EducateMe 
International did not work, then he would lose his job. The Pro Vice-Chancellor 
(Distance Education) countered the threats by the Vice-Chancellor, and the 
challenges from the Union and EasyTeach supporters by having a successful risk 
management plan in operation, supported by the Division of Teaching and Learning 
and the Division of IT and endorsed by an external consultant.  
 
The enactment of the policy also produced a debate over workloads for academic 
staff. Members of the Union and other academic staff challenged the impact of 
EducateMe International on what they saw was an already difficult workload 
situation. This debate was focused on challenges to the Deans and occurred in the 
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Faculty Boards (John). Debate focused on impact rather than on the system itself. In 
adopting this tactic the Union incorporated this issue into their negotiating of the 
Enterprise Bargaining Agreement 16 bringing the issue of workloads and another 
issue, the time demands of EducateMe International training into a public forum.  
 
However, the enactment and implementation of the policy of Online Technologies in 
Course and Units meant that there was a public demand for compliance which had to 
be reported to other academic staff in the Academic Board on a regular basis. The 
debate became one of the policies of human resources management and industrial 
relations rather than one that focused on teaching and learning. The enactment of 
policy was in the end done by the Academic Board, not the Vice-Chancellor. It was 
by academics themselves and it was to academics that compliance had to be reported. 
The Vice-Chancellor had, by changing the structure of the Academic Board, enabled 
change to be enabled by processes apparently driven by academics themselves rather 
than by her.  
 
As with the previous parts of this story there were levels of discourse driving the 
open debate and challenges operating in the public forums of the university.  
 
The Vice-Chancellor, most probably because in another university she had been 
Chair of an Academic Board, had a strong belief in academic authority. By 
restructuring the Academic Board and excluding the division representatives, the 
Vice-Chancellor was effectively reinforcing the tradition of what it means to be an 
academic. At the University of Australia, the intellectual and academic divide 
between academic and general staff had been effectively removed and replaced by a 
tradition of ‘managerialism’. Teaching and learning had become to be seen as 
processes that needed to be managed. The new discourse was one that challenged 
this and suggested that the management should be by academics based on an older 
ideology of intellectualism (Hofstadter, 1963; Katchadourian, and Boli, 1985; 
Howley, et al., 1993), fundamentally embedded in the work of academics. It can be 
argued that the removing of division representatives from Academic Board re-
                                                 
16 The Enterprise Bargaining Act (EBA) is an agreement between the National Tertiary Education 
Union and the University of Australia outlining the agreed initiatives between the parties to ensure the 
ongoing growth and viability of the university as well as provide improved employment conditions for 
staff of the university for the life of the Agreement. 
 
 
 
177 
established academic power, giving support to the notion that authority comes from 
knowledge, which implies power (Foucault, 1978). 
 
Although academic authority was re-established in the university, the resistance to 
EducateMe International continued. The discourse underpinning this resistance of 
EducateMe International was essentially a continuation of the previous discourse 
identified in Chapters Four and Five, academic emancipation. Academics were still 
resentful that their authority to choose was being removed and that they no longer 
had a choice about teaching. Instead, all academic staff had to comply with the 
policy of teaching their units online. Academic choice in teaching and learning had 
been removed by policy. Academic staff wanted to maintain choice. They thus 
challenged in the open forums of the university, based essentially on a discourse of 
academic freedom and thus need to be emancipated from the discipline of policy 
compliance where it challenged their academic freedom. 
  
This need for emancipation was in essence a reaction to the appearance in the 
university with the new Vice-Chancellor of managerial authority, or 
‘managerialism’. Rather than acting as an academic in an academic institution, the 
Vice-Chancellor adopted the role of manager/CEO in the University of Australia. By 
exploiting her role as Vice-Chancellor, the Vice-Chancellor was creating an authority 
vested in the leader. Not only did she reinforce academic authority, but as leader of 
the university, the Vice-Chancellor was also perceived to be able to influence the 
Academic Board. The Vice-Chancellor was decisive in continuing the discourse of 
discipline in the university and centralise the processes and systems as her 
predecessor had done also. Additionally, the Vice-Chancellor established processes 
which enabled the new discourse to drive the operations of the key forum which 
determined academic standards and policy, the Academic Board.  
 
With policy comes compliance. Once a policy is enacted, it becomes a requirement 
to comply with that policy, at least in discourse. Of course people will challenge, 
people will re-contextualise and some will even reject policy, based on other 
discourses. But the hegemony of authority will ensure that policy compliance is 
widespread and it was at the University of Australia with the new enterprise-wide 
LMS. By enacting policy requiring all units to have at least a basic online presence in 
EducateMe International, the Academic Board, and thus the Vice-Chancellor, was 
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able to coerce academic staff into the system, through compliance procedures. 
Essentially, the process was one based on discipline, as non-compliance would result 
in having to provide an explanation to the Vice-Chancellor. Through the creation of 
policy, which brings this discourse to the front stage, the Vice-Chancellor was able to 
establish a legitimacy and hegemony for herself in the university, further enhancing 
her role as the manager or leader of the organisation and giving her power and 
control of the university. 
 
Managerialism was the overarching discourse in this phase of the implementation of 
EducateMe International. It could be argued that the Vice-Chancellor, wanted to be  
a strong leader of the organisation, and this process gave her the opportunity to 
influence other aspects of the university. Through her influence, the Vice-Chancellor 
was able to reinforce the principles and authority of academics, who had apparently 
lost their authority under the previous administration. The support divisions were 
now responsible for providing support for academics in their teaching, research and 
administration work, and had no influence in the creation or institutionalisation of 
policy as had previously been the case. To further enhance her position, the Vice-
Chancellor was able to enforce centralisation through discipline and ultimately 
remove academic choice from teaching and learning. 
 
Chapters Four, Five and Six have discussed the story of the selection and 
implementation of an enterprise-wide LMS at the University of Australia. The use of 
social dramas has enabled the researcher to investigate the events in each phase of 
the selection and implementation process from the front stage, reporting obvious 
issues in systems implementation, and from the back stage, identifying the hidden 
aspects of systems implementation and the underpinning discourses. The next 
chapter will discuss the implications of this analysis for systems selection and 
implementation. 
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Chapter Seven – Discussion and Conclusion 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The methodological analogy of social dramas (Corbitt, 1995) was used in this thesis 
to discuss the obvious sets of events involving power and politics in the systems 
selection and implementation process. This chapter summarises that analysis and 
suggests that some dominant themes emerge which not only highlight the role of 
power in the systems selection and implementation process, but which also support 
the proposition, argued initially in Chapter 2. The actual technical implementation 
process is dependent as much on the organisational attributes and processes and their 
social construction in reality, as it is on the technical competencies of the software 
and the personnel undertaking the implementation and on the acceptance by users. 
The ensuing discussion is followed by an ana lysis of the discourse driving the 
organisational politics behind the systems selection and implementation process. To 
conclude the thesis the limitations of the study are discussed together with a 
discussion of the implications of the results for both practice and research and where 
future research might emerge as a result. 
 
7.2 The construction of obvious power through discourse – 
the technology debate 
In the front stage (Goffman, 1959) of systems selection and implementation the role 
of power relations are expressed either openly, or are enforced through rules, statutes 
and policies. Inevitably, the intent of this study is to establish the role of discipline 
(Foucault, 1977), in order to understand the power relations and the role of these 
power relations and politics in systems selection and implementation. Policy, rules, 
statutes and decisions reinforce the power status of the decision maker and attempt to 
subjugate the actors. 
 
In the previous three chapters, a number of front stage issues have emerged, which 
are illustrative of the power exercised and maintained by various actors. As this case 
study is based on the higher education industry, the emerging issues relate to 
practices the actions and dramas associated with the systems selection and 
implementation process as within exemplified the university. The first of these 
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related to debate and policy about what technology platform would underpin the 
provision of IT infrastructure within the university (Chapter 4.3). 
 
Driving this debate was the perceived need to control the technological infrastructure 
of the university. In Chapter 4.6, it was argued that the Vice President of 
Administration was trying to create efficiencies and gain cost savings through 
centralisation and standardisation of IT management. He was committed to the 
notion of a single operating system. In the implementation of this action, through a 
policy enacted within the university administration, there were consequences for the 
use of IT in teaching and learning. In the front stage dramas, acted out in the 
Academic Board, in Faculty Boards, in School Meetings and through global emails 
across the university, the policy was challenged and contested. The apparent power 
vested in the policy, and therefore in its agents also, the Vice-President of 
Administration and ITS, was believed to counter the power academics had always 
had to select appropriate pedagogies, materials and teaching tools for their courses 
and units. This new set of standards and its policy context removed that power. The 
academic community, contesting the policy, challenged the applicability of the 
policy to real practice. They alleged that the Vice-President of Administration and 
the implementing division, ITS, did not have the right to interfere in what was an 
academic matter only and demanded the removal of the policy. 
 
The power vested in both individuals and policy was contested openly and over a 
lengthy period of time. Essentially, the contestations were not only a struggle about a 
system, but about efficiency and administration versus academic expertise and 
pedagogy. Whilst the policy was never altered from its beginnings in the mid 1990s, 
the academics recontextualised it (Corbitt, 1997). Each faculty had separate IT 
sections established within the faculty offices, and in some cases, in specific schools. 
These groups operated the required IT platforms and enabled the continuance of five 
separate learning management systems to operate for over four years. The intent of 
standardised operational and administrative practices within the university was 
accepted and complied with. However, each faculty recontextualised their own 
practices as it related to teaching and learning through having a faculty-wide 
standard adopted and subsequently operated at the faculty level. As a result the 
power vested in academic choice over what could/should be taught, how and why, 
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remained at the faculty level and was maintained at the level of each academic. The 
nature of teaching and learning in the university remained decentralised. 
 
However, throughout the story the university administration was not content with 
leaving this level of power in the hands of individual academics, or at faculty level, 
as this challenged any real attempt to centralise and standardise. Challenging this 
centralisation and standardisation made compliance to Federal Government 
requirements more difficult for the university. The challenges also made 
accountability and comparative assessment between units and courses even more 
complex and difficult. The story told in this thesis recounts two separate further 
attempts by the university to invest power over teaching and learning in a central 
authority. 
 
In the first attempt the university through an apparent independent appointee, 
decided to purchase an enterprise learning management system, QuickLearn. The 
new Deputy Vice-Chancellor was given responsibility to implement it across all 
faculties (Chapter 4.4). This too failed as there was no disciplinary structure in place 
to ensure compliance. Academic Staff and Deans were again able to recontextualise 
the decision and maintain their positions of power in relation to teaching and 
learning. It was only through the obvious enactment of policy through a restructured 
Academic Board under the new Vice-Chancellor some two years later that shifted 
power from the faculties and academic staff to centralise control, monitored for 
compliance through processes enacted in the Academic Board (Chapter 6.7).  
 
All attempts to challenge this policy and its associated shift in power were thwarted 
by the disciplinary powers vested in the statutes of policy enacted publicly through 
Academic Board. Implementation of the new system was then driven by centralised 
control. Power was vested in people given responsibility to ensure the 
standardisation of process and structure for all units and courses. These were the 
Deputy Vice-Chancellor and Division of Teaching and Learning, reporting to that 
Deputy Vice-Chancellor. Despite contesting the policy on three occasions in 
Academic Board and despite challenging its impact through Union- led challenges to 
the Vice-Chancellor about workloads, the situation remained unchanged (Chapter 
6.7).  
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In the front stage, these series of events looked like a debate over technology and the 
old ‘Microsoft’ versus everyone else debate. However there was a fundamental 
discourse driving this debate, the discourse of academic emancipation or freedom. 
The nature of a university is the promotion of intellectualism and freedom of choice 
(Manne, 1998; Gaita, 2004). Essentially, the academic staff were wanting to teach 
the way they wanted to, adopting an individualist approach, resisting the apparent 
direction by the Senior Executive to move teaching and learning  by academic staff 
onto the one centralised system.  
 
As Foucault (1978) and Ashforth and Mael (1998) argue, power relations occur 
where there is resistance between actors that have the ability to influence the actions 
of the other (Chapter 2.4). The discourse in this technological debate was a conflict 
driven on the one hand by the managerialism of the Senior Executive against the 
academic staffs’ notions of academic freedom imbedded in a discourse of 
intellectualism (Chapters 5.6 and 6.9). With the enactment of the decision requiring 
academic staff to transfer to the central system, resistance occurred as their freedom 
of choice in teaching and learning was challenged (Chapters 4.5, 5.6 and 6.9). As 
was argued in Chapter 2.4, the utilisation of discourse enables members to challenge 
the existing power relations and in effect establish a new power relation. As raised in 
Chapter 2.8, Ball (1990) defines discourses as “what can be said, and thought, and 
also about who can speak, when, where and with what authority.” The authority 
vested in being an academic had been challenged and resistance emerged. The 
academic staff contested this new form of authority, seemingly invested in the new 
learning management system. 
 
The second attempt to select and implement an enterprise-wide learning management 
system was different. The process was accompanied by statute and policy enactment. 
The dramas were more vehement in their representation of opposition. Contestation 
reached academic and even industrial forums. The obvious challenges were about 
academic freedom, workloads and resistance to change. The discourse of discipline 
associated with the first enterprise-wide learning management system attempt was 
now supplemented, even surpassed in influence by managerialism. This 
transformation of discourses over time is not unusual. Westwood and Clegg (2003) 
claim that all discourses are in a constant state of change. This change reflects the 
new discourse of the new Vice-Chancellor. Change with new CEOs is common and 
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often reflects a changed set of values and subsequently new practices (Buchanan and 
Badham, 1999; Bacharach and Lawler, 1998; Introna, 1997). 
 
This leads, as Foucault (1978) and Buchanan and Badham (1999) argue, to new 
expressions of power, through new discourse, which operate through the re-
construction of existing social and organisationa l routines, and through targeting 
change in individuals and groups, in this case, the academic staff (Chapter 2.4). 
Enhancing the discourse of managerialism and discipline drove new policy 
formulation and reconstituted power through the formation of new social relations. 
As Corbitt (2000, p. 311) argued, policy is “influenced by pluralistic inequality 
associated with sectional interests, power and factions.” The Vice-Chancellor, 
through the new Academic Board, was able to enact policy requiring academic staff 
to adopt EducateMe International. Through compliance associated with the policy, 
the use of EducateMe International became mandatory. Resistance and contestation 
again emerged. However, recontextualisation was not possible and the previously 
weak position of having no formal statute, as policy was now removed. Academics 
themselves had enacted the policy requiring use of the learning management system 
and requiring compliance. Hogwood and Gunn (1984) argue that policy is a method 
of legitimising power. In this example, policy was enacted to legitimise power vested 
in both the Vice-Chancellor and the Academic Board. 
 
The academics in the university challenged the discourse of managerialism imposed 
through policy and directives to regain their emancipation from the control inherent 
in managerialism (Chapter 6.9). The academic staff wanted to be emancipated from 
the disciplinary power imposed by the managerialism of the Senior Executive and 
the Vice-Chancellor, in response to being forced onto one learning management 
system. In this case study, academic staff wanted to retain their academic authority, 
using their expertise in teaching and learning. They contested policy to regain control 
of choice in teaching and learning.  
 
What became apparent was that similar discourse persisted throughout the system 
selection and implementation process, but acted out over different sets of issues in 
different social dramas. Academic staff used any opportunity to challenge the 
discourse of managerialism, which was the most consistent ideology influencing 
action across the university. Dramas were acted out over the selection and 
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implementation of QuickLearn, the selection and implementation of EducateMe 
International, over the requirement of academic staff to undergo training, the 
requirement to migrate existing systems to the new system, and in addition other 
issues affecting the university through this period, but not related to the 
implementation of EducateMe International, such as, strategic planning 
requirements, operationa l planning and target setting, budgeting, the review of all 
academic policies, evaluation of courses and units, and the internationalisation of the 
curriculum.  
 
Power changed throughout this process. The new Vice-Chancellor recognised that in 
order to change university and its operation, in her words, to “achieve a quality 
agenda”, then power relations needed to be different. It was apparent that the Vice-
Chancellor perceived that there was a need to change the power vested in members 
of the University; that there was a need to formalise that change through policy and 
then build in compliance. This was achieved by the restructuring of the Academic 
Board giving academics academic authority. However, through the creation of the 
new Academic Board, power apparently shifted again from academics in schools and 
faculties to the central management of the university. In the first six months of the 
new Academic Board, eighty percent of the academic policies were changed and new 
ones such as the Online Technologies in Courses and Units policy added. The 
practice of managerialism though authority, statute, policy and compliance was put 
in place. 
 
The transforming nature of power relations derives from Foucault’s (1976; 1977; 
1978; 1980; 1982) argument that power is non-static, fluid and exercised, rather than 
something that can be possessed by managers and those seeking power (Chapter 2.8). 
In this case study, power relations did shift through changes in leadership and the 
practice of control through policy. The new learning management system was being 
implemented technically throughout these changes. The stages inherent in a technical 
implementation were self evident (Chapter 6.4) but that process was being moulded 
by the changing dramas and the changes in power relations enacted in university 
forums. Any changes there directly changed what could be done with the learning 
management systems. The setting of the functionalities in the software related 
directly to the requirements of the policy and the associated requirements for 
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compliance. This in turn affected and was affected by another continuing set of 
dramas about pedagogy. 
 
7.3 The construction of obvious power through discourse – 
the pedagogical debate 
A debate emerged as a contest over praxis or practical application of pedagogy. This 
contest was based around direct interference with existing practice in teaching and 
learning. The contest reopened the debate about the relevance of technology to 
teaching and learning and its relevance to teaching both on and off-campus students. 
One of the early debates (Chapter 4.2) related to what members of the university 
argued about what type of university the University of Australia should be. Through 
the mergers that created the new university (Chapter 4.2), debate emerged about  
whether the target market was on or off-campus students. Confusion existed. There 
was no clear strategic plan. As a result, academic staff practiced teaching and 
learning independently, using any method they found useful. Academic staff had, 
through practice and a lack of direction, created and developed their academic 
authority.  
 
In the selection and implementation of the first learning management system, 
QuickLearn (Chapter 4.3), debate emerged over what members of the university 
believed a learning management system should be. The power vested in academics 
through institutionalised practice was challenged. One system was not seen as being 
able to be used by everyone. The practice of differentiated pedagogies was 
threatened and existing power relations were being challenged. The failure of 
QuickLearn resulted from these attempted changes to power relations with 
standardisation and centralisation (Chapter 4.5). Academic staff resisted and 
challenged the inherent discourse of centralisation and standardisation in order to 
emancipate themselves from the requirement to teach in a pre-determined method. 
The ultimate failure of QuickLearn resulted from open challenges in Academic 
Board (Chapter 4.5). Publicly the praxis of the academic staff was supported and 
changes rejected. However, power relations were reconstituted. New systems were 
able to be evaluated and implemented, even to a limited extent. The extent of the 
changes to power relations was strong enough to enable the second attempt, a year 
later.  
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A further set of dramas occurred in the selection process of members for the Steering 
and Consultative Groups (Chapter 5.2) and in the dramas associated with the 
selection of EducateMe International (Chapter 5.3). Academic staff created the 
dramas again because their practice and academic authority were challenged. They 
argued that the real demand for a new system was not necessary. They also 
challenged any need for a single system across the university. The university had 
made its reputation of what it was already doing in teaching and learning. There was 
no obvious reason to change that. However, the committees were established and a 
selection process commenced. The academic staff had to recontextualise their 
practice and accept that power relations about teaching and learning had been, and 
were again changing.  Power was now vested in the selection committee and those 
advising it (Chapter 5.3). The differentiated set of power relations existing within the 
university had been usurped by directive and placed, with the authority of the Senior 
Executive, in the Steering Committee. 
 
This social construction of power was about something different. The issue that was 
debated was not the same. However, the discourse was similar. The management’s 
objective to centralise and control practice and ensure standards were in place, 
challenged the pre-existing advocacy of academic freedom (Chapter 6.9). Power 
relations had changed because of an earlier set of dramas over a new learning 
management system. Power was now re- invested in the authority given to a new 
committee, composed of academics and support staff from Learning Services. 
Responsibility had changed. A group of staff were now responsible for a decision 
which would impact on all academics. Power was thus vested in a centralised group. 
That group had the responsibility to make a recommendation, based on the views of 
the university community. This expectancy to include all members of the community 
was a direct challenge to the differentiated practice in teaching and learning decision 
making of the existing university. Power relations through this process were drawn 
inwards, rather than outwards previously. 
 
One other discourse influenced each of these sets of social dramas and framed the 
underlying discourse of managerialism. The discourse of standardisation, of having a 
singular set of universities, driven by managerialism, meant that the universities were 
required to comply with Federal Government policy. The discourse of accountability 
and responsible expenditure of public funds was the foundation of policy which 
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required standards of practice across universities, which subjugated them to 
compliance through quality audits and annual reporting. To meet these demands, it 
was therefore essential that the university itself complied through driving the same 
discourse through all practices within the university. Thus the notions of 
managerialism, vested in state policy, were translated into policy and compliance 
within the university.  
 
Learning management systems are structured software technologies, which can be 
standardised and subjected to the influence of discourse. Power can then be 
transferred from the differentiated practices of an academic to the structures inherent 
in the learning management system. Power relations thus change. They move from 
the authority of the individual to the authority vested in the structures of the software 
(Winner, 1986; 1992). In this way, the social construction of power relations vested 
in discourse operating at an organisational level can directly affect the 
implementation of systems. In suggesting this, it is possible that such subjection can 
exist in organisations other than educational ones, and theory can emerge, which 
might frame further research in the future. 
 
7.4 Theorising Systems Selection and Implementation 
The findings demonstrate that contrary to the literature on systems selection and 
implementation, the systems selection and implementation process is invariably a 
complex process that is influenced by factors other than a particular implementation 
method or tool such as Soft Systems Methodologies (SSM), Structured Analysis, 
Design and Implementation of Information Systems (STRADIS), Structured Systems 
Analysis and Design Method (SSADM), Rational Unified Process (RUP), James 
Martin’s RAD (JMRAD), or Effective Technical and Human Interaction of 
Computer-Based Systems (ETHICS). The story told in Chapters Four, Five and Six 
support this argument, especially that the systems selection and implementation 
process is essentially political and non-rational (Self, 1981; Mitev, 2001), being 
influenced by sectional interests, power and factions, often associated with specific 
stakeholders (Corbitt, 1997). This section brings together the post-structuralist theory 
of power relations into the information systems discipline, specifically exploring the 
role of power and politics in systems selection and implementation. This section 
concludes with a comparison of this study to that of the seminal work of Markus 
(1983), as introduced in Chapter 2.7.  
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A two-level understanding of systems selection and implementation merged from the 
case study. At one level, the systems selection and implementation process went 
through the process of, planning for the system, developing the requirements of the 
system, evaluating each system against the requirements, and selecting and 
implementing the system. This was a complex and iterative process, affected, even 
directed, by other levels of organisational influence (Figure 6.3). The implementation 
of the system was as much driven by the structures imposed on its use by the 
administration of the university as it was by the structural limitations of the software 
and the operating and infrastructure systems supporting it 
 
The top level of influence was political where direction emerged through statute, 
policy and the demands of compliance, informed both by discourse and changing 
power relations. As argued in Chapter 2.4, the focus of previous research on systems 
implementation has been on the critical success factors involved with implementing a 
system (Ginzberg, 1981; Rockart, 1979; Delone and McLean, 1992; 2003; Somers 
and Nelson, 2001; Wilkin and Castleman, 2002; Shanks et al., 2003; Seddon, 1997) 
and the actual implementation process (Avison and Fitzgerald, 1995, 2003; 
Maddison, et al., 1983; Davis, 1974; Lucas, 1981, Hawryszkiewycz, 2001; Hoffer, et 
al., 1998; Lauden and Lauden, 1998). In this study that process was affirmed 
(Chapter 6.4). However, the nature and form of the system that emerged at the “Full 
Launch” stage of implementation (Figure 6.3) was fundamentally different from 
what was proposed in the requirements process. These differences were the inability 
to personalise the layout and look of the unit area and functionality was limited 
allowing some users to have a wider variety of tools and features available.  
 
What is significant from this analysis is that the systems process can at the one time 
follow structured and semi-structured methodologies and at the same time be 
influenced and in fact changed by the complexities and sectional interest of 
organisational politics and ensuing struggles for power. This occurs to the extent that 
an apparently ‘normal’ systems implementation is at the obvious level a process 
comprising multiple stages and an iterative form but at the same time delivering 
content and internal structures which are reflective of social constructed power 
relations derived from debate over ideology and driven by discourse. The conflicting 
discourse of academic freedom and managerialism created a series of social dramas 
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over many issues which became the strongest influence on the nature and eventual 
use of the system itself. 
  
The case study shows that the systems selection and implementation process 
transforms through the struggles for the exercise of power. This challenges the 
existing view of systems selection and implementation, that transforming processes 
are consistent with iteration. In the political realm of organisational power relations, 
complexity creates chaos. The attempted subjugation of staff is challenged by those 
actors as a means of political emancipation from control. This search for 
emancipation by the academic staff was ultimately to enforce structural change in the 
system itself as management imposed structural parameters on the system which, in 
effect, restricted its use by academic staff. The selection and implementation of the 
new enterprise-wide learning management system spanned two and a half years. This 
time period saw a number of changes and shifts in leadership, resistance and 
challenges within discourse. This transforming nature of power and politics and the 
complexity that results in systems selection and implementation is not identified in 
the systems implementation literature. 
 
This apparent level of influence over the system itself is also couched in lessons 
learned by the organisation through its history of enterprise-wide selecting and 
implementing learning management systems. For example, there was a difference in 
the effectiveness of the implementation between the original enterprise-wide learning 
management system, QuickLearn, and the new learning management system, 
EducateMe International. In the original implementation, there was no policy 
requiring users to adopt QuickLearn as the then Vice-Chancellor, although interested 
in providing standardisation across the university, was not driven by a discourse of 
managerialism. He was driving a discourse of intellectualism, of academic freedom, 
as a means to improve the research output of the university.  Whether users adopted 
QuickLearn or kept using their current system was not enforced, or required. In the 
case of the selection and implementation of EducateMe International, the new Vice-
Chancellor did not believe that standardisation and centralisation would occur 
without policy. Ultimately, EducateMe International had policy requiring all 
academic staff to comply with and have a basic online presence for their units. The 
case study has supported an argument by Parr, et al., (1999), Duchessi, et al., (1989), 
Somers and Nelson (2001), Akkermans and van Helden (2002), Poon and Wagner 
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(2001) Averweg and Erwin (1999), Hartman and Ashrafi (2002), and Teo and Ang 
(1999) that the system would not be used across the university had it not been driven 
from the top. 
 
The story of the selection and implementation process of the enterprise-wide learning 
management system at the University of Australia also challenges the accepted view 
that systems implementation is a linear process, and that in order to “successfully” 
implement a system, certain steps need to be followed. These steps need to be 
completed in a linear manner. In other words, we cannot proceed to the next step 
until the current step has been completed, and that the appropriate outputs have been 
produced (Nickerson, 2001; Avison and Fitzgerald, 1995, 2003; Maddison, et al., 
1983; Davis, 1974; Lucas, 1981, Hawryszkiewycz, 2001; Hoffer, et al., 1998; 
Lauden and Lauden, 1998). Rather, this study supports the argument by Nguyen 
(2000), that the implementation process does not fo llow this linear method because 
of the nature of systems implementation and one of the most important elements of 
systems implementation, the people. 
 
Much of the contestation and debate in the social dramas is reflective at the obvious 
level to the existence of resistance. Ashforth and Mael (1998), McKenna (1994), 
Krovi (1993), and Markus (1983) have argued that change is closely related to 
resistance. What was experienced during the selection and implementation of 
EducateMe International was implemented, was in essence, resistance. However, this 
resistance was only the obvious aspect of the emerging power relations in the 
organisation. This resistance reflected a deeper discourse over challenges to the 
discourse of academic authority and intellectualism. Foucault (1978) suggests that 
power emerges where there is resistance. However, it is not through the front stage 
issues of power that are of interest, it is through the emerging discourse that the role 
of power and politics influence the systems selection and implementation process. 
This case study has highlighted the impact that this can have. However like all case 
studies the extent to which this level of theorising can be universally applied has to 
be questioned.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2.7, Markus (1983) used a case study to explore the 
initiation, design process, design content, installation and use of a financial 
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information system in Golden Triangle Corporation17, a large manufacturing firm. 
Data was collected via interviews with over 30 designers and users of the system and 
was supplemented by documentary evidence about the system and organisation. The 
implementation of the financial information system spanned 15 years (Markus (1983, 
p. 433-434). In this case study, data was collected in 20 interviews, supplemented by 
documentary evidence, project plans and available minutes of meetings. This project 
lasted seven years. 
 
One difference between the two studies occurs in the epistemological and ontological 
approaches taken. Whilst Markus’ (1983) study can be seen as either a positivist or 
interpretive approach (Lee, 1989; Walsham, 1993; Lee, et al., 2000), this study 
adopted a critical approach in order to understand change, not only from the 
perspective adopted by Markus, but also to understand it within social and economic 
circumstances, constrained by various forms of social, cultural and political 
domination. 
 
The conceptualisation for the financial information system, implemented at Golden 
Triangle Corporation, began in 1971 by the corporate accounting department. Task 
forces were created to evaluate the need for the financial information system and 
identify the costs and benefits of the proposed system. In 1972, software was 
purchased from a software vendor. The purchased software mirrored current 
practices within the organisation. However, the task force decided to modify the 
software in order to make use of modern database management techniques. This 
process took two and a half years and centralised the databases at Golden Triangle 
Corporation. Information was not solicited from divisional accountants until 1974, 
when it was time to set up the database, but during this time the divisions were 
invited to attend presentations outlining the benefits of the system. The 
implementation process took a phase-in approach. The largest division volunteered to 
trial the financial information system in 1975. That same year, the accountants 
complained that the system had not been beneficial and technical recommendations 
to change the system were made and implemented. Subsequently, further divisions 
began using the system because, there was a hidden inducement to participate, those 
that held off from using the system had to provide the same information as the new 
system, but they had to do it manually.  
                                                 
17 The pseudonym used by Markus (1983) to provide anonymity to the organisation in her study. 
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The university in this case study decided to build on the use of five different learning 
management systems already in use in the university and adopt a standard system 
across the whole university. Two attempts were made two years apart. 
Implementation of the first system was focused partly in two sections of the 
university only and that adoption was not universal. Use created significant 
dissatisfaction and another attempt to find an acceptable and useable learning 
management system was undertaken. In this case implementation was supported 
formally with policy and with a senior executive responsible. Implementation was in-
parallel with existing systems for a 12 month period before fully adoption of the 
system across the university. Resistance still was evident in the second attempt but 
there was a hegemony of acceptance of the new systems because the requirements to 
adopt was build into formal policy compliance. 
 
The background to each story of the selection and implementation process is similar 
in that a system was selected and implemented through directives from a higher 
authority. Resistance was common in both cases as end-users did not want to adopt 
the new system, as they were familiar and happy using existing practices. The use of 
the financial information system was publicised as being voluntary. However, 
pressure was placed on users that did not adopt the new system, as non-compliance 
meant that users had to do their work manually. In the adoption of the learning 
management system, non-compliance required the explanation to the Academic 
Board and the Vice-Chancellor.  
 
Cognitive differences between resistors and non-resistors at Golden Triangle 
Corporation derived from status and functional locations within the firm’s hierarchy 
and division of labour (Markus, 1983, p. 436). In the case study of the learning 
management system, there were no cognitive differences between resistors and non-
resistors in terms of status and functional location. However, throughout this process 
there were changes amongst resistors and non-resistors relating more to political 
allegiance than status or functional location. In addition, it became clearly apparent 
that the compliance requirements of policy impacted on who were resistors and non-
resistors and the extent to which they were active. 
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Markus (1983) showed that technical issues arose during the implementation process. 
For example, the database management system chosen for this application did not 
work well with the computer's operating system, and there was insufficient main 
storage to meet the applications requirements, meaning frequent downtime and late 
reports. In the case of EducateMe International, there were minor problems with the 
software provided and the technological infrastructure of the university. Software 
upgrades were provided regularly and funding was allocated in order to upgrade the 
technological infrastructure of the university.  
 
Markus identified that the political context of the financial information systems was 
important. Markus (1983, p. 436-437) reported that intra-organisational politics and 
power dynamics developed between corporate and division accountants. In 
conjunction with the politics and power dynamics, organisational restructuring 
occurred during the implementation process. Corporate accountants felt the divisions 
were lying to them. This impacted on the success of the implementation. In this study 
of the learning management system, the political context was also important. By 
using a critical methodology, a more in-depth understanding of the process was 
enabled. The political context, in this case leadership, specifically determined the 
actual functionality of the learning management system and influenced the adoption 
of the system, through compliance. In contrast to Markus (1983), this study analysed 
discourse that affected implementation. This showed that although there was the 
obvious resistance of the learning management system, it was not due to the 
cognitive or attitude differences of members in the organisation. Rather, resistance 
was driven by contestation over ideology. Differences existed about why change and 
a new system was needed and about the extent and validity of its imposition in 
relation to compliance. This discourse analysis suggests that power directly impacts 
on implementation through disciplinary action through the acquisition and holding of 
knowledge and subsequently through subjugation of the resistors. This discourse 
analysis also highlighted that even at the organisation level, systems are subject to 
the political influence of the State through discourse. 
 
In terms of practice, Markus (1983, p. 437-438) made three suggestions. Markus 
argued that for successful implementation, there was a need to change the people 
inside the organisation. Markus (1983, p. 437) argued that if some acceptors were 
moved into positions occupied by resistors, resistance amongst the divisional 
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accounts would diminish or vanish. In this study of the learning management 
system, the resistors were directly brought into the selection and implementation 
process. They played an active and significant role throughout the process. In the 
end, after twelve months of full implementation, all demands of the policy are in 
place. All units in the university are taught in the learning management system and 
there have been two rounds of compliance reporting. Despite this, there is still 
resistance. The political context has been subtly defused but not rendered inactive. 
Resistance is still driven by pre-existing discourse. In this case, the resistance 
diminished but not because they were replaced, but rather because their influence 
became an integral part of the implementation process. Rather than being 
marginalised, a process of inclusiveness of the resistors ensured that their political 
influence was diminished (Cf. Danziger, 1971; 1976). There was perceived to be no 
need in this learning management system case study to change the people inside the 
organisation. 
 
The second suggestion made by Markus (1983, p. 437-438) was the requirement to 
fix technical problems in the information system. Resistors were included in the 
technical evaluation task force, making recommendations to fix any technical issues. 
These technical solutions were implemented, which improved the efficiency of the 
system. However, resistance to the financial information system did not disappear. 
In the study of the learning management system, there was a perceived need to fix 
technical issues. Weekly meetings reviewed performance and users were involved. 
Technical performance of the learning management system improved dramatically, 
but similarly to the Markus case study, resistance did not completely disappear.  
 
The third suggestion made by Markus (1983, p. 438) was in relation to organisational 
politics. In the financial information system case study, lower hierarchical divisions 
noticed that information flow was focused in the corporate accountant division and 
as a result, they had more power. The financial information system project team 
specifically excluded any representative who might voice objections to its design 
details. The divisional accountants felt that they had lost control and were unhappy. 
Nothing had changed as a result. Markus therefore suggested that by even replacing a 
few key actors, resistance would not be eliminated. In the case study of the learning 
management system, resistors were explicitly included in the selection and 
implementation process to voice their opinion. The organisational politics of 
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resistance, in itself, was ineffective, due to their inclusion. However, what is different 
in this study is that it shows that when the politics of Senior Executives in the 
organisation and the power vested in them are used as subtle weapons to enforce 
compliance then no level of organisational politics can sustain any effective action. 
The requirements of compliance forced even the most intransigent resistor to comply 
as the apparent holder of the power over the learning management system policy was 
the Academic Board, which comprised only of members of academic staff.  
 
In addition, this study has shown that resistance itself is not related necessarily to the 
organisational politics imbedded in a particular issue. The organisational politics at a 
much more organisation-wide level, for example, industrial relations, can be 
influential. In this case study, it was rather the power vested in policy compliance to 
the Academic Board rather than organisational politics, which determined the 
effectiveness of the system implementation.  
 
Through the use of interaction theory, Markus (1983, p. 438-440) found that the 
difficulty of using the financial information system was only a secondary complaint. 
It was the proposed changes to the way managerial accounting would be done that 
was the real issue, one that no amount of technical fixing would solve. Furthermore, 
this issue was one of potential loss of power for divisional managerial accountants. 
In this case, Markus has focused on the obvious expression of power and control. If a 
critical approach had been used, then a deeper understanding of what the discourse 
was that was driving this perceived loss of power, associated with the managerial 
accounting, would have emerged. 
 
In this case study of the learning management system, the obvious contests were 
concerned with perceived limitations imposed on pedagogy and the appropriateness 
of the technology chosen to sustain the mission of the organisation. By understanding 
discourse, the real reasons for contest and debate about the selection and 
implementation of the new learning management system became evident. On the one 
hand, there was debate driven by the contest between the ideology of intellectual 
freedom and a counter-ideology of managerialism. On the other hand, there was the 
clash between an ideology which protects the intellectual freedom of individua ls in 
universities and the imposition of an ideology of standardisation by the state. As Ball 
(1990) had shown with the United Kingdom in the 1980’s, where there is a contest 
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concerning ideology at the organisational level and ideology at the state level, 
contestation is a natural consequence and in fact, the ultimate result, if the power of 
the state is sustained, is the recontextualisation of practice at the organisational level. 
After twelve months of implementation of the learning management system, it is not 
yet possible to ascertain if that recontextualisation has occurred. However, what is 
clear is that after twelve months, resistance is still vocal to the extent that the policy 
driving the structure of the learning management system was challenged fo r the third 
time in the Academic Board in November 2004. Again, there was no change. 
However, the challenging discourse persists. 
 
The Markus (1983) paper is a structured, perhaps limited view of systems 
implementation. The epistemology inherent in positivism seeks out only the obvious. 
Using a critical methodology seeks out the hidden and unspoken and the discourse, 
which identifies who can say what to who and how. Discourse exposes threats to the 
political emancipation of individuals in organisations. Understanding discourse 
enables the researcher to discover the richness of the complexities involved with the 
system selection and implementation process. This study uncovered an 
understanding of systems implementation, which suggests that the obvious processes 
evident in the taxonomy of stages is, on the one hand, determined by the 
requirements of the information technology artefact, but on the other hand, is 
bounded by the control and power vested in organisational management, informed by 
discourse, historically created either externally to or internally in the organisation. 
 
The implementation of the learning management system shows that power is more 
diffuse and non-systematic than Markus had argued. It can be argued that the 
systems implementation process is people- influenced rather than people-determined 
as Markus (1983) claimed. Determinism suggests that power exists as some 
quantifiable whole and is ingrained and objective. Power in reality is subjective. It is, 
and is becoming, rather than exists unmoved or unchanged. Power changes and is 
changed. It forms and reforms as the context in which it is created or displayed and is 
recontextualised by the actors operating within it. This is determined by the sequence 
of discourse. As discourse emerges socially, power is enacted by subterfuge, 
containment, disruption, challenge and radical action. This study has shown, that 
power is enforced through challenge rather than hierarchy or organisational structure, 
as Markus (1983) suggested. 
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This research improves our epistemological understanding of the role of power in 
systems implementation and engages the reader and researcher in appreciating the 
richness and complexity of the role of power and power relationships. The Markus 
(1983) research was a landmark in IS publishing and remains so. This research has 
highlighted the de-contextualisation of current systems design and implementation 
methodologies and tools, noting that power fundamentally impacts on systems 
implementation and drives organisational attitudes towards systems acceptance. 
 
7.6 Implications for practice 
The outcomes of this study have identified some implications for practice, where the 
current research can provide a better understanding of the human issues involved, 
specifically the power and politics in system selection and implementation. It should 
be noted however, that the outcomes of this study are not to provide a solution to the 
power and politics involved in systems implementation, but to recognise their 
important role in selecting and implementing a system.  
 
It can be argued that the enactment of policy influences the probability of successful 
implementation, but this research adds to this understanding. Previous research has 
focused on the influence of the CEO or project champion as a leader (Thong, et al., 
1996; Thong and Yap, 1996; Thong, 1999). This research has shown that that same 
person can also have a direct affect in determining not only action, but also content 
of the system through the exercise of power and the games of politics. In this case, 
leadership has been enhanced by management and by manipulation that is natural in 
organisations.  
 
This follows that there is an apparent de-contextualisation of systems implementation 
models created by the strict use of process models and critical success factors as 
identified in this study. As identified in Chapter 2.3, there is little reliance on one 
particular system implementation process model (Fitzgerald, et al., 1999). 
Practitioners need not feel restricted by the formality of process models. Rather, they 
should embrace and modify various applicable process models to the current system 
implementation. Different system implementations will require different process 
models for the implementation. There is no such thing as a ‘one process model fits 
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all’ as different system implementation projects have different contexts and 
ultimately require different implementation models, including a combination of 
appropriate models. Practitioners need to be made aware of the inherent division 
between the various systems implementation models and the issue of leadership 
addressed above.  
 
As identified by authors such as Kling (1980), Markus (1983), Krovi (1993), 
Ashforth and Mael (1998) and Buchanen and Badham (1999), resistance to the 
adoption of a new system is the key contributor to struggles for the exercise of power 
and potentially a reason for system failure. The enactment of policy forces users to 
adopt the new system, eliminating their choice from using another system, or 
resisting the system altogether. In other words, this research informs members of 
systems implementation projects that to ensure the system is utilised in an 
organisation, then policy needs to be enacted, requiring all users to adopt that 
particular system.  
 
Another lesson learned from the case exemplar is to involve as many people as 
possible, including the variety of end users, in the selection and implementation 
process. This lesson could be incorporated into the requirements gathering process, 
as all members of the organisation should be given the opportunity to have their 
input into what they required in the new system. As members are given the chance to 
provide their requirements, they feel that they are being listened to and feel that they 
contributed to the selection process. As a result, the overall buy- in of the new system 
will increase because they felt that they had input into this systems implementation 
process. Furthermore, by involving as many resistors of the new system as possible, 
there is an opportunity to turn their negativity and resistance into a positive aspect of 
the implementation process. By having the most vocal opponents of a new system, 
they are able to argue and convey their negativities during the selection and 
implementation process, ensuring that the best system is selected that even the 
resistors would support. These resistors could then turn into the strong supporters of 
the new system.  
 
7.7 Limitations of the study 
As in all studies, this study has limitations, which alter the outcomes. The case study 
methodology used in this research has been questioned in regards to the 
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generalisability of the results (Yin, 1994; Borg and Gall, 1989; Denscombe, 1998). 
Only one organisation was investigated, which makes the result context-specific. 
What might have occurred in this organisation may not apply in another. However, 
as has been argued in this thesis, system selection and implementation studies have 
usually dismissed or ignored the role of power, politics and discourse in the 
implementation process. This case study highlights the impact power, politics and 
discourse might have and suggests that they are potentially relevant in other 
organisations. Furthermore, the objective of qualitative research, and indeed case 
studies (Chapter 3.4), is not to generalise to populations, but to generate theory, 
which can be tested, by positivist researchers in future studies, or provide 
confirmatory evidence of existing theory (Creswell, 1994; Yin, 1994; Lincoln and 
Guba, 1985; Stake, 2000).  
 
As a result of not being able to use ethnography as a participant-observer, much of 
the data has possibly missed some of the richness that could have been gained. To 
combat issues of validity, other activities were undertaken to increases the validity 
and reliability of the study (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). This included a prolonged 
engagement of two years in the organisation to learn the ‘culture’, test for 
misinformation introduced by distortions, either by the researcher of the members 
and to build trust. Additionally, two member checks were performed (Chapter 3.7). 
This was done to at least address, to some extent, the limitations of the politics of 
truth (Kvale, 1996). 
 
A further limitation of this study was in not being able to interview everyone related 
to the selection and implementation of both QuickLearn and EducateMe 
International. Reasons for this were out of the control of the researcher as the 
selection and implementation process of the original system started in 1998. The 
process is now six years further on since that and some members of the University of 
Australia had either retired or resigned, taking positions elsewhere. However, to 
ensure the richness and validity of the story, seventeen members of the selection and 
implementation team were interviewed, which enabled a consistent story to be told.  
 
One final limitation of this study is the bias that not only the researcher brings into 
the story, but also the bias of each member interviewed. Kvale (1996, p. 286) argued 
that interpersonal interaction in the interview may have a decisive impact on the 
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results. The researcher acknowledges that bias did occur in members recounting the 
story of the selection and implementation process of EducateMe International. The 
researcher also acknowledges that some of those members interviewed recounted 
their versions of the story with selectivity. It is common in organisational interviews 
to expect that some details of stories are either deliberately or accidentally deleted in 
the telling. However, Chapter 3.7 highlighted issues of validity, reliability and 
credibility, to try and minimise the potential bias. Furthermore, the recollection of the 
selection and implementation process as told in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, is the 
researcher’s narrative of the events that occurred in this process. It is the researcher’s 
interpretation of the story as told by the members interviewed.  
 
Although particular limitations were identified, I have argued here that these have 
not affected the accurate portrayal of the power and politics involved with systems 
implementation. 
 
7.8 Future Research 
In terms of future research, the obvious aspect of taking this research further is to 
take my research and observe the power and politics involved with different systems 
implementation projects in other Universities and in industry. This will enable the 
researcher to further explore the theory more with reference to other case studies. It 
is expected that similar results to those developed in the current research, that the 
selection and implementation process is a complex process influenced by social 
agents, that that it is the role of power and politics, through discourse and the 
enactment of policy that drives the selection and implementation process.  
 
This study could also be used to generate a set of hypothesis, which can then be 
tested quantitatively via surveys sent out to a large number of organisations. By 
utilising a quantitative approach, a greater number of organisations can be 
approached. Having a large number of organisations involved in the study would 
then increase the generalisability of the results. 
 
This study explored the role of power and politics in system selection and 
implementation. The current study could be extended to investigate the role of power 
and politics in other phases of systems implementation. These phases include the 
requirements engineering phase, system design, negotiations with stakeholders, and 
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post-implementation. Research into these phases of systems implementation enables 
the identification of discourses emerging in that phase. Research into the other 
phases of systems implementation also provides greater detail, bringing a deeper, 
rich understanding of the social issues of power and politics in each phase.  
 
The final potential area for future research is to explore the role of discourse in 
systems selection and implementation. Little research has explored discourse in 
information systems and therefore, there is little understanding of the role and impact 
of discourse in information systems research. However, we know from management  
systems that discourse plays a role in the way organisations operate. It is believed 
that we need to understand this in information systems. This study has highlighted 
that discourse does clearly inform process. We need to know more to enrich our 
understanding.  
 
7.9 Conclusion 
The central concern of this study has been to identify the role of power and politics 
in systems implementation. A non-structuralist view of power as both an obvious and 
hidden concept has provided the researcher a lens through which I can observe the 
selection and implementation of an enterprise-wide learning management system. 
The framework aimed to identify the obvious process of system selection 
implementation, and then deconstruct that process to expose the hegemonic nature of 
policy, the reproduction of organisational culture, the emancipation within discourse, 
and the nature of resistance and power relations. A post-structuralist, critical case 
study of the selection and implementation of an enterprise-wide learning 
management system at the University of Australia was presented and analysed using 
social dramas to distinguish between the front stage issues of power and the hidden 
discourses underpinning the front stage dramas.  
 
The key findings from this study have indicated that the system selection and 
implementation works at two levels. The low level is the selection and 
implementation process, which operates for the period of the project. The high level 
is the arena of power and politics, which runs simultaneously to the selection and 
implementation process. Challenges for power are acted out in the front stage, or 
public forums between various actors. The social dramas, as they have been 
described here, are superfluous to the discourse underpinning the front stage. It is the 
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discourse that remains the same throughout the system selection and implementation 
process, but it is through various social dramas that reflect those discourses. 
Furthermore, the enactment of policy legitimises power and establishes the 
discourse, limiting resistance. Additionally, this research has identified the role of the 
“State” and its influence at the organisational level, which had been previously 
suggested in education literature (Ball, 1990). 
 
Politics in the systems implementation process involves changing power relations. 
These power relations are created through the use of discourse. Discourse represents 
meaning and social relationships, forming both subjectivity and power relations. 
Discourses are also the practices of talk, text and argument that continuously form 
that which actors speak. The challenge to discourse typically emerges as resistance to 
the new system. Members of an organisation oppose change and will attempt to resist 
the new system by a series of social dramas. It is the recognition of the human factors 
and more importantly the rich view of power and politics in system selection 
implementation, which is needed to improve the systems implementation process. 
 
The current literature on systems implementation methodologies and tools are 
structuralist and miss the important rich human factors involved and driving the 
implementation process. This structuralist approach de-contextualises system 
selection and implementation failing to recognise that each organisation, each 
implementation is set in a different context. What may occur in one implementation 
may be altered in other implementation. The current study acknowledges that the 
systems implementation methodologies and tools will change for each 
implementation, but the driving force is through the power and politics. It is through 
these challenges to power relations via resistance that power relations, and the 
implementation process get recontextualised. By acknowledging the post-
structuralist view of system selection and implementation, we can now provide a 
deeper understanding of the system selection and implementation process.  
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Appendix A – Interview Schedule 
 
 
Can you please tell me how the University of Australia came about implementing 
EducateMe International?  
 
 
 
 
From your point of view, who were the key players?  
 
 
 
 
In your opinion, what do you think motivated the key players to operate in the way 
they did?  
 
 
 
 
In your opinion, what obstacles do you think these key players faced in their attempt 
for achievement in implementing EducateMe International?  
 
 
 
 
What type of role did you play in the systems implementation? 
 
 
 
 
Were there any obstacles in your way, in your position during the implementation of 
EducateMe International?  
 
 
 
 
What were some of the political plays that occurred in the implementation of 
EducateMe International? Who was involved? What happened? How was it 
resolved? 
 
 
 
 
On reflection, how could it have been done better/differently? 
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